Accountability and Performance of Government Agencies in the Delivery of Water, Education and Road Services in Nigeria

By:

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Acronyms

CGG	Commission on Global Governance
CGS	Conditional Grants Scheme
CSOs	Civil Society Organizations
CTB	Centralized Traditional Bureaucracy
DFFRI	Directorate of Food, Roads and rural Infrastructure
FERMA	Federal Road Maintenance Agency
FGDs	Focus Group Discussions
FMARD	Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development
FMW	Federal Ministry of Works
FRN	Federal Republic of Nigeria
GDN	Global Development Network
GEP	Girl-Child Education Project
IGPs	Intergovernmental Partnerships
LEAs	Local Education Authorities
LGAs	Local Government Areas
MDAs	Ministries, Departments and Agencies
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organizations
NISER	Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Research
NUC	National Universities Commission
NWRI	National water Resources Institute
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
PTA	Parent-Teachers Association
RAMP	Rural Access and Mobility Project
RBDAs	River Basin Development Authorities
RUWASSA	Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Agencies
SBMCs	School Based management Committees
STU	Small Town Unit
SUBEB	State Universal Basic Education Board
SWAs	State Water Agencies
UBEC	Universal basic Education Commission
UK	United Kingdom
WASHCOM	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene Committee
WCA	Water Consumers Association

Executive Summary

Public service delivery in Nigeria is bedevilled with governance crisis especially in the education, water and road sectors in spite of alternative channels being developed to deliver services for the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Have the alternative channels being employed proved to be effective and better channels of service delivery? Have the service delivery systems been accountable and participatory? What factors account for the emerging performance? What are the effects of the governance mechanisms on outcome in the various sectors? In unravelling these issues it was hypothesized that accountability and participation in service delivery have significant effects on output, that these governance *indicators* are significantly influenced by the socio-economic characteristics of the beneficiaries and channels of service delivery and that performance of service delivery is significantly affected by geographical location and regional characteristics. The study made use of secondary data obtained from relevant agencies in Abuja and the 12 states covered as well as primary data obtained from an extensive survey of facilities and beneficiaries. In what follows we present the summary of the results of the qualitative and quantitative analysis of the data.

Governance and Service Delivery Performance in the Water Sector

Intergovernmental partnerships (IGPs) and centralized traditional bureaucracy (CTB) are the channels through which water services are delivered as part of the efforts to achieve the MDGs in Nigeria. The IGP has a better performance in terms of participation and accountability. The channel has a framework for involving beneficiaries in needs assessment, choice of locations of water projects and in the operation and management of water facilities. With respect to accountability, though the performance of the two channels is not impressive, the IGP channel nevertheless has an edge over that of the CTB. Higher proportion of IGP beneficiaries claimed access to any type of information on water facilities in their communities, compared to the CTB beneficiaries.

With respect to the performance of water facilities such as water availability all year round, accessibility to beneficiaries' residences, affordability of water and water adequacy, majority of the beneficiaries of the two channels expressed satisfaction but generally the IGP channel has a slight edge over that of CTB.

Determinants and Effects of Governance on Water Service Delivery

We examined the extent to which household and community characteristics influence the governance of water services in the country focusing on indicators such as participation and accountability. We found that participation depends on household and community characteristics such as educational attainment, income, geographical domain as well as

channel of service delivery and geo-political zones. We accept the hypothesis that participation is significantly influenced by the socio-economic characteristics (income and educational attainment) of the beneficiaries and channels of service delivery. With rising income and educational attainment the probability in water service delivery may reduce. The probability of participation is significantly higher in the rural than urban areas. And it is also higher in the case of IGP than CTB. We also accept the hypothesis that socio-economic characteristics (household size, income and educational attainment) of the beneficiaries are significant determinants of accountability. Accountability is unlikely to change significantly irrespective of the channel adopted in providing water for the communities. The results show that where poverty is endemic, citizens may not be capable of holding service providers and government officials accountable. A critical level of empowerment (in terms of income) is required before citizens can exercise their rights even when they have a clear understanding of such rights.

As regards the effect of governance attention is focussed on water availability. We reject the hypothesis that participation in water service delivery has significant effect on output whereas in the case of accountability the hypothesis is accepted. We found that with rising awareness and increased accountability there is the tendency that the projects implemented will guarantee water availability all the year round; with a higher probability in the urban than rural areas. Overall, for these two governance indicators, the probability of all-season availability of water is apt to increase by 11.8 and 11.7 percent respectively.

Governance and Service Delivery in the Education Sector

The channel for education service delivery for the achievement of the MDGs is through intergovernmental partnerships exemplified by the creation of the Universal Basic Education Commission (UBEC) and its partnership with State Universal Basic Education Board (SUBEB) in all the 36 states of the federation. A major institutional change is the introduction of School Based Management Committees to foster community participation in the management of primary schools across the country. Nonetheless, the analysis of the governance practices show there is considerable room for improvement. Less than half of the respondents claim that they participate in the execution of education projects implemented by SUBEB. The reason for non-participation in education projects is lack of participation opportunity or lack of awareness of such projects.

The education projects implemented by SUBEB have certainly improved access to education services as claimed by most respondent beneficiaries. They also consider the quality of the entire education project environment as good. However, teachers and classrooms remain grossly inadequate. By and large it can be concluded that the

governance of service delivery has been relatively effective resulting in positive changes in availability, access, affordability and quality.

Determinants and Effects of Governance on Education Service Delivery

The extent to which household and community characteristics influence the governance of education services at the primary school level was analysed focusing on such indicators as participation and accountability. The results show that participation depends on income, educational attainment and geo-political zones and that the probability that beneficiaries will participate does not differ between rural and urban areas. As regards education and income, the analysis reveals that the higher the income and educational attainment of the community members, the lower the probability of participating in the delivery of education services. This is a reflection of poor governance in the education sector and it is an indication that despite the activities of UBEC and SUBEB the crisis of governance in terms of lopsided participation of the citizens in the implementation of service delivery projects remains unresolved.

With regard to accountability, the results indicate that the opportunity to make complaints against violation of preferences in decisions regarding the allocation of resources, choice of location of education facilities and management of resources and secure appropriate response depend mainly on the age and income of the beneficiaries and the household size. The result indicates that older citizens are not likely to enforce accountability compared to younger members of the community. Moreover, we found that there is no significant difference in accountability between rural and urban areas as far as education service delivery is concerned. Thus, we reject the hypothesis that participation and accountability are significantly affected by geographical location. On the other hand, we accept the hypothesis that participation and accountability are significantly affected by socio-economic characteristics.

With regard to the hypothesis that governance has significant effects on education service delivery, the results depend on the type of output and governance indicators. We focus on such outcomes as students' performance and adequacy of classrooms. We reject the hypothesis in the case of participation and accept it with regard to accountability. The key finding here is that students' performance has not been significantly affected by participation of community members in the management of the schools. The main determinants are the number of teachers and geo-political zones. In the case of classroom adequacy, the results show that there is no significant difference between rural and urban areas and is not affected by participation of community members in the management of the schools. Classroom adequacy is significantly influenced by awareness of rights and responsibilities by stakeholders, accountability and regional characteristics.

Governance Practices in Road Service Delivery

The identified channel for the provision of rural roads in the country is the centralized traditional bureaucracy in which an agency of the Federal Government (Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development - FMARD) is charged with the control of the services rendered. There are two variants of this approach namely; (i) rural roads implemented by the FMARD with funds provided by the MDGs Office, (ii) rural roads implemented by FMARD using Constituency Funds appropriated by Members of the National Assembly (Constituency Project). The mechanisms for service delivery under this bureaucratic approach failed to recognize the need for participation of community members in project design, implementation and road maintenance. Results suggest that needs assessment, project location, costing and implementation have followed improper procedures. With regard to the constituency roads, the politicians determined the location of the road projects based on political considerations with minimal participation of beneficiary community members.

Another governance indicator considered is accountability which is grossly undermined in the two variants of centralized traditional bureaucracy approach adopted in the delivery of road services. State Coordinators of Federal Department of Rural Department explained that their roles became ineffective due to lack of funds and logistics. Moreover, the stage by stage supervision and monitoring reports sent to their Head Office in Abuja received no feedbacks, which rendered them powerless with regard to enforcement of rules and sanctions that would have ensured good performance by contractors. These shortcomings were the same for MDGs and the Constituency funded road projects.

Service Delivery Performance in the Road Sector

We found that the supervisory roles played by the State Coordinators were of little or no effect in ensuring that the road projects were timely completed and to specifications. As a result, performance by the contractors with regard to both the Constituency and MDG funded roads were generally poor. Besides, physical inspection of the completed and uncompleted MDG and Constituency funded roads indicated they were in very poor conditions, a problem compounded by the use of laterite for surfacing the roads. Indeed, the fact that rural feeder roads were by design surfaced with laterite, will make them not to be cost effective, as the surface materials are easily washed away by a single heavy rain. As a result, the roads are not effectively utilised during rainy season on account of their poor quality. In terms of accessibility, however, we found that rural road rehabilitation actually opened up rural communities and that affordability of cost of rural transportation was enhanced at the initial stages of road rehabilitation.

By and large, despite the acclaimed crucial roles played by road transport in enhancing the attainment of the MDGs, service delivery in the sector has been highly defective principally due to weak institutional structures, lack of coordination of efforts by the three-tiers of government and relevant institutions, poor stewardship by public officials arising from conflict of interest, as well as weak community participation.

Policy Implications and Conclusions

Effective delivery of services in the education, water and road sectors is critical for the attainment of MDGs in Nigeria. Earmarking part of government revenue for this purpose is a step in the right direction. Desirable results will be achieved however, only if there is an overhaul of the governance mechanisms and delivery channels. An important policy lesson emerging from this study is that service beneficiaries should always be aware of their rights and responsibilities with regard to the provision of services in their communities.

Moreover, the emergence of inter-governmental partnership in water service delivery has demonstrated that a decentralized governance system provides better results. It is instructive therefore, to ensure that alternative channels for delivery of public services have a framework for involving beneficiaries in needs assessment, choice of locations of projects and in the operation and management of facilities. There is also the need for proper inter-governmental coordination and economic empowerment of the beneficiaries to enable them discharge their responsibilities creditably. Such a framework enhances accountability and guarantees effective service delivery. It will also lead to an improvement in service delivery performance in terms of increased availability, accessibility, quality and adequacy.

Finally, it is apt to point out that accountability and participation are necessary conditions for improved delivery of public services and for good governance. However, they need to be fostered in addition to other key elements of good governance including effective budget process and timely release of funds in order to have any significant improvement in public service delivery in the country.

1. Introduction

This study examines different public service delivery channels which are associated with the achievement of MDGs in three key sectors namely, education, water and transport (roads) in Nigeria. Public services are being delivered through centralized traditional bureaucracy (CTB) in which Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) are reformed to control the provision of public services in these sectors. There are also other delivery approaches such as creation of agencies (agencification) for better delivery of services and inter-governmental partnerships (IGPs) for the provision of public services in which the Federal Government is partnering with State Governments through the instrumentality of a conditional grant scheme (CGS). There are growing concerns as to whether or not the country is making the required progress to achieve the targets of the MDGs in spite of these initiatives which emerged since early 2000s. This is the challenge of this study. The study is of interest because improving service delivery to the poor is both a widespread political demand and key to the achievement of the MDGs; and improving governance is integral to achieving these goals. The study is further motivated by the need to strengthen transparency, participation and accountability mechanisms in public service delivery to assist the marginalized poor and to fully realize the desired development outcomes.

Public service delivery is critical to the attainment of the MDGs. A major challenge in this regard is the improvement in the performance of the MDAs involved in the delivery of required services and improved governance of the associated institutions. The MDAs are used as institutions to turn resources into welfare outcomes and as vital links in the service delivery chain. Inter-governmental collaboration in the delivery of public services was initiated in 2007 to enhance the achievement of MDGs through the conditional grant scheme. Has this proved to be a better channel of service delivery? Have the service delivery systems (CTB and IGPs) been accountable? Which of the service delivery approaches has been more effective and participatory? What factors account for the emerging performance? The study places emphasis on the governance structures and institutional changes that help policymakers, citizens, service providers, development partners and other stakeholders to enhance the quality of public services and ultimately improve their development outcomes.

Theoretically, incentives aimed at influencing the choice of effort exerted in a service delivery system and the type of individuals attracted to specific tasks at different levels of the service delivery hierarchy, are positively and significantly related to service delivery outcomes especially in the education sector. Conditional on providers exerting effort and being motivated, therefore, increasing resources can have beneficial effects. Thus, it is necessary to strengthen the governance structures with proper decentralization and delegation of power to ensure that those who have remit for public service delivery perform

with utmost transparency and accountability right from the highest authority to the service delivery unit. Adequate financing, infrastructure, human resources, material and equipment have to be available for service delivery at the frontline, as well as proper institutions and governance structure to provide adequate incentives to the service providers. The availability of these essential elements and institutions are a function of the efficiency of the entire service delivery system. Government at the upstream level sets overall policies, allocates resources and designs rules and service providers' incentive systems; service providers' behaviour downstream is conditioned by these sets of constraints and incentives as well as rules determined locally; while citizens' decisions are influenced by the choices offered and the services' characteristics. Accommodating these diverse interests within a transparent process where each party can be held accountable for actions taken with high compliance with rules and regulations in order to match service outcomes with the right delivery options constitute good governance.

A key element in the design of the service delivery channels for the attainment of the MDGs is decentralization of regulatory and administrative control from the Federal to lower levels of government. A host of factors is likely to influence the performance of decentralized public service delivery. These include fiscal aspects of decentralization, transparency of government actions, citizen participation in public service delivery and other factors. The level of awareness of citizens is critical in improving service delivery on account of decentralization. Theoretically, the argument that decentralization improves resource allocation, accountability and cost recovery relies heavily on the assumption that sub-national governments have better information than the central government about the needs and preferences of the local population, and that the population is more aware of actions of sub-national governments than of the central government. However, whether sub-national governments have information about the preferences of citizens depends critically on the existence of mechanisms for the local population to participate in the delivery of public services and have their voice heard in decision making. According to Azfar et al (1999), citizen participation in service delivery facilitates information flows between the government and local population and thereby reduces asymmetric information. It provides means for demand revelation and helps the government to match the allocation of resources to user preferences. Moreover, it can promote government accountability by increasing citizens' awareness of actions of and control over sub-national governments.

As we examine the governance issues and performance of service delivery in the education, road and water sectors, the various service delivery channels are characterized along the aforementioned paradigmatic delineations for which there has been global convergence over the years. For each sector, what public management or "governance" practices are associated with public service delivery in Nigeria? (ii) What conditions affect

service delivery performance? (iii) What are the effects of the "governance" practices on service outcomes? The study proceeds in this manner with a view to determining which channel delivers expected outcomes in a transparent and accountable manner in the interest of the stakeholders. Furthermore, the issues of awareness, citizens' participation are analysed (qualitatively and quantitatively) and their effects on service delivery outcomes determined. This enables us to ascertain the critical changes required in terms of governance reforms and institutional re-engineering for effective delivery of public services in the country.

1.1 The Problem Setting

As allocation of public spending is buoyed by the debt relief gains of 2005, there may not be commensurate progress on the MDGs unless there is considerable improvement in the governance of the delivery of associated public services. There is growing concern in the country as to whether the goals will be achieved based on the myriad of problems associated with the delivery of key services in critical sectors including education, water and transport. Access to such services especially by the masses of the people is highly restricted due to inadequate supply, high cost and dysfunctional governance structures.

With regard to education, services are delivered within a dysfunctional governance and weak management environment especially at the primary school level where all the three tiers of government in the country play considerable role. The education sector has enormous needs for effective coordination arrangements. Evidence suggests that nine out of 12 key management functions in the sector are concurrent, i.e. expected to be delivered by more than one government level. Thus, the sector has enormous needs for effective coordination arrangements. Another weakness of the current arrangements in education relates to lack of clarity in the accountability framework. It is unclear which government level is responsible for achieving key educational outcomes. There are also major concerns about interactions between the Universal Basic Education Commission (UBEC), a federal structure created to support primary education nationwide and state ministries of education. There has been a common claim that instead of supporting state efforts to upgrade primary education, UBEC has been trying to run the primary school network without showing much interest in building state capacity to manage its primary education. This undermines longer-term sustainability of the recent reform efforts (Freinkman, 2007).

In the water sector, the need for improvement of service delivery cannot be overemphasized. About 58.9 percent of the Nigerian population had access to improved water source as at 2009 down from 66.25 percent in 2003. Although the proportion of the population using improved sanitation facility has been rising, it stood at 51.6 percent as at 2009 (FRN, MDGs Report 2010). Most consumers who receive piped water are supplied by

state water corporations, all of which are currently owned by the governments of the states within which they operate. All three government levels (Federal, State and Local) have been engaged in uncoordinated activity to provide water and this frequently resulted in duplication of efforts. At the same time, there has not been much interest in the development of local water systems. In the transport sector, the involvement of multiple agencies in the enforcement of road transport regulations result in high transactions costs. Besides, inadequate road and poor initial construction and design have tended to shorten the useful life of the roads and increase the operating cost of vehicles.

Public service delivery in Nigeria is in crisis and infrastructure across the country is in huge deficit. Indeed, the crisis in the education, road and water sector is a crisis of governance. The mechanism for service delivery is deficient in accountability, transparency and effective resource management which are critical elements of governance of service delivery. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) defines governance as the use of political authority and exercise of control in a society in relation to the management of its resources for social and economic development. This broad definition encompasses the role of public authorities in establishing the environment in which economic operators function and in determining the distribution of benefits as well as the relationship between the ruler and the ruled. According to the Commission on Global Governance (CGG), governance has to do with the institutional environment in which citizens interact among themselves and with government agencies and officials. In Nigeria, adoption of alternative service delivery mechanisms as exemplified by innovative approaches associated with the MDGs is a major governance reform which is aimed at improving access to quality education and improved safe drinking water in Nigeria. Nonetheless, access to drinking water and improved educational facilities is still far from being adequate in various geo-political zones of the country particularly in rural areas. The approaches essentially involve agencification and inter-governmental partnerships especially in the water and education sectors. What are the incentives and institutional arrangements associated with such service governance that define the interaction between providers and beneficiaries? What are the governance practices and how do they affect the desired outcomes? These are the issues unravelled in this study.

1.2 Objectives

The broad goal of this study is to examine the governance and performance of public service delivery for the achievement of MDGs in Nigeria. The specific objectives are threefold:

(i) Examine the nature of government channels for the delivery of education, road and water services;

(ii) Determine the effects of governance (accountability and participation) on services

delivered in the education and water sectors and examine the variations in the output across the geo-political and geographical zones; and

(iii) Ascertain the factors affecting governance (accountability and participation) in the delivery of education, road and water services in Nigeria and compare the performance of the alternative service delivery channels.

1.3 Hypotheses

The following working hypotheses are adopted in the execution of the study.

(a) Accountability and participation in service delivery have significant effects on output in the education and water sectors irrespective of the type of service delivery channels.

(b) Accountability and participation in service delivery are significantly influenced by the socio-economic characteristics of the beneficiaries;

(c) The output (performance) of service delivery is significantly affected by geographical location and channel of service delivery.

The remaining part of the report is structured as follows. Following this introductory section, we present a highlight of the country background and sector context in section two while section three contains a more elaborate presentation of the conceptual framework and literature review. Section four contains the research methodology while the results of the qualitative and quantitative analysis are presented in section five. The report is rounded off in section six with a presentation of the summary of findings, policy recommendations and conclusions.

2. Background of Country and Sector context

Nigeria is a federal constitutional republic comprising 36 States and its Federal Capital Territory, Abuja. The country lies between latitudes 40 and 14^0N, and longitudes 20 and 15^0E (Figure 1). It has a total area of 923,768km^2 (356,669 sq m) making it the world's 32nd largest country after Tanzania. It has a density of 184.2 per km^2. The country shares borders with the Republic of Benin in the West, Chad and Cameroon in the east, and Niger in the north. Its coast in the south lies on the Gulf of Guinea on the Atlantic

Figure 1: Map of Nigeria showing the 36 States and the Federal Capital

Ocean. Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa and the seventh most populous country in the world. The country is divided into thirty-six states and one federal Capital territory, which are further divided into 774 Local government Areas (LGAs). The country has six cities with a population of more than one million people. These are, from largest to smallest, Lagos, Kano, Ibadan, Kaduna, Port Harcourt, and Benin City.

According to the country's 2006 population census, it has a total population of 140,003,542 people while the 2012 estimated population figure is 170,123,740 (http://en.wikipeadia.org/wiki/nigrtia). Nigeria has been undergoing explosive population growth and one of the highest growth and fertility rates in the world. It is one of the eight countries expected to account collectively for half of the world's total population increase from 2005 to 2050 (United Nations, 2005). Nigeria is a large country with a greater proportion of its population (about 70 per cent) living in the rural hinterlands. It is also a country with high incidence of poverty. This makes delivery of accessible, affordable and sustainable services a great challenge. The case of water, education and transport services in form of road provision is not an exception.

The three sectors (water, education and road) are very critical to the socio-economic wellbeing of the teeming population of the country and the growth and sustainability of the country's economy. Thus, governance of delivery of services in these sectors becomes an issue of concern hence, the focus on them in this study.

The Education Sector

The Federal Ministry of Education at the Federal level is responsible for the formulation of education policies and strategies in the country. At the State level there are the State Ministries of Education while at the Local government level there are Local Education Authorities LEAs). While the Federal government is responsible for tertiary education, the State Ministries, through the State Universal Basic Education Board (SUBEB) is responsible for primary education in urban and rural areas with the LEAs as the executing authorities. At the Federal level there is the Universal Basic Education Commission (UBEC) which collaborates with the SUBEB at the State level in supporting primary education and Junior Secondary education in the country. There is also the National Universities Commission (NUC) which regulates activities of tertiary Institutions. There are private sector operators in the education sector right from the pre-primary facilities to tertiary institutions. Again there is no formal contractual arrangement between the government and the private sector actors in education service delivery, except regulatory functions being performed by the NUC over tertiary institutions and those by the State Ministry of Education over private sector actors in the primary and secondary education at the State and Local levels.

Road Sector

The road sector is also administered at the Federal, State and Local government level. At the Federal level is the Federal Ministry of Works (FMW) which is responsible for construction of federal roads, the Federal Road Maintenance Agency (FERMA) which is responsible for rehabilitation and maintenance of Federal Roads, the Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural development (FMARD) which is responsible for construction and rehabilitation of rural earth roads and later the introduction of Rural Access Mobility Project which took off after the scrapping of the Directorate of Food, Roads and Rural Infrastructure (DFFRI) which was responsible for rural road provision between 1985 and 1993. There is also the Constituency Channel for road provision which is under the National Assembly. It offers the National Assembly members the opportunity to push for construction of roads in their various constituencies.

The Water Sector

With respect to institutional framework for water supply in the country, there are five levels. At the Federal level there is the Federal Ministry of Water Resources with two parastatals – The River Basin Development Authorities (RBDAs) and the National Water Resources Institute (NWRI). Other line Ministries at that level that have to do with water supply include the Federal Ministry of Agriculture, the Federal Ministry of Health, and the Federal Ministry of Environment. There are also the RBDAs, each of which has jurisdiction over between 2 and four States. The Federal Ministry of Water Resources is responsible for formulating, developing and implementing National Water Policy and carrying out necessary reviews from time to time. At the State level, are the State Water Agencies (SWAs), each of which is responsible for developing and managing water supply facilities within its respective State. In many States, the responsibilities for rural water supply have been transferred to the State Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Agencies (RUWASSA). At the Local Government level, the Local Government Authorities (LGAs) are responsible for the provision of rural water supplies and sanitation facilities in their areas of jurisdiction. At the fourth level are the private sector firms and individuals who engaged in water provision in plastic bottles and rubber sachets. There are some who operate water tankers and sell to consumers. However, there is no formal framework or contractual arrangement for their operations and their activities are not coordinated. At the last level are communities and households who embark on construction of water facilities provided by government agencies. The 2010 MDG report put access rate to safe drinking water in 2009 at 58.9 per cent indicating that 41.1 per cent of Nigerians lacked access to safe drinking water.

3. Conceptual Framework and Literature Review: Governance of Effective Public Services Provision

In broad terms, governance is the exercise of economic, political and administrative authority to manage a country's affairs at all levels. It comprises the mechanisms, processes and institutions through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise their legal rights, meet their obligations and mediate their differences. In the case of water for instance, governance refers to the range of political, social, economic and administrative systems that are in place to develop and manage water resources, and the delivery of water services at different levels of society (Global Water Partnership, 2002).

3.1 Governance on the Supply Side

Conceptually, governance has increasingly been used in the public and voluntary sectors to refer to the oversight of executive power; it sets the expectations for executive agents, sets parameters, grants decision rights and conditional authority and it monitors performance against targets. Governance is constituted by a number of processes which are designed to meet a number of objectives and which are usually organised into a number of structural arrangements. However, 'governance' in the modern sense tends to be associated with a system constituted by devolved bodies assuming 'bottom up' range of responsibilities while subject to 'top down' regulations, scrutiny and oversight – a network in place of a single central controlling agent but one that is accountable to its members (Storey et al, 2008).

Since the early 1990s alternative service delivery framework has been popularized under many names in both developed and developing countries and has now become a world-wide phenomenon. In its original form it was meant to be a creative and dynamic process of public sector restructuring that improves the delivery of services to clients by sharing governance functions with individuals, community groups and other government entities (see Ford and Zussman, 1997). Some of the service delivery channels invented since the 1990s can be categorized into four clusters namely; (i) mainstream government (ministries, departments and agencies - MDAs), (ii) agencies (statutory, non-statutory), (iii) partnerships (with other governments, contracts) and (iv) private entities (not-for-profit, for-profit).

With regard to public service delivery, consensus is growing regarding the inability of a centralised system to deliver services efficiently and to the satisfaction of beneficiaries. The search for alternative service delivery channel has been part of the New Public Management reforms in various parts of the world. In this connection, agencification which is a core element of this paradigm has been part of the governance reform agenda both in developing and developed countries. The NPM-related reforms have resulted in various types of agencies such as the non-departmental bodies and Next Steps agencies in the UK,

public establishments in France, Italy and Portugal, state agencies in the Nordic countries, and so-called bureaus and boards in central eastern European countries (Pollitt and Talbot, 2004; OECD, 2002, van Thiel, 2011). According to Pollitt et al (2004), agencification refers to the creation of semi-autonomous agencies that operate at arms' length of the government, to carry out public tasks like service delivery, policy implementation and/or regulation. Consistent with this definition, Talbot (2004) offers three basic criteria by which NPM-Talbot (2004) related agencies can be identified: (i) structural disaggregation from government and/or the creation of task-specific organizations, (ii) performance 'contracting' – some form of performance target setting, monitoring and reporting and (iii) deregulation of controls over personnel, finance and other management matters.

As noted by Slyke (not dated), philosophically, policy makers are enacting decisions that not only restrict but in many cases remove government from providing services directly to citizens. In part, this is being driven by market and political ideologies that have their roots in perceptions about greater efficiencies and innovations arising from private sector and broader support for smaller government. According to McMaster (1999), there are alternative forms of service delivery. These include contracting our services to private firms, franchising services to the private sector, the use of grants and vouchers, mobilising community groups and developing self service measures as well as the privatization of government enterprises that have provided urban services. However, as much as there are many alternative channels of service delivery, there must be fundamental reforms with respect to legislations, administrative frameworks, and the totality of business environment before any of them could be effectively adopted.

In Nigeria, the 2000s witnessed the emergence of public service delivery channels for enhancing the achievement of MDGs in various sectors of the economy. This includes mechanisms for MDAs involvement in service delivery, a system of centralized traditional bureaucracy (CTB), creation of agencies (agencification) and partnership between the Federal and lower levels of government (inter-governmental partnerships – IGPs) in the delivery of education and water services. These alternative channels of service delivery are the focus of attention in this study as far as the water, education and road services associated with the implementation of the MDGs in Nigeria are concerned. A key element in the design of the service delivery channel is decentralization of regulatory and administrative control from the Federal to lower levels of government.

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of structural arrangements. However, 'governance' in the modern sense tends to be associated with a system constituted by devolved bodies assuming 'bottom up' range of responsibilities while subject to 'top down' regulations, scrutiny and oversight – a network in place of a single central controlling agent but one that is accountable to its members (Storey et al, 2008).

Since the early 1990s alternative service delivery framework has been popularized under many names in both developed and developing countries and has now become a world-wide phenomenon. In its original form it was meant to be a creative and dynamic process of public sector restructuring that improves the delivery of services to clients by sharing governance functions with individuals, community groups and other government entities (Ford and Zussman, 1997). Some of the service delivery channels invented since the 1990s can be categorized into four clusters namely; (i) mainstream government (ministries, departments and agencies - MDAs), (ii) agencies (statutory, non-statutory), (iii) partnerships (with other governments, contracts) and (iv) private entities (not-for-profit, for-profit).

With regard to public service delivery, consensus is growing regarding the inability of a centralized system to deliver services efficiently and to the satisfaction of beneficiaries. The search for alternative service delivery channel has been part of the New Public Management reforms in various parts of the world. In this connection, agencification which is a core element of this paradigm has been part of the governance reform agenda both in developing and developed countries. The NPM-related reforms have resulted in various types of agencies such as the non-departmental bodies and Next Steps agencies in the UK, public establishments in France, Italy and Portugal, state agencies in the Nordic countries, and so-called bureaus and boards in central eastern European countries (Pollitt and Talbot, 2004; OECD, 2002, van Thiel, 2011). According to Pollitt et al (2004), agencification refers to the creation of semi-autonomous agencies that operate at arms' length of the government, to carry out public tasks like service delivery, policy implementation and/or regulation. Consistent with this definition, Talbot (2004) offers three basic criteria by which NPM-related agencies can be identified: (i) structural disaggregation from government and/or the creation of task-specific organizations, (ii) performance 'contracting' – some form of performance target setting, monitoring and reporting and (iii) deregulation of controls over personnel, finance and other management matters.

3.2 Governance on the Demand Side

The role of citizens in the principal-agent public service provision and management is crucial for ensuring effective service delivery. This is important in the light of the prevailing economic reforms that ushered in transformations from 'governance by authority to

governance by contract' (David, 2006). Under this paradigm shift, the agency theory best explains managerial behaviour of government as 'principal' and contractors as 'agents'. In this arrangement, government still maintains control of activities but contracts out to the private sector the production and or supply of goods and services. Price competition is introduced through the open invitation of tenders from firms. Government maintains responsibility for determining the quality, timing and quantity of services to be provided (World Bank, 2009).

The consideration of the roles of citizens in these arrangements becomes necessary because, under conditions of incomplete information and uncertainty which characterize most business settings, two agency problems arise: adverse selection and moral hazard. Adverse selection is the condition under which the principal cannot ascertain if the agent accurately represents his ability to do the work for which he is being paid. Moral hazard is the condition under which the principal cannot be sure if the agent has put forth maximal effort (Eisenhardt, 1989). For this reason, attention is now being focused on role of citizens or users of services being provided. Under the principal-agent relationships, the role citizens' play, especially the ability to *demand* for services instead of being *supplied* matters a lot. The extent to which their voices count in determining their needs and to voice discontents with quality of services provided, demand value for money, ability to hold governance actors accountable are crucial tools for counteracting the fault lines and weaknesses inherent in the principal-agent service provision and managerial relationships. It is has been suggested, for example, that the dilemma of failed public services stems from the structure of responding to public 'needs', such that services are 'supplied' rather than 'demanded (GDN, 2009). In this regard, Cornwall and Gaventa (2000) point to citizen 'demand' for services as the starting point of good governance in service delivery, pointing out that, for effective service provision through the principal-agent mechanism, a distinction must be made between 'invited spaces' created for citizens 'from above' through governmental or donor interventions, and spaces which are 'chosen, taken and demanded' through collective citizen actions 'from below' (bottom-up). They stressed that, in coming to terms with structures under which citizens can hold governance actors accountable, and to demand value for money, rather than focusing simply on the role of the state in ensuring rights of citizenship, attention should be drawn to emerging new models of accountability which focus on the role of citizens themselves in monitoring the enforcement of rights, and in demanding public scrutiny and transparency. It is in this direction that the World Bank (2012) advocates for citizens' exertion of influence by assuming some responsibilities such as monitoring and supervision, etc., in the process of service delivery. A good example of citizens exerting influence is parents joining Parents-Teachers Associations (PTA) in the delivery and management of basic education in most countries (World Bank, 2012). This

point reinforces the growing consensus on the values of decentralisation and devolution of administrative and regulatory mechanisms that allow for consultative 'bottom-up' approach to service delivery.

At the Local government level, for instance, local community development associations, interest groups and associations can offer citizens useful channels for exerting influence enabling them to operate from position of strength (Ya'u, 2012), as opposed to the weakness in citizens operating within the 'invited spaces from above', which , due to lack of information flow limits citizens ability to hold governance actors accountable (Cornwall and Gaventa, 2000). On the other hand, attention is being drawn to the importance of democratic governance structures which put power in the hands of citizens and offer effective channels of information flow which is a crucial factor in ability to hold actor accountable. But as pointed out, many political systems have failed to achieve this (GDN, 2009). Under true democracy, a majority of voters should be able to vote in new politicians of their choice that will improve service delivery. But in practice, in many political systems, several factors compromise or weaken this long route. Such factors include election rigging, low voter turnout, etc (GDN, 2009). In spite of the dilemma, however, the fact still remains that true democracy that allows for institutional structures, policies and information flow in the bottom-up framework remains key to governance of effective service delivery (World Bank, 2007).

4. Methodology

4.1 Analytical Techniques

The study employs both qualitative and quantitative techniques in achieving the specified objectives. In characterizing the governance practices attention is focussed on key indicators such as awareness, participation and accountability. Data from in-depth interviews of officials of relevant agencies and FGDs are used to describe the governance practices associated with the delivery of services in the education, road and water sectors. The output indicators used in analysing the performance of service delivery channels include availability of water, adequacy of classrooms and performance of students. The survey data used in the analysis tend to be skewed towards the demand side of service delivery which is known to be far more problematic in Nigeria than the supply side. The approach is also consistent with the fact that research on public service delivery in developing countries, including Nigeria, has focused on supply-side problems such as absenteeism, red tapism, corruption, weak institutions, poor regulatory framework and inefficient supply mechanisms while leaving the demand-side relatively under-studied. Yet the exclusion of beneficiaries' from the governance of service delivery systems and lack of awareness among them have been found to be important causes of failure of public service delivery in developing

countries (see Berg *et al*, 2011). In the case of Nigeria, in particular, demand-side analysis which focuses on beneficiaries' awareness of governance arrangements and service delivery procedures, their participation and assessment of accountability in the system is desirable. This will go a long way to resolve the governance crisis in public service delivery and lead to an enhancement of access and satisfaction in the provision of road, water and education services in the country.

4.1.1 Determinants of Governance in Service Delivery

The governance indicators involved in the analysis are participation and accountability. The *a priori* expectation is that good governance will prevail in a community with high income, high educational attainment, reasonable household size and proximity to the location of the facility provided. Specifically, the relationship between participation of a particular household in the execution of a project will be inversely related to the distance between the household and the location of the particular project; whereas the household size may have a positive relationship. With regard to accountability, both the service provider and beneficiary have a role to play. To hold the provider accountable, the beneficiary must possess the necessary empowerment in terms of income and educational attainment. Efforts involved in reporting poor performance are not costless and unless a beneficiary earns a reasonable level of income the cost may be unbearable. Thus, accountability may be low in poverty stricken communities. These expectations are tested following standard econometric procedures and the results enable us come up with appropriate suggestions as to how the governance system can be made more effective in the supply of water to the affected communities.

The analysis is applicable to the water and education sectors for which relevant survey data are available. For instance in the water sector, the focus of attention is the explanation of the factors affecting governance in the two channels (IGP and CTB) involved in water supply. The analysis is apt to provide a better understanding of the effects of such factors (especially the socio-economic characteristics of the beneficiaries) and differences (if any) between channels and across the six geo-political zones of the country. Specifically, three indicators of governance are involved in the analysis. They are participation, accountability and awareness. The hypothesis is that governance is significantly affected by the socio-economic characteristics of the beneficiaries. Implicitly, the estimating equation is expressed as:

$G = f(X_1, X_2, X_3, X_4, X_5,$ Zone, Domain, Channel)

where,

G	=	Governance indicator
X_1	=	Household size
X_2	=	Age of household head

X_3 = Income
X_4 = Educational attainment (number of years of schooling)
X_5 = Distance between residence and facility
Zone = Dummy variable representing geo-political zones
Domain = Dummy variable Rural = 1; otherwise = 0
Channel = Dummy variable IGP =1; otherwise = 0

The analysis is carried out for each of the indicators of governance namely, participation and accountability. Participation is proxied by the proportion of beneficiaries that participate in the execution of the project while accountability refers to the proportion of beneficiaries who indicate that they are willing and have opportunity to report poor performance. The participation indicator takes a value of unity for those who participated and zero otherwise. A similar assignment of value is made for those who have opportunity to report poor performance. Therefore, since the dependent variable in the analysis is a binary variable a probit analysis is carried out. The channel of service delivery is included to capture supply-side governance issues; but this is relevant only to the water sector.

4.1.2 Effects of Governance on Service Delivery

The output indicators in respect of education service delivery are the proportion of students who pass the common entrance examination at the end of their course in a particular school and adequacy of classrooms. Invariably the input of teachers, the learning environment and governance structure are critical variables that will determine such output/outcome. The relationship between the output and input variables is examined in an econometric analysis. The estimating equation is specified implicitly as follows.

Q_i = Service delivery performance in education = $f(X_{i1}, X_{i2}, X_{i3}, X_{i4,}D)$

where,
Q_i = proportion of students that pass common entrance in school i
X_1 = teacher-students ratio
X_2 = distance between pupils' residence and the school
X_3 = pupils per class
X_4 = governance proxied by parents' participation in school management
Zone = Dummy variable representing geo-political zones
Domain = Dummy variable Rural = 1; otherwise = 0

With regard to adequacy of classrooms, the estimating equation is specified implicitly as:
Q_i = f(PART, AWARE, ACCOUNT, Zone, Domain)

where,

Q_i = Adequacy of classrooms (with a value of unity for respondents who claimed that number of classrooms is adequate and zero otherwise)
PART = Participation(proportion of beneficiaries who participate in project execution(
AWARE = Awareness (proportion of beneficiaries with information on the project)
ACCOUNT = Accountability (proportion of beneficiaries who indicate that they have opportunity to report poor performance)
Zone = Dummy variable for geo-political zones
Domain = Dummy variable: Rural = 1; otherwise = 0

As regards service delivery in the water sector, the output indicator is availability of water at all seasons. The estimating equation is:

Q_i = f(PART, AWARE, ACCOUNT, Zone, Domain, Channel)
where,

Q_i = Availability of water (with unity for respondents who claimed that water is available at all seasons and zero for those who claimed otherwise)
PART = Participation(proportion of beneficiaries who participate in project execution)
AWARE = Awareness (proportion of beneficiaries with information about the water facility)
ACCOUNT = Accountability (as earlier defined)
Zone = Dummy variable for geo-political zone
Domain = Dummy variable Rural = 1; otherwise = 0
Channel = Dummy variable IGP = 1; otherwise = 0

The literature on the effects of governance on service delivery has identified three key elements in characterizing public service delivery. They are the quality of the service, its cost and its availability. According to Kaufmann et al (2008), poor governance can affect service delivery directly through higher price and indirectly through lower quality or quantity available. With data on users' evaluation of access to public services and survey of public agencies, the authors analysed the cost of bad governance and importance of various governance determinants on access to public services in Peru using probit and OLS regressions. Using the two data sets enabled them to cover both the demand and supply-side effects of governance. They found that low-income users are more likely to be discouraged and not to seek a service than wealthier ones especially when in need of a basic service such as water and education. The analysis suggests that individual

characteristics such as education and age matter in the decision about whether or not to seek a service when needed.

The inclusion of socio-economic characteristics as determinants of governance is considered to be relevant in view of the critical role such characteristics can play in ensuring that service delivery is beneficiary-centred and result-oriented. Like many governance reforms, the emerging channels of public service delivery seem to follow top-down approaches in response to global trends ignoring the preferences and capabilities of the public (consumers) in the governance process (Goetz and Gaventa 2001; Rojas 2000; Sajor and Minh Thu 2009). With regard to the water sector for instance, recent studies in some developing countries have argued and demonstrated that lack of information on household preferences regarding water services is an important impediment to implementing sustainable public water supply systems (Vásquez, Franceschi, and Van Hecken 2011; Vásquez, 2011). There is therefore, the need to have a better understanding of household capabilities, characteristics and preferences in order to design and nurture appropriate forms of service governance for the implementation of sustainable water projects in Nigeria.

4.2 Data Collection

Both primary and secondary data were used in the study. But the study is largely primary-data based. The data were collected using structured questionnaires, in-depth interviews and focus group discussions (FGDs). The coverage of the service delivery channels is nation-wide. In particular, the IGPs are being implemented in the 36 states of the Federation across the six geo-political zones. The survey was designed to cover two states in each of the geopolitical zones making a total of 12 states which constitute about 33 percent of the states in the country. The states selected from each of the six geo-political zones are Kaduna and Jigawa (North-west zone), Adamawa and Yobe (North-east zone), Niger and Nasarawa (North-central zone), Lagos and Ekiti (South-west zone), Anambra and Imo (South-east zone) and Rivers and Delta (South-south zone). The states were selected on the basis of their participation in the partnership approach to water services delivery for at least two years since its inception in 2007. In zones where different parties are in government, efforts are made to allow the states selected to reflect multi-party representation.

The key secondary data include the activities of ministries and agencies in the delivery of relevant services, implementation procedures associated with services delivered under the inter-governmental partnership arrangements, locations of rural roads provided under the 2006 MDGs Office Projects and list of 2009 constituency road projects. Besides, relevant publications and policy documents were obtained from the relevant ministries

concerning the recent reforms and project implementation strategies in the education, water and transport (road) sectors.

Primary Data for the Education Sector

The collection of primary data relating to education services was based on in-depth interviews, survey of facilities and survey of beneficiaries. In-depth interviews were conducted in each state with officials of the State Universal Basic Education Board (SUBEB). The Director of School Services and the Desk Officer in charge of the Federal Teachers Scheme were the interviewees. In each of the 12 states, 20 Primary Schools identified to have benefited from the Federal Teachers Scheme and the Book and Instructional Materials Supply Scheme of UBEC were included in the facility survey. The schools spread over a maximum of 10 local government areas (LGAs) in each state and cover both rural and urban areas. Within the community where the facility is located five households were selected for inclusion in the survey of beneficiaries. Thus, in each of the selected States 100 beneficiaries were covered. Altogether a total of 24 interviewees, 240 primary schools and 1,200 beneficiaries were involved in the survey.

Primary Data for Rural Road Construction/Maintenance

The primary data for the road sector were collected through in-depth interviews and FGDs. The road projects sponsored by the MDGs Office in 2006 were implemented by the Department of Rural Development of the Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development. In each state, two of such roads were selected making a total of 24 rural roads. In 2009, the rural road projects, known as Constituency Roads were implemented by RAMP (Rural Access and Mobility Project) a project in the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development. However, in the list of participating states obtained from RAMP, only two states (Jigawa and Anambra) fall within the 12 states already selected for the coverage of the study. Therefore, the two states, Jigawa from the North and Anambra from the South were included in the study of constituency road projects. The Desk Officers responsible for the implementation of the road projects were the interviewees during the survey. Moreover, within the communities linked with the road projects, FGDs were conducted to further examine the key pillars of governance such as transparency in service delivery, accountability and communication. The two villages linked by a road were involved in the FGDs. Thus, for the 24 selected MDA-controlled roads, 48 FGDs were conducted while for the two constituency roads, four FGDs were held. In other words, a total of 52 villages across the country were involved in the survey.

Primary Data for the Water Sector

The collection of primary data in the water sector was based on in-depth interviews, survey of facilities and survey of beneficiaries. The Desk Officers in charge of the MDA-delivered services at the state level were selected as key informants for the in-depth interviews. For the CGS water projects, designated Desk Officers were also involved in the interviews. In some States, officials of Water Corporations and the Focal Persons for project implementation were the key informants. The survey of communities was carried out in each of the 12 selected states. Within the selected communities where the water projects are located FGDs were held to further examine the key pillars of governance such as transparency in service delivery, accountability and communication. Altogether a total of 60 FGDs were conducted – 24 for the MDA-delivered services and 36 for the services delivered under the inter-governmental partnership (IGP) arrangements. Data on key variables such as accessibility, functionality, repairs/maintenance costs, quality, quantity, availability etc. were obtained during the discussions to complement available quantitative information. For the survey of beneficiaries, five communities with water facilities were targeted in each state; and from each community a sample of 25 beneficiaries was drawn for inclusion in the survey. Thus in each of the selected States 125 beneficiaries were covered; thus giving a total of 1,500 across the 12 states.

5. Presentation of Analysis

This section is structured in such a way as to accomplish the objectives of the study, validate the working hypotheses focusing on key governance issues to be addressed in ensuring that public service delivery is result-oriented. The four areas of focus in the presentation of the results are (a) the nature and effectiveness of government channels for public service delivery (b) accountability mechanisms and service delivery outcomes, (c) channel differences and other factors influencing governance mechanisms, and (d) rural-urban split/geographical differences in accountability of public service delivery. These areas, with the exception of the first, are associated with the three working hypotheses which provide overall guidance for the analysis and interpretation of results.

5.1 Nature and Effectiveness of Government Channels for delivering public services.

The analysis here focuses on different government channels for delivering water, education and rural roads and how beneficiaries rate their performance and the quality of services delivered.

5.1.1 Effectiveness of Government Channels for Delivering Education Services

Effectiveness of government channels for delivering education public services is examined qualitatively by assessing the perception of beneficiaries with regard to availability,

adequacy, accessibility, affordability and quality of the services provided. The results show that majority of respondents (53 percent) indicate that teachers are not available or are inadequate (Appendix Figure 5.1). This confirms a NISER (2007) Mid-term assessment report on MDG[1]. Like teachers, classrooms are also indicated by 58 percent of respondents to be inadequate (Appendix Figure 5.2) and are largely responsible for the phenomenon of large or choked classes that is not conducive to learning. Furthermore, it was found that SUBEB Education Projects have certainly improved access for most respondent beneficiaries (Appendix Figure 5.3). This was measured by the distance in kilometres from household to SUBEB School that they have to trek. With regard to affordability, 69 percent of respondents claim SUBEB education projects are affordable (Appendix Figure 5.4). Moreover, respondents perceive the quality of the entire education project environment as good (64 percent), Fair (27 percent) while only nine percent see it as poor. Clearly, therefore, on the issue of performance in the education sector, efforts should be geared towards improving on the number of classrooms, provision of teachers, improving quality of the education project environment, improving affordability and ultimately access.

With regard to the impact of service delivery, respondents were asked to assess the changes observed between 2008 and 2011 in terms of whether the situation has worsened, improved or not in respect of availability, accessibility and affordability of education services. The results show that positive impact has been made on beneficiaries. Majority of the respondents rated the situation better in terms availability (73 percent), accessibility (77 percent) and affordability (78 percent). The delivery of services under the partnership arrangements between UBEC and SUBEB also involves the application of rules to guide the performance of contractors (service providers) and involvement of relevant stakeholders. In virtually all geo-political zones of the country the due process and bidding system of contracting is practised as required by the MDGs Office. Along this line, several criteria such as show of tax clearance certificate, registration with SUBEB and evidence of completion of similar projects etc are set and used as guide for the award of contracts. This ensures that only credible contractors are engaged. When engaged, they are monitored and any erring contractor is sanctioned by either being asked to go back to site and follow specifications, delayed payment or outright revocation of contract and blacklisting. This practice ensures good attitude and commitment by contractors to effectively deliver on projects.

The strategies in place to ensure quality and functionality of school facilities include regular monitoring and evaluation of school facilities, ensuring compliance to specifications by contractors and the involvement of the beneficiary communities in the management of school facilities. Indeed, provision and management of basic education services would not

[1] The report states that there are about 25 million children attending 60,188 basic public schools with only about 575,068 teachers of whom only about half (51.6 percent) are qualified.

have been possible without the involvement of all relevant stakeholders. In all the zones, stakeholders in the provision of basic education range from individual community members who form members of Parents Teachers Associations (PTAs), School Based Management Committees (SBMCs) (involved in the management of school facilities), the Local Government, State Universal Basic Education Board (SUBEB), the Federal Government (UBEC), as well as CSOs and NGOs who are involved in monitoring and evaluation.

5.1.2 Effectiveness of Government Channels for Delivering Water Services

This section examines the effectiveness of service delivery. This is done looking at how households/users perceive availability, accessibility, affordability, adequacy and quality of water facility, considering the water sector separately and the two channels of delivery. A little above three-fifths of the respondents perceived water facilities to be available while majority of the beneficiaries of both the MDA and CGS water facilities held the same opinion, though the proportion of MDA beneficiaries is higher than that of CGS beneficiaries suggesting that MDA water facilities could be more available than CGS facilities (Appendix Table 5.1.1). With respect to accessibility, at least nine out of every ten respondents claimed water facility to be available, and again majority of the MDA and CGS beneficiaries also shared this view but the proportion of CGS beneficiaries is higher than that of their MDA counterparts, suggesting that water facilities provided under the CGS could be more accessible than those provided by MDAs.

On the issue of affordability, at least nine out of every ten respondents claimed water facilities to be affordable with majority of MDA and CGS beneficiaries in this category but the proportion of CGS beneficiaries is higher, again suggesting that CGS water facilities could be more affordable. With respect to whether water drawn from the facilities is adequate, majority of the respondents replied in the affirmative. The same applies to MDA and CGS beneficiaries but the proportion of the former is higher, suggesting again that MDA water facilities have more capacity to produce higher quantity of water compared to the CGS ones. As regards water quality, majority of the respondents claimed that the water from the water facilities had no taste, no colour and no sediments. This suggests that generally the quality of water was perceived by the respondents to be good. The same applies to beneficiaries of MDA and CGS water facilities. However, the proportion of the MDA beneficiaries who claimed that water had taste is higher than their MDA counterparts, while the proportion of the CGS beneficiaries who claimed water to have colour is higher compared to their MDA counterparts.

Generally, it could be said that water service delivery is effective from the perception of the respondents. The findings also suggest that: MDA water facilities could be more available than CGS facilities; CGS water facilities could be more accessible and affordable

than MDA facilities; and that MDA water facilities have more capacity to produce higher quantity of water compared to the CGS ones.

5.1.3 Effectiveness of Government Channels for Delivering Rural Feeder Roads

The country's total road network is shared among the three levels of government in terms of provision and maintenance. However, in spite of the three-tier categorization, to date, the Federal Government is the only active key player in the provision of rural feeder roads in the country; interestingly it is an activity outside its constitutional jurisdiction. The reason for the Federal Government veering into provision of rural feeder roads is not farfetched, as the two sources of funds (Millennium Development Goals and Constituency Funds) meant for rural feeder roads are all in its custody. Instead of channelling the funds to Local Governments for implementation under the principle of Fiscal Federalism, the Federal Government chose to channels these funds to its Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (FMARD), which has branch offices in all the states of the federation for implementation. The state offices of the FMARD are headed by State Coordinators.

Rural feeder road projects are directly executed at the local communities by the FMARD offices in the States without the involvement of Local Governments using the MDGs and Constituency funds. These two categories of funds are applied towards feeder road provision using similar approach in terms contractual and management procedures, but only differentiated by the strategy of deciding the location of the feeder road in the communities. While the State Coordinators of the FMARD exclusively decide where MDGs-funded roads are sited, the locations of Constituency-funded roads are exclusively determined by politicians (National Assembly Members). In both cases however, in-depth interviews indicate that there have been little or no participation of State and Local Governments officials, as well as the community members at all stages of road project cycle. As a result, accountability and transparency issues among actors were highly compromised. Such crucial principal-agent accountability mechanisms in project management for ensuring quality in service delivery like performance monitoring, community participation, certification before payment, etc became ineffective despite actors awareness of their provisions as alignment control tools for ensuring quality in service delivery. Insight into this disconnects was provided by the Badagry Local Government Engineer in Lagos State as follows:

> *Lack of coordination among the Federal, State and Local Government Areas is major problem. A project initiated by Federal Government for execution at the state level should be brought to the attention of State. The State should mobilize Engineers and relevant officials of the local government involved for supervision. But this is lacking.*

5.2 Governance Mechanisms and Quality Service Delivery

Hypothesis: (a) Accountability and participation in service delivery have significant effects on output in the education and water sectors irrespective of the type of service delivery channels.

5.2.1 Accountability mechanisms and Education Service Delivery

Accountability, as another attribute of good governance, is measured by the extent to which stakeholders have opportunity to ask questions, seek clarifications and report cases of dissatisfaction with services or activities of institutions and agencies in the belief that doing so will enhance service delivery. Accountability is examined by looking at respondents' access to any type of information on the education project in their communities and existence of opportunity to complain about poor performance of the education project. Within the communities, accountability is also examined by looking at the existence or otherwise of rules and sanctions guiding the use of the education facility or project.

With regard to whether opportunity exists for reporting poor school facility/project to MDA officials, most of the respondents (55 percent) expressed lack of opportunity to make a report/complain. In addition to the above, the issue of accountability is examined with respect to the relationship among beneficiaries. This relates to the existence of rules and guidelines for usage of education projects within communities and whether these are enforced. Such rules and sanctions are important to ensure that projects are properly utilised. Evidently, rules and sanctions exist as indicated by majority of respondents (54 percent) and are applied on everyone as indicated by 86 percent of respondents. This is indicative of the high level of importance attached to them. Clearly, these help to ensure that projects are put to good use.

5.2.1.1 Effects of Participation on Education Service Delivery

The output indicators in respect of education service delivery are the proportion of pupils who passed the common entrance examination at the end of their course in a particular school and adequacy of classrooms. Invariably the input of teachers, distance between students' residence and schools and governance structure are critical variables that will determine such output/outcome. With regards to governance and students' performance, It is expected *a priori*, that the relationship between students' performance and number of teachers will be positive. In other words, the higher the number of teachers, the higher will be the proportion of students that pass common entrance. On the other hand an inverse relationship is expected between students' performance and distance from their residence. Furthermore, the effect of governance on performance is expected to be positive since it

breeds an environment that is supportive of knowledge sharing in school management and development should be conducive for improved performance of students.

The relationship between the output and input variables is examined in a regression analysis in which the proportion of students who passed common entrance is the dependent variable while the explanatory variables are the number of teachers, distance of students from schools and participation of community members in the management of the schools. The results indicate that participation has no significant role to play in the performance of students. The main determinants are the number of teachers and geo-political zones (Appendix Table 5.2.1). Out of the coefficients of the five zones in the model, only the coefficient of South-east zone is not statistically significant; implying that the effect is not significantly different from that of the South-south. The performance of students is significantly higher in the South-west than South-south whereas the performance is significant lower in each of the northern zones (Northwest, North-east and North-central) than it is the case in the South-south. These results are consistent with what is known about performance of students across the country.

The analysis of the effects of governance on education service delivery produced mixed results depending on the outcome indicators. The major outcomes analysed are the proportion of pupils who passed the common entrance examination at the end of their course in a particular school and adequacy of classrooms. The key finding here is that students' performance has not been significantly affected by participation of community members in the provision of education services. The main determinants are the number of teachers and geo-political zones. The performance of students is significantly higher in the South-west than South-south whereas the performance is significant lower in each of the northern zones (Northwest, North-east and North-central) than it is the case in the South-south. Once again, these results are consistent with what is known about performance of students across the country.

5.2.2 Accountability Mechanisms and Water Service Delivery

Accountability in the delivery of water services is addressed by assessing access of beneficiaries to any type of information on the water facility in their communities, existence of opportunity to complain poor performance of water facility and existence of rules and sanctions guiding use of water facility. It appears that there is constrained access to any type of information from both channels of delivery of water services, as claimed by 65.5 per cent of the beneficiaries of both the MDA and CGS water facilities. However, it appears the situation is not as bad with CGS channel compared with MDA channel as close to 40 per cent of the beneficiaries of this channel claimed existence of access to any type of information compared to the MDA corresponding proportion of 21.3 per cent. With respect to availability of opportunity to make a report to officials in case of dissatisfaction with

functionality or quality of water facility a little above half of the beneficiaries claimed lack of such opportunity. However, the situation does not seem that bad because close to half of the beneficiaries claimed the opportunity was there.

However, comparing the two channels, the state of existence of such opportunity is better with CGS channel as more than 50 per cent of the beneficiaries of the channel claimed the opportunity was there to lodge complaints. With respect to whether there are rules and sanctions guiding use of water facility in the community, the situation is almost neither here nor there. About half of the beneficiaries claimed existence and non existence of sanctions (Appendix Table 5.2.2). However, more MDA beneficiaries claimed there were sanctions guiding the use of water facilities, perhaps due to limited opportunity to lodge complaints if there is problem with the facility.

The importance of water as a utility for domestic, agricultural and industrial activities creates a sense of serious concern among the various stakeholders. This is why any delivery channel which seeks to make impact widens the scope of participation of the stakeholders as is experienced in the CGS channel mode of operation. This is again responsible for the reason why many stakeholders especially community members seek participation in the process. As could be seen from the previous section there is relatively opportunity for lodging complaints and seeking for information on water facilities. It is reasonable for delivery channels, especially government institutions to provide such opportunities because water could be used as a political instrument. This is corroborated by the high level of awareness among community members on execution of water projects and the procedure for engaging contractors. About nine out of every ten respondents claimed awareness of water projects in their communities. This is due to the nature of the service. It is consumed everyday and it means much to their livelihood. The pattern is the same for both the MDA and CGS channels except that the proportion of respondents claiming awareness of MDA water projects is slightly higher than that of the CGS channel. This is not surprising because politicians use provision of water as dividend of democracy and construction of water projects is always well publicised.

Due to the importance attached to water, there is active participation of community members. In some communities households are levied to maintain water facilities while committees are set up to manage proceeds from such levies. This is illustrated below:

"*Before contractors are taken to site, the community or schools are visited and requested to make provision for three possible locations for the facility. The first port of call is the LGA. The LGA chairman is informed of the activity taking place in a community in his domain. Then we move into the communities or schools. If it is RUWASSA, rural communities, there are Water, Sanitation and Hygiene Committees (WASHCOM) at the community level. If it is STU, small towns (5000 to 20000 population), there are Water Consumers Association (WCA). They are actively involved in the process" (coordinator, RUWASSA, Anambra State)*

"*When they came, they met village leader and requested for suitable location. Village leader in consultation with 2 Ward Heads and others met and chose a location. Place is central and a bit removed from another borehole constructed by the State" (FGD for CGS water project, Dakaci village, Kajuru, Kaduna State)*

5.2.2.1 Effects of Governance Mechanisms on Water Service Delivery

Having examined the different channels for providing water services and the variations in performance in this study, the basic premise here is to determine the effect of governance on service delivery focusing on water availability and to ask how improved accountability and participation could improve this outcome. Thus, in what follows we analyse the effects of governance indicators such as participation, accountability and awareness on availability of water at all seasons using a probit model. The data set is based largely on a survey of beneficiaries' evaluation of accountability and participation thus examining the demand side of service delivery. An attempt is made to capture the supply side by including in the model the channels of service delivery which reflect the different agencies involved in controlling the supply of water services. At the Federal level, it is only the Federal Ministry of Water Resources that is the controlling agency as regards the centralized traditional bureaucracy (CTB) approach whereas in the case of the inter-governmental partnerships (IGPs), the Office of the Senior Special Assistant to the President on the MDGs is the relevant agency as far as the articulation and implementation of water provision for achieving MDGs is concerned. This arrangement therefore precludes a survey of water agencies for the purpose of assessing the supply side of service delivery. In this connection, a qualitative approach has therefore, been adopted to examine the governance issues involved. The inclusion of the service delivery channel in the probit regression is to complement the qualitative analysis. Other non-governance variables that can affect the service outcome such as geographical domain or scale of settlement (whether rural or urban) and regional characteristics proxied by geo-political zones are also included as regressors in the probit model. Each regression includes zonal (regional) dummies to control for possible regional differences not captured by the other explanatory variables.

The coefficients of all the explanatory variables in the model are statistically significant with the exception of participation (Appendix Table 5.2.3). With rising awareness and increased accountability there is the tendency that the projects implemented will guarantee water availability all the year round. On the basis of the marginal effects of these two indicators, the probability of all-season availability of water is apt to increase by 11.8 and 11.7 percent respectively (Appendix Table 5.2.4).

The positive sign and statistical significance of awareness are consistent with *a priori* expectation and should be of considerable policy relevance. The policy lesson is that the beneficiaries should always be aware of their rights and responsibilities with regard to the

provision of services in their communities. For instance in the particular case of water services, the beneficiaries have a role to play to ensure availability of water all year round and they should be made to recognize and understand this at the appropriate stage in the design and implementation of water projects. They are to be involved in the maintenance and repair of water facilities by paying levies for pump repairs and arranging to manage the process. Since frequent breakdown of pumps can contribute to unavailability of water all year round, any efforts made by the beneficiaries to undertake repairs as at when due can lead to an improvement in water availability. These responsibilities have been creditably discharged in some of the communities included in this study. For instance, FGD participants in one of the communities with IGP water facility narrated a relevant incidence:

> "*Hand pump handle was broken by the children within the six month of its commissioning and we called the contractor to come and repair it. Afterwards, when there is a breakdown, beneficiaries often contribute money. People are levied and are ready to contribute between ₦100 and ₦300." (FGD participants, Kufana Village, Kajuru LGA, Kaduna State)*

The coefficient of geographical domain is negative and significant. The variable (domain) has a value of unity for rural areas and zero otherwise. The result therefore, implies that there is a higher probability of all-year round water in the urban areas than rural areas. This result actually corroborates the findings of the qualitative analysis. As rural-urban pattern of distribution of respondents in that analysis shows that more urban respondents than their rural counterparts claimed water is available all year round for both CTB and IGP channels. With regard to the geo-political zones, the coefficients are all positive. This implies that availability of water is better in each of the zones than it is the case in the South-south zone. In the light of the foregoing the quantitative analysis indeed, tends to validate the findings of the qualitative aspects of the study and this complimentary results have actually strengthened the authenticity of the findings in general.

In sum, attempts have been made to examine governance of delivery of water services in Nigeria looking at two different channels – the IGP and the CTB channels. The water sector suffers from policy inconsistency and poor policy implementation. This has had adverse impact on delivery of water services in the country in spite of availability of abundant water resources. The performance of the two channels using governance indicators like awareness, participation, and accountability reveals that generally, the IGP channel fairs better. The channel has a framework for involving beneficiaries in needs assessment, choice of locations of water projects and in the operation and management of water facilities. With respect to Accountability, though the performance of the two channels is not impressive, the IGP channel nevertheless has an edge over that of the CTB. Higher

proportion of IGP beneficiaries claimed access to any type of information on water facilities in their communities, compared to the CTB beneficiaries.

With respect to the performance of water facilities such as water availability all year round, accessibility to beneficiaries' residences, affordability of water and water adequacy, majority of the beneficiaries of the two channels expressed satisfaction but generally the IGP channel has a slight edge over that of CTB. An examination of the impact of water facilities provided through both channels on the situation of water in the beneficiaries' communities between 2008 and 2011 revealed that, to majority of the beneficiaries of both channels, the situation in 2011 was better compared to that of 2008. This is with respect to water availability, accessibility, adequacy, affordability, quality and the time spent fetching water. Though both channels of delivery have impacted positively on the situation of water in the various communities where they were located, sustainability become a serious issue, as substantial proportion of beneficiaries claimed the water facilities are not functional throughout the year due most especially to incessant breakdown of generating plants and mal-functioning of water pumps. However, it appears that the IGP channel has a better arrangement for carrying out repairs, compared to that of CTB.

5.2.3 Accountability Mechanisms and Quality of Road Service Delivery

One of principal reasons for placing the provision and maintenance of rural feeder roads under the jurisdiction of the 774 Local Governments in Nigeria is that Federal Government is too far removed from the grass-root to effectively assess their needs, just as it would be too difficult for the Federal Government to assess the conditions and rehabilitation needs of feeder roads due to the huge size of the country, especially with the rural roads accounting for 67% of the total country's total road network. Moreover, by constitutional arrangements, the implementing Federal Government Agency, Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (FMARD) and the private contractors it hires are not accountable to the beneficiary communities. As a result, there was complete disregard for the role of users in accountability mechanisms for ensuring quality of feeder roads being provided. With no mechanism put in place to lay complaints by users, beneficiary communities were left at the mercy of contractors to execute the road projects according to specifications, or not to execute at all as it were some many cases.

Rather, accountability mechanisms put in place were between the Federal Government implementing agency (FMARD) and its Contractors. Even at this level, results from the field indicate high levels of non-compliance to the accountability mechanisms by the principal actors (Officials of the FMARD sitting in Abuja, the State Coordinators of FMA&RD and the Private Contractors hired to execute the projects). On performance monitoring of contractors in particular, which was the responsibility of the State Coordinators of the

FMARD, the Coordinators interviewed indicated that the reporting and feedback mechanisms, which were to play significant roles in the effective execution of the road projects by contractors were completely undermined by their superior in Abuja. According to them, the stage by stage supervision and performance monitoring reports sent to Headquarters in Abuja were of no effect as they received no feedbacks from Abuja. Consequently, they lacked ability to enforce compliance, rules and sanctions. The situation was similar with regard to implementation of the MDGs and the Constituency funded feeder roads across all the states studied. It was therefore not surprising that, all the State Coordinators contacted reported tales of woos in project implementations. Surprisingly, facts available with the State Coordinators indicate that many of non-performing contractors received payments at Abuja with complete disregard to performance monitoring reports submitted by them.

On quality of roads that were completed, the beneficiary community members interviewed indicated that the benefits they enjoyed lasted less than a year after completion of the projects, as the roads easily washed off with the onset of the first rainy season. With no maintenance mechanism built into the road projects, the community members remarked that many of the feeder roads soon turned out to be gullies. Nonetheless, the tremendous benefits of feeder roads to rural communities are not in doubt. With regard to one completed feeder road in Kaduna State, for example, an elated community head had this to say:

> *As father of the village, I have seen the benefit in terms of improved transportation of farm products and movement of people, improvement in trading and commercial activities in farm products such maize, tomato, yam pepper, groundnut, onion. As a result of the road, we can now take our farm products from this village to Kaduna, Zaria, and Kano even up to Abuja. Also, if someone is sick, the person can easily be taken to Mararaba – Jos hospital. Moreover, commercial motorcycle business (Okada) began to thrive from Rahama to Mararaba Jos due to the road. The road has reduced cost of transportation. Before the road was constructed, Okada journey to Mararaba Jos was N600, but now it is between ₦200 - ₦250. Travel time has also reduced from 2 hours before to about 30 minutes. Also vehicle breakdowns have reduced.*

But in spite of these immediate benefits, the roles of community members in ensuring quality through project management tools inherent in participation and accountability were lacking. This is partly responsible for the short lifespan of the benefits of the completed feeder roads which easily got deteriorated after completion due to poor project execution and management. The situation is most likely to be better if the Local Governments are to implement the road projects as they are directly accountable to the rural communities. At that level, local participation and accountability mechanisms are most likely to be very effective given the opportunities available to communities to make complaints, determine their needs, etc, through their Representatives that are easily accessible to them at the Local Government Council Offices.

5.3 Sectoral Differences and Other Factors Influencing Governance Mechanisms

The hypothesis to be tested in this section is that accountability and participation in service delivery are significantly influenced by the socio-economic characteristics of the beneficiaries. Essentially, the question to be tackled, *inter alia*, is what factors influence governance in the delivery of the various services? In terms of sectoral differences, it is important to note that road has the most centralized delivery channel. Although water and education have some form of inter-governmental partnership, the governance practices vary. Governance on the demand side is grossly limited in the education sector whereas it is far more pronounced in the case of water. There are opportunities for community participation as well as involvement of private sector and civil society organizations in the monitoring and evaluation of water service delivery (Appendix Table 5.3). These differences in delivery channels may account for variations in performance. There are also differences in the outcome variables in terms of their physical and economic characteristics. For instance, the degree of 'publicness' varies substantially between water and road and between education and road. On the other hand there is not even justification for the comparison of the outcomes from the three sectors in terms of their physical characteristics. It is far more valuable, therefore, to examine intra-sectoral differences in service delivery channels to ascertain their influence on performance and to provide the basis for prescribing reform measures. The water sector stands out in this regard and is relied upon for analytical evidence; although the education sector is also relevant for the purpose of validating the specified hypothesis.

5.3.1 Factors Influencing Governance Mechanisms - Accountability and Participation in Education Service Delivery

As indicated, intergovernmental partnership between UBEC and SUBEB is the identifiable channel of service delivery for education projects. This form of partnership is non-existent for road and water services. As an important governance indicator, it is perceived that giving people the opportunity to participate in various stages of project implementation enhances the credibility of the channel of delivery, project acceptability and ownership all of which impact positively on the sustainability and overall success of the project. Thus, the extent to which MDA education projects provide opportunity for stakeholders' participation is given particular attention. It was found that less than half of the respondents (48 percent) participate in the execution of education projects implemented through this channel. Fifty percent of respondents indicate the reason for non-participation in education projects as lack of participation opportunity while 34 percent claim that their non-participation is due to lack of

awareness of such projects. Much more crucial is the level at which respondents participated in the execution of education projects. Most respondents (45 percent) indicated that this is at the level of 'Repairs & Maintenance of School Facilities'. This is followed by 'Purchase of Educational Consumables' (18 percent). It is disheartening that the three main areas that may most account for ownership and ultimately sustainability attract the least levels at which respondents participate in education projects viz: 'Project/Programme Identification' (15 percent), 'Needs Assessment and Prioritisation' (nine percent) and 'Location of Educational Project' (six percent). Clearly, there is need to enhance the credibility of this channel of delivery, project acceptability and ownership all of which would impact positively on the sustainability and overall success of projects.

5.3.1.1 Factors Influencing Participation and Accountability in Education Service Delivery in Nigeria

A probit model is estimated to determine the key characteristics that influence governance in the delivery of education services. The two indicators of governance involved in the analysis are participation and accountability. The explanatory variables in the participation model are age of head of household, household size, household income, education of head of household, distance between the household and the education facility (primary school), geographical domain of the facility (rural or urban) and the region (geo-political zone) in which the school community is located. The results of the analysis are presented in Appendix Tables 5.3.1 and 5.3.2 in terms of the estimated coefficients and marginal effects.

The results show that age, household size, distance and geographical domain are not significantly related to the probability of participation in service delivery in the education sector. The probability that beneficiaries will participate does not differ between rural and urban areas. The significant predictors of participation are income, educational attainment and geo-political zones. Out of the six geo-political zones, the South-south zone is adopted as the reference zone for the analysis. The effect of each of the remaining five zones is therefore, considered in relation to that of South-south. In the case of North-west and South-west, there seems to be no difference in their effects relative to that of South-south. The probability that beneficiaries in the North-east will participate is significantly lower than that of South-south whereas in the South-east and North-central, it is significantly higher.

As regards education and income, the analysis reveals that the higher the income and educational attainment of the community members, the lower the probability of participating in the delivery of education services. Thus, the *a priori* expectation that good governance will prevail in a community with high income and high educational attainment is contradicted by this result. However, this is not surprising as far as Nigeria is concerned and the finding will be insightful in articulating better policies to strengthen the service delivery

channel. Indeed, the finding is a reflection of the reality even at the country level. Evidently, it is known that the higher the growth of the Nigerian economy, the worse the incidence of poverty has been over the years in spite of the emphasis on improved political participation, corruption reduction and governance reforms aimed at creating better service delivery channels. For instance, real GDP in Nigeria grew from 6.5 percent in 2005 to 7.82 percent in 2010 while the incidence of poverty rose despicably from 54.4 percent to 70 percent over the same period based on data from the National Bureau of Statistics. Poor governance is one of the major reasons for this development paradox. The fact that rising income and educational attainment tends to be associated with decreasing probability of beneficiaries' participation in education services delivery as revealed by this study is a reflection of poor governance in the education sector and it is an indication that despite the activities of UBEC and SUBEB the crisis of governance in terms of lopsided participation of the citizens in the implementation of service delivery projects remains unresolved. There is therefore, a great lacuna to be filled in terms of re-designing education policies and re-engineering service delivery channels to resolve the governance issues retarding progress in the sector.

The analysis in respect of accountability indicates that distance, educational attainment and geographical domain are not significant determinants. Specifically, there is no significant difference in accountability between rural and urban areas as far as education service delivery is concerned. The significant predictors are household size, age, income and geo-political zones. The higher the household size the higher is the probability that project implementers will be held accountable whereas the probability is lower with rising income and age (Appendix Table 5.3.3). For instance, household size has a marginal effect of about 0.9 percent increase in the probability that the implementers will be held accountable; whereas the marginal effect of age is a reduction in the probability by 0.3 percent. The marginal effect of distance, education and geographical domain is not significantly different from zero. There is no difference in accountability in the North-central and South-west zones relative to the South-south zone. The probability to hold implementers accountable is lower in the North-west relative to the South-south whereas it is greater in the North-east and South-east (Appendix Table 5.3.4).

The accountability indicator being analysed is the willingness of the beneficiaries to exercise the right to "voice" in the delivery of education services. Specifically, the result indicates that the opportunity to make complaints against violation of preferences in decisions regarding the allocation of resources, choice of location of education facilities and management of resources provided by parents and teachers associations (PTAs) etc. and secure appropriate response depend mainly on the age and income of the beneficiaries and the household size. The result indicates that older citizens are not likely to enforce accountability compared to younger members of the community. This is plausible since the

time, vigour and transaction costs involved may be more difficult to bear for older than younger citizens. The positive and statistically significant coefficient of household size is an indication that it should be better for larger households to meet these requirements relative to households of smaller sizes. Moreover, the motivation to hold government officials and service providers accountable may be more compelling for larger households that are likely to have more potential beneficiaries of primary education compared to smaller households.

There are two sides to the explanation of the negative relationship between income and accountability. Even though wealthier citizens are likely to cope better with the transactions costs of expressing their "voices", they may not be enthusiastic to do so if there are alternative services which they can utilize (as it is the case in Nigeria) while the public services are faced with the problem of poor governance. Besides, if the beneficiaries' trust and confidence in the regulatory authorities and service providers to remedy the situation have waned considerably as it is the case in Nigeria in recent times, the motivation to enforce accountability may be relegated even when income of dissatisfied beneficiaries seem to be rising.

5.3.2 Effects of Channel Differences and Other Factors on Accountability and Participation in Water Service Delivery

In the water sector, services are delivered through two major channels namely; the centralized traditional bureaucracy (CTB) approach under the control of Ministry, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) and the Inter-governmental Partnership (IGP) approach under the conditional grant scheme (CGS). It is hypothesized that governance of service delivery will be influenced by these varieties of delivery channels in addition to the socio-economic and demographic characteristics of the beneficiaries and the location of their communities in the rural and urban areas.

5.3.2.1 Factors Influencing Accountability and Participation in Water Service Delivery

The analysis proceeds with participation and accountability as indicators of governance in a probit model in which household size, age, educational attainment, income, geographical domain (rural-urban), channel of service delivery (IGP or CTB) and geo-political zones are included as explanatory variables. The South-south zone is selected as the benchmark for comparing the effect of the other five zones which are included in the model as dummy variables. The results of the participation model show that household size and age have no significant effect on probability of participation. The significant determinants are educational attainment, income, geographical domain, channel of service delivery and geo-political zones (Appendix Table 5.4.1). The marginal effect of income seems imperceptible but

judging by the sign and significance of the coefficient, the implication is that with rising income, the probability of participation may reduce.

With regard to education, the marginal effect is that the probability of participation is apt to reduce by about 0.58 percent with an increase in educational attainment (Appendix Table 5.4.2). The coefficients of domain and channel are positive and statistically significant. This implies that the probability of participation is significantly higher in the rural than urban areas. Moreover, the probability of participation is significantly higher in the case of IGP than CTB. These results are consistent with the findings of the qualitative analysis.

Out of the five geo-political zones included in the analysis, only the North-west and North-east have significant coefficients; implying that the other three – North-central, South-west and South-east - are not significant determinants of participation. Furthermore, the coefficient of North-west is positive and this implies that there is a significantly higher probability of participation in the zone than it is the case in the South-south (which is the reference zone). On the other hand, the coefficient of North-east is negative and this implies that there is a significantly lower probability of participation in the zone than it is the case in the South-south.

As regards accountability, the results show that age and channel of service delivery are not significant determinants. In the case of the latter, the implication is that the probability of holding project implementers accountable is unlikely to change significantly irrespective of the channel adopted in providing water for the communities. As shown in Appendix Table 5.4.3, the significant variables are household size, education, income, geographical domain and geo-political zones. The marginal effects of household size and education are positive and they are capable of increasing the probability of accountability by 1.14 and 1.22 percent respectively (Appendix Table 5.4.4). Although the marginal effect appears imperceptible, the implication of a negative coefficient of income is that rising income has a tendency of lowering the probability of accountability.

The result in the case of education is consistent with *a priori* expectation. A more educated individual is likely to have greater awareness of his rights and have better access to information. They also should be more willing to complain about poor performance since they are supposed to have a better understanding of the rules and sanctions guiding the delivery of water services. Thus we should expect that a higher level of education should lead to greater accountability as the results reveal. A similar relationship may be expected between income of individuals and accountability. Contrary to expectation, however, the results show that accountability and income are negatively related. This implies that even when income is increasing, users may not be willing to express their voice against providers.

However, it important to ask why an increase in the income of users will not lead to greater access to the mechanisms that they can use to “voice” suggestions and complaints.

What the result is showing is that this is possible in areas where poverty is endemic. In other words where income is generally low, citizens may not be capable of holding providers and government officials accountable. A critical level of empowerment (in terms of income) is required before citizens can exercise their rights even when they have a clear understanding of such rights. This result is consistent with the findings of Kaufmann et al (2008) in their analysis of the effects of some socioeconomic variables (including education and income) on users' discouragement from using services when needed. The authors had expected that the number of citizens that would be discouraged (i.e. chose not to use services *on account of poor governance* even when they are needed) would be positively correlated with income and education among other factors. The coefficient of education in their probit regression goes from negative in primary education to positive for university education. In the case of income, the coefficient is negative for low income, positive for middle income and zero for high income. The citizens covered in the Nigerian study are largely of very low level of education and of very low income; judging by the high incidence of poverty in the country which is currently put at about 70 percent. The result is therefore, not totally surprising.

It is also not surprising that the effects of education and income are different. This is because an increase in educational attainment especially in rural areas may not necessarily translate to a significant increase in income. With the high rate of unemployment and high transactions costs in the country, undertaking activities that will bring service providers into account may be a tall order for the citizens. Thus, in the face of poor governance and unsatisfactory performance, citizens may be discouraged from investing their time and money on presenting complaints if they know that their "voice" will likely fall on deaf ears or the cost will be prohibitive. In other words, they may rather "exit" from the service or remain ambivalent than attempting to enforce accountability especially in situations where alternative sources of water exist. Indeed, this result corroborates the qualitative analysis earlier presented. The analysis clearly indicates that some community members who expressed their displeasure with the lack of consultation demonstrated by the government officials and service providers before making decisions about the type and location of water facilities, were not enthusiastic to participate in the management as well as monitoring and evaluation of the water projects.

As depicted by the results of the qualitative analysis in previous chapters, the effects of geographical domain and geo-political zones on governance vary widely. The results are corroborated by the estimated probit model on accountability in this section. The results reveal that the probability to hold project implementers accountable is significantly higher in the rural than urban areas. The effects of geopolitical zones on accountability are not statistically significant in the case of North-west and South-west zones. The effect is

significantly higher in the case of North-east and North-central than it is in the South-south. In the case of South-east, the coefficient is negative and significant implying that the probability of being accountable is lower in this zone than in the South-south.

5.4. Rural-Urban Split in Accountability of Public Service Delivery

This section focuses on the differences in the findings relating to the urban and rural areas. Essentially this is to address the hypothesis that performance of service delivery is significantly affected by geographical location. Since the road services are basically rural-based, the findings here relate to the education and water sectors where there are possibilities of urban-rural differences in service provision and governance mechanisms.

5.4.1 Geographical Differences in Accountability of Education Service Delivery

With regard to effectiveness of government channels for delivering public services, the situation is worse in the rural areas where 62 percent of respondents identify this inadequacy that is also more acute in the south east (94 percent). Inadequacy in rural areas can be attributed to the low level of development of many rural areas in Nigeria and to which many government workers including teachers dislike being posted to. Teachers are more available in the north east (73 percent) and northwest (65 percent). This is not surprising due to the low level of (western) education pervasive in these zones and which government may consciously want to improve through posting of teachers.

The preponderance of inadequacy of classrooms, is observed in the south east (93 percent) and slightly better in the north east (75 percent). At least two geo-political zones (north east and south east) have 100 percent access to SUBEB education projects. It is only in the southwest and northwest that only 53 percent and 69 percent respondents respectively claim to have access. The rural areas of the southwest zone are also affected by poor access as indicated by 53 percent of respondents. With regard to affordability, the situation is the case in all the geo-political zones except for the northwest where up to 61 percent of respondents claim that education is not affordable. It has been indicated already that though education is said to be free, in some zones/states, parents still have to provide their children with uniforms, other books etc that are not covered by this channel of service delivery. As such, education may still not be considered so affordable. In the words of the Yobe state Girl-Child Education (GEP) Desk Officer,

> *"In spite of the free education policy, girl-child primary school enrolment is still very poor in the rural areas. The situation is a bit better in the urban areas. The poor girl-child enrolment is due to the prevailing high level of poverty in the state. Poverty affects basic education because even though basic education is said to be free, parents in Yobe state still have to provide their children with uniforms, books, etc. Moreover, even though the phenomenon is reducing, the value attached to girl child education, especially in the rural areas is very low, such that parents, especially mothers, prefer their daughters to go hawking in the streets in order to bring home the much needed money".*

The clearly complimentary trend with regards to perception of quality of entire education project environment is observable in the northeast, northcentral, northwest and south-south. It is only in the southeast that the perception of quality of projects is rated 'Fair' by most (77 percent) of respondents, while it is only in the southwest that they are rated 'Poor' by as many as 29 percent of respondents. Again this may be explained by not much need for or appreciation of MDGs assisted projects in the south west zone.

With regard to impact of education projects put in place since 2008-2011, by geo-political zones, education is said to be better available than before in the north central (91 percent) and north east (82 percent); it is better accessible in the north central (89 percent) and south west (83 percent); and better affordable as well in the north central (90 percent) and south east (87 percent). In terms of access to any type of information about MDA (CGS Variant) Education Projects. The lack of access is more so among rural (78 percent) than among urban residents (67 percent). This can be attributed to the fact that urban residents who utilise public facilities are more likely to seek out information than their rural counterparts. The situation is more pronounced in the northeast, southwest and northwest geo-political zones. More access is indicated by south east urban (86 percent) and rural (48 percent) respondents (Figure 5.5).

Lack of opportunity to make a report/complain about poor school facility/project to MDA officials, is worse in the rural (66 percent) than urban (54 percent) locations. The situation is more unfavourable in the rural (66 percent) than urban (54 percent) locations. This to some extent underscores the belief that the higher level of enlightenment in urban areas with respect to having knowledge of the possibility of, and the procedure for making a complaint or report, as well as the manner of going about this, the higher the likelihood of knowing about and utilising the opportunity. Here, urban respondents will clearly have an upper hand over their rural counterparts. In conclusion, it is obvious that the governance of service delivery has been relatively effective resulting in positive changes in availability, access, affordability and quality. The effects appear to be better in urban than rural areas.

5.4.2 Geographical Differences in Accountability of Water Service Delivery

This section examines the rural urban dichotomy with respect to effectiveness in accountability, participation, awareness mechanism with respect to provision of water services and whether there are some peculiar socio-economic characteristics responsible if some differences are observed. With respect to respondents' level of awareness of implementation of water facilities, Though majority of the respondents in the rural (94.4 percent) and urban (88.6 percent) areas claimed awareness of execution of water projects for the two channels of delivery, the proportion of the respondents in rural areas in this

category is higher than that of their urban counterparts (Appendix Table 5.,4). This suggests that level of awareness of water execution of water facilities is higher in the rural areas than in the urban areas. This could be attributed to the small size of rural communities and the large size of the urban communities. It is easier for rural community members to know what goes on in their communities due to close social relations that exist there, compared to the complex urban communities. The same applies to level of awareness of the procedure for engaging contractors for the execution of water facilities.

With respect to participation in execution of water facilities, though majority of the respondents claimed lack of participation in the execution of both the MDA and CGS water facilities, for MDA water facilities, the proportion of those who participated in rural areas (37.8%) is much higher than that of those who participated in urban areas(4.5%) as indicated in table 4. This could be attributed to the fact that MDA focuses more on rural areas than urban areas. Another reason could be that urban residents hardly find time to participate compared to their rural areas; and that mobilization is easier in rural areas than in urban areas. With respect to CGS water facilities, the proportion of participants in the urban areas and rural areas are almost at par. This is could be because CGS water facilitates are both for urban and rural communities, and CGS has a built in mechanism for strong involvement of stakeholders.

With regard to access to any type of information on the water facility, though for the two channels of water service delivery, majority of the respondents claimed lack of access, the proportion of the urban respondents (27.4 percent) that claimed access to any type of information on MDA water facilities is higher than that of their rural counterparts. As for CGS water facilities the proportions of rural and urban respondents that claimed existence of access to information are almost at par. This pattern suggests the state of access to information on water facilities is better in the urban areas that in the rural areas. The plausible reasons for this could be higher level of education and enlightenment among respondents in the urban areas as well as ability to afford the cost of asking for information like use of telephone and cost of transport to sources of such information. The same applies to availability of opportunity to make a report to officials in case of dissatisfaction with functionality of water facility, a situation which appears to be better as indicated in Appendix Table 5.4. However, when it comes to availability of rules and sanctions guiding use of water facility, it appears that rural communities have more of such sanctions compared to urban communities for both MDA and CGS water facilities. The reason for this is likely to be associated with the fact that in rural areas, water sources are scarce and the available ones have to be well managed and guided seriously unlike in the urban areas where there are many alternatives.

6. Summary of Key Findings, Policy Implications and Conclusions

This study sought to examine the governance and performance of public service delivery in the education, road and water sectors for the achievement of MDGs in Nigeria following the adoption of alternative channels since the early 2000s. In the analysis we hypothesized that accountability and participation in service delivery have significant effects on output in the education and water sectors and that these governance indicators are significantly influenced by the socio-economic characteristics of the beneficiaries. Moreover, it was hypothesized that performance of service delivery is significantly affected by geographical location of beneficiaries. In what follows we present the summary of findings, conclusions and policy implications.

6.1 Summary of Key Findings

The findings derive from a combination of the validation of the working hypothesis and qualitative analysis of the governance issues in each of the three sectors included in the study. Accordingly, the summary of findings are presented with highlights from the results of such validation relating to the education and water sectors and qualitative analysis relating to the road sector.

6.1.1 Findings in Respect of Education Service Delivery

We reject the hypothesis that participation and accountability are significantly affected by geographical location. We found that there is no significant difference in the effects of participation and accountability between rural and urban areas as far as education service delivery is concerned. On the other hand, we accept the hypothesis that participation and accountability are significantly affected by socio-economic characteristics. The significant explanatory variables are income and educational attainment (for participation) while in the case of accountability the predictors are household size, age, income and regional characteristics reflected in the geo-political zones. The fact that rising income and educational attainment tends to be associated with decreasing probability of beneficiaries' participation in education services delivery as revealed by this study is a reflection of poor governance in the education sector and it is an indication that despite the activities of UBEC and SUBEB the crisis of governance in terms of lopsided participation of the citizens in the implementation of service delivery projects remains unresolved.

With regard to the hypothesis that governance has significant effects on education service delivery, the results depend on the type of output and governance indicators. We reject the hypothesis in the case of participation and accept it with regard to accountability. The major output indicators analysed are the proportion of pupils who passed the common entrance examination at the end of their course in a particular school and adequacy of

classrooms. The key finding is that students' performance has not been significantly affected by participation of community members in the provision of education services. The main determinants are the number of teachers and regional characteristics. The performance of students is significantly higher in the South-west than South-south whereas the performance is significant lower in each of the northern zones (Northwest, North-east and North-central) than it is the case in the South-south. These results are consistent with what is known about performance of students across the country.

Furthermore, the results show that adequacy of classrooms does not differ significantly between rural and urban areas and is not affected by participation of community members in the delivery of education services. The significant explanatory variables are awareness, accountability and regional characteristics. The probability of classroom adequacy tends to increase significantly with increase in awareness and accountability. This is understandable given the innovative governance mechanisms under the School Based Management Committees (SBMCs) introduced into the primary education system in 2005. Through the instrumentality of the (SBMCs), community members seem to have been able to exercise their collective voice which occurs in the interactions among members, policy makers (regulators) and school authorities. The SBMCs have accountability responsibilities and there are procedures to ensure full awareness and understanding. These include a responsibility for the oversight of school finances and they work directly with Head Teachers in managing school accounts. The SBMCs also provide funding for the provision of facilities in schools based on needs. The positive and significant effects of awareness and accountability in this study is therefore, an indication that the discharge of these responsibilities have started to yield desirable results especially in terms of improvement in the adequacy of classrooms in primary schools in the communities included in the study.

6.1.2 Findings in Respect of Water Service Delivery

With regard to governance of water service delivery, we accept the hypothesis that participation is significantly influenced by the socio-economic characteristics (income and educational attainment) of the beneficiaries and channels of service delivery. With rising income and educational attainment the probability in water service delivery may reduce. Moreover, we found that the probability of participation is significantly higher in the rural than urban areas; and it is significantly higher in the case of inter-governmental partnerships (IGP) than centralized bureaucratic (CTB) channel. As far as accountability is concerned, we also accept the hypothesis that socio-economic characteristics (household size, income and educational attainment) of the beneficiaries and channels of service delivery are significant determinants. Household size and educational attainment are capable of increasing the probability of accountability whereas income has a tendency of lowering the

probability in the sense that when income is increasing, users may not be willing to express their voice against providers. The results also reveal that the probability to hold project implementers accountable is significantly higher in the rural than urban areas.

Furthermore we examined the effects of governance on service delivery focusing on water availability and found out how improved accountability and participation could improve this outcome. We have to reject the hypothesis that participation in water service delivery has significant effect on output whereas in the case of accountability the hypothesis is accepted. The results show that with rising awareness and increased accountability there is the tendency that the projects implemented will guarantee water availability all the year round. Also, we accept the hypothesis that performance of service delivery is significantly affected by geographical location as evidenced by the result which shows a higher probability of all-year round water in the urban areas than rural areas.

Inter-governmental partnerships through the conditional grant scheme (IGP/CGS) and centralized traditional bureaucracy (CTB) are the channels through which water services are delivered as part of the efforts to achieve the MDGs in Nigeria. Governance of service delivery through the IGPs seems to be better than CTB in terms of awareness of procedures, rights and responsibilities, access to information and willingness and existence of opportunities to report poor performance. The IGP/CGS channel also appears better with respect to water availability, affordability, functionality, adequacy and arrangement for repairs and maintenance of facility as well as access and quality. Nonetheless, the two channels have positive impact on the water situation of the communities where they were located.

6.1.3 Findings in Respect of Road Provision

Road services are provided through the centralized traditional bureaucracy – an approach that is bedevilled with numerous governance challenges. The implementation of rural road projects using the two variants of this approach (MDGs and the Constituency Funds) was fraught with problems that led to general poor performance by service providers (contractors) in all the regions. Many of the problems such as weak monitoring as well as inadequate material and financial resources could have been averted if the State Coordinators of the projects were empowered financially and logistically to carry out their assigned responsibilities which they clearly understood. .The situation was worsened by the roles of the State Coordinators being undermined by non-response to their technical monitoring reports to Headquarters in Abuja. As a result, they lacked the ability to enforce compliance to specifications and or enforce sanctions on non-performing contractors. Thus, the crisis of poor participation and accountability continue unabated. Nonetheless, in the

communities where rural roads have been provided community members acknowledged the tremendous socio-economic benefits that have accrued to them.

6.2 Policy Implications and Recommendations

6.2.1 Policy Recommendations for Improved Education Service Delivery

Even though positive changes have taken place in education service delivery between 2008 and 2011, the trend where majority of respondents claim that SUBEB education projects are affordable needs to be maintained and improved upon if the country is to achieve universal primary education by 2015 or beyond. In these schools, books and other instructional materials and at times a meal a day should be provided each child for free or at the most, a token, in order to encourage new entrants and retain those already within the system. This is a sure way to ensure that beneficiaries equally take advantage of accessibility and availability.

The fact that rising income and educational attainment tends to be associated with decreasing probability of beneficiaries' participation in education services delivery as revealed by this study is a reflection of poor governance in the education sector and it is an indication that despite the activities of UBEC and SUBEB, the crisis of governance in terms of lopsided participation of the citizens in the implementation of service delivery projects remains unresolved. This huge lacuna needs to be filled in terms of re-designing education policies and re-engineering service delivery channels to resolve the governance issues clogging the way of progress in the sector. Generally, beneficiaries of education projects need to have more room and opportunity to participate at higher levels of the project execution cycle.

The effect of governance on performance is expected to be positive and the participation of community members in the management of school is very crucial. Therefore, community members' knowledge, experience and approaches of resolving issues and of making valuable contributions for smooth running of schools as well as monitoring the way teachers perform their functions need to be harnessed and an environment supportive of knowledge sharing in school management and development be created for improved performance of students. This will ensure that management responsibility is not left in the hands of government; be it at the Federal, State or local level. Nevertheless, this should be done advisedly since a key finding of the study is that performance has not been significantly affected by participation of community members in the management of the schools. This is more crucial in the rural areas and will provide opportunities to complain against violation of preferences in decisions regarding the allocation of resources, choice of location of education facilities and management of resources provided by parents and teachers associations (PTAs).

As a way of improving the performance of students, there is need for the government to provide more teachers in the primary schools. In this connection government should provide incentives for teachers in rural areas as a form of motivation to prevent absenteeism and improve their performance.

6.2.2 Policy Recommendations for Improved Water Service Delivery

Since the communities may not be able to handle the maintenance of some water facilities, it is necessary for the MDGs Office to liaise with the local governments or appropriate agencies within the states to be involved in assisting the communities in carrying out maintenance services that are beyond the capacity of the community members. The LGAs should also be involved in the design of the projects. An important measure to promote participation of community members is for the contractors to hire labour within the participating communities for project execution rather than bringing workers from outside the communities.

6.2.3 Policy Recommendations for Improved Road Provision

To address the poor performance of service delivery in the road sector the following measures are recommended.: (i) Capacity building for project design, implementation and management in the road sector should be enhanced at the Local Government level; (ii) Rural communities should be involved and be sensitized on participatory project design, implementation and management, and to be aware of their roles in accountability mechanisms for ensuring quality service delivery, (iii) For effective rural road provision, the inter-governmental partnership arrangements especially in the water sector should be adapted to improve the channel of road service delivery in the country, (iv) Preventive maintenance method is recommended for ensuring that the current situation where most of the rural roads get deteriorated in the first year of construction/rehabilitation is contained. Preventive method requires that water must be evacuated as quickly as possible from the road before it softens the surface and does irreversible damage to the road bed and foundation. This requires eliminating standing water by filling in of potholes and ruts on level ground as well as preventing the formation of lateral and longitudinal gullies where the destructive momentum of flowing water is particularly damaging, (v) Irrespective of the agencies involved in the provision of rural roads, local governments' participation in monitoring and evaluation of road projects must not be negotiated, and (vi) To enhance durability of roads and minimize cost, alternative materials for paving rural roads should be developed through research activities rather than relying on asphalt which is usually very expensive, and the consequent reliance on laterite for surfacing of rural roads.

6.3 Conclusions

Effective delivery of services in the education, water and road sectors is critical for the attainment of MDGs in Nigeria. Earmarking part of government revenue for this purpose is a step in the right direction. Desirable results will be achieved however, only if there is an overhaul of the governance mechanisms and delivery channels. The flaws in the governance of education service delivery continue unabated notwithstanding the inter-governmental partnership channel for service delivery. Despite the activities of UBEC and SUBEB the crisis of governance in terms of lopsided participation of the citizens in the implementation of service delivery projects remains unresolved. Nevertheless, it can be concluded that the governance of service delivery has been relatively effective resulting in positive changes in availability, access, affordability and quality.

An important policy lesson emerging from this study is that service beneficiaries should always be aware of their rights and responsibilities with regard to the provision of services in their communities. For instance in the particular case of water services, the beneficiaries have a role to play to ensure availability of water all year round and they should be made to recognize and understand this at the appropriate stage in the design and implementation of water projects. They are to be involved in the maintenance and repair of water facilities by paying levies for pump repairs and arranging to manage the process. Since frequent breakdown of pumps can contribute to unavailability of water all year round, any efforts made by the beneficiaries to undertake repairs as at when due can lead to an improvement in water availability.

Moreover, the emergence of inter-governmental partnership in water service delivery has demonstrated that a decentralized governance system provides better results. It is instructive therefore, to ensure that alternative channels for delivery of public services have a framework for involving beneficiaries in needs assessment, choice of locations of projects and in the operation and management of facilities. Such a framework enhances accountability and guarantees effective service delivery. It will also lead to an improvement in service delivery performance in terms of increased availability, accessibility, quality and adequacy. A delivery channel that lacks such a framework will find it difficult to deliver services on the basis of value for money. The road sector where such a framework is lacking, has witnessed bad governance and poor delivery of service. Thus, in addressing the decay of road infrastructure in the country, there is need to pay attention to governance issues including participation, accountability and transparency in the design and operation of delivery channels.

In the light of the foregoing, a clear message for policy makers is the need to empower the citizens economically to enable them hold providers of public services accountable and to discharge their responsibilities creditably. This is borne out of the finding

that where poverty is endemic, citizens may not be capable of holding service providers and government officials accountable. A critical level of empowerment (in terms of income) is required before citizens can exercise their rights even when they have a clear understanding of such rights. The poverty reduction programmes of the government should therefore, continue to be vigorously pursued so that the capacity of the citizens to demand accountability can be strengthened. Invariably, this is apt to lead to a reduction in corruption and release of funds for financing public service delivery in the country.

Finally, the point must be stressed that good governance requires timely release of funds for financing the provision of public services. This study reveals that a major challenge in the delivery of (education, water and road) services irrespective of the channels is the delay in releasing funds for the execution of projects. The budget process in the country does not allow easy and timely access to the funds by intended users. When budgets are not passed on time by the National Assembly (and even Houses of Assembly in the states), MDG projects suffer due to delays in fund release. Unspent funds during the fiscal year are expected to be returned to the treasury. Where and when this occurs service delivery performance is apt to be adversely affected. Thus, it is apt to point out that accountability and participation are necessary conditions for improved delivery of public services and for good governance. However, they need to be fostered *parri* passu with other key elements of good governance including effective budget process and timely release of funds in order to have any significant improvement in public service delivery in the country.

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Appendix I: Tables

Table 5.1.1: Effectiveness of Delivery of Water Services in Nigeria

Indicator	Response	MDA		CGS		TOTAL MDA/CGS	
		No	%	No	%	No	%
Availability	Yes	146	58.9	314	50.7	460	60.4
	No	102	41.1	200	49.3	302	39.6
Accessibility	Yes	223	86.8	496	96.1	719	93.0
	No	34	13.2	20	3.9	54	7.0
Affordability	Yes	200	88.1	440	91.9	640	90.7
	No	27	11.9	39	8.1	66	9.3
Adequacy	Yes	142	61.5	340	68.1	482	66.0
	No	89	38.5	159	31.9	248	34.0
Quality							
Has taste	Yes	51	19.9	66	12.1	117	14.6
	No	205	80.1	479	87.9	684	85.4
Has colour	Yes	18	7.0	59	11.1	77	9.8
	No	238	93.0	473	88.9	711	90.2
Has sediments	Yes	41	16.6	82	15.4	123	15.7
	No	206	83.4	452	84.6	658	84.3

Source: Authors' Calculation Using 2011 Survey Data

Table 5.2.1: Estimated Regression Model of Effects of Participation on Students' Performance

Dependent Variable: Proportion of Students Who Passed Common Entrance

Variable	Coefficient	S.E.	P>|t|
Number of Teachers	0.177**	0.072	0.015
Distance	-0.027	0.219	0.900
Participation	-0.011	0.045	0.801
North-west	-12.792***	4.873	0.009
North-east	-10.938**	5.207	0.037
North-central	-15.882***	4.357	0.000
South-west	12.966***	4.308	0.003
South-east	-3.373	4.477	0.452
Constant	73.396***	4.576	0.000

Author's computation

Note: ***significant @ one percent level

**significant @ five percent level

Table 5.2.2: Assessment of Accountability Mechanisms

Indicator	Responses	MDA		CGS		Total MDA/CGS	
		No	%	No	%	No	%
Existence of any type of Information	Yes	48	21.3	224	39.7	272	34.5
	No	117	78.7	340	60.3	517	65.5
Availability of Opportunity to make a report to officials in case of dissatisfaction with functionality/quality of water facility	Yes	76	34.5	274	53.0	350	47.5
	No	144	65.5	243	47.0	387	52.5
Availability of Rules and Sanctions guiding use of water facility	Yes	131	51.0	264	48.8	395	49.5
	No	126	49.0	277	51.2	403	50.5

Source: Author's computation using survey data

Table 5.2.3: Estimated Probit Model of Effects of Governance on Water Supply
Dependent Variable: Availability of Water All-year Round

Variable	Coefficient	S.E.	P[|Z|>z]
Participation	0.024	0.126	0.848
Awareness	0.313*	0.163	0.054
Accountability	0.312***	0.123	0.011
Domain (Rural-Urban)	-0.760***	0.123	0.000
Channel of Service Delivery	0.357***	0.136	0.009
North-west	2.703***	0.264	0.000
North-east	1.303***	0.251	0.000
North-central	2.979***	0.262	0.000
South-west	1.451***	0.250	0.000
South-east	0.797***	0.262	0.000
Constant	. -1.730***	0.300	0.000
Log likelihood = -359.62 LR chi2(10) = 456.10 Prob > chi2 = 0.00 Number of obs = 867			

Author's computation

Note: ***significant @ one percent level
*significant @ ten percent level

Table 5.2.4: Marginal Effects of the Variables in the Water Availability Probit Model

Variable	Coefficient	S.E.	P[|Z|>z]
Participation	0.009	0.047	0.848
Awareness	0.118*	0.061	0.054
Accountability	0.117***	0.046	0.011
Domain (Rural-Urban)	-0.268***	0.040	0.000
Channel of Service Delivery	0.134***	0.051	0.008
North-west	0.571***	0.032	0.000
North-east	0.363***	0.046	0.000
North-central	0.681***	0.033	0.000
South-west	0.387***	0.042	0.000
South-east	0.261***	0.071	0.000

Author's computation

Note: ***significant @ one percent level

*significant @ ten percent level

Table 5.3: Alternative Channels of Public Service Delivery in Nigeria

S/N	SECTOR	SERVICE DELIVERY CHANNELS
1	Education	(i) Agencification -Creation of Universal Basic Education Commission (UBEC) (ii) Partnerships (Inter-governmental Partnering) – UBEC at Federal level and State Universal Basic Education Board (SUBEB) at State level
2	Road	(i) Agencification – Creation of the Federal Road Maintenance Agency (FERMA) (ii) Centralized Traditional Bureaucracy (CTB) (a) Federal Government Controlled (involving only Executive Arm of Government – Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development) (b) Federal Government Controlled (involving both Executive and Legislative Arms of Government – Constituency Road Projects)
3	Water	(i) Centralized Traditional Bureaucracy (CTB) MDA-Controlled - Controlled only by Federal Ministry of Water Resources (FMWR) (ii) Partnerships (Inter-governmental Partnering - IGP) -Community participation -Monitoring and Evaluation by private sector, civil society and community-based organizations

Source: Authors' compilation

Table 5.3.1: Estimated Probit Model of Determinants of Participation in Education Sector

Dependent Variable: Participation in Education Service Delivery

Variable	Coefficient	S.E.	P[|Z|>z]
Household size	-0.023	0.015	0.139
Age	0.00013	0.0049	0.978
Income	-1.08e-06**	4.69e-07	0.022
Distance	-0.0038	0.009	0.675
Education	-0.022**	0.010	0.032
Domain (Rural-Urban)	0.047	0.148	0.752
North-west	-0.137	0.132	0.302
North-east	-1.127***	0.194	0.000
North-central	2.356***	0.258	0.000
South-west	-0.044	0.141	0.750
South-east	0.789***	0.237	0.001
Constant	0.386	0.326	0.236
Log likelihood = -464.004 LR chi2(11) = 216.81 Prob > chi2 = 0.00 Number of obs = 833			

Source: Authors' computation

Note: ***significant @ one percent level
**significant @ five percent level

Table 5.3.2: Marginal Effects of Variables in the Education Sector Participation Probit Model

Variable	Coefficient	S.E.	P[|Z|>z]
Household size	-0.0095	0.0062	0.139
Age	-0.000055	0.00197	0.978
Income	-4.28e-07**	0.0000	0.022
Distance	-0.0015	0.0037	0.675
Education	-0.0088**	0.0041	0.032
Domain (Rural-Urban)	0.0186	0.0588	0.751
North-west	-0.0541	0.0522	0.300
North-east	-0.3848***	0.0503	0.000
North-central	0.6182***	0.0251	0.000
South-west	0.0177	0.0557	0.750
South-east	0.2988***	0.0786	0.000

Source: Authors' computation

Note: ***significant @ one percent level
**significant @ five percent level

Table 5.3.3: Estimated Probit Model of Determinants of Accountability in Education Sector

Dependent Variable: Accountability in Education Service Delivery

Variable	Coefficient	S.E.	P[|Z|>z]
Household size	0.026*	0.013	0.057
Age	-0.008*	0.004	0.069
Income	-8.91e-07*	4.84e-07	0.065
Distance	-0.012	0.009	0.208
Education	-0.004	0.010	0.666
Domain (Rural-Urban)	0.047	0.137	0.732
North-west	-0.524***	0.144	0.000
North-east	0.499***	0.149	0.001
North-central	0.267	0.169	0.115
South-west	-0.056	0.142	0.690
South-east	0.971***	0.229	0.000
Constant	0.020	0.311	0.947
Log likelihood = -479.67 LR chi2(11) = 135.00 Prob > chi2 = 0.00 Number of obs = 833			

Source: Authors' computation

Note: ***significant @ one percent level
*significant @ ten percent level

Table 5.3.4: Marginal Effects of Variables in the Education Sector Accountability Probit Model

Variable	Coefficient	S.E.	P[|Z|>z]
Household size	0.009*	0.005	0.057
Age	-0.003*	0.002	0.069
Income	-3.30e-07*	0.000	0.065
Distance	-0.004	0.003	0.207
Education	-0.002	0.003	0.666
Domain (Rural-Urban)	0.017	0.050	0.730
North-west	-0.181***	0.045	0.000
North-east	0.193***	0.058	0.001
North-central	0.102	0.066	0.124
South-west	-0.021	0.052	0.688
South-east	0.372***	0.078	0.000

Source: Authors' computation

Note: ***significant @ one percent level
*significant @ ten percent level

Table 5.3.5 Estimated Probit Model of Determinants of Participation in Water Sector

Dependent Variable: Participation in Water Service Delivery

Variable	Coefficient	S.E.	P[|Z|>z]
Household size	-0.001	0.010	0.908
Age	0.004	0.004	0.312
Education	0.017*	0.009	0.086
Income	-1.19e-06***	3.30e-07	0.000
Domain (Rural-Urban)	0.261**	0.113	0.021
Channel of Service Delivery	0.461***	0.119	0.000
North-west	0.983***	0.198	0.000
North-east	-0.820***	0.230	0.000
North-central	0.259	0.185	0.160
South-west	-0.119	0.202	0.553
South-east	-0.187	0.203	0.356
Constant	-1.187***	0.294	0.000
Log likelihood = -460.33 LR chi2(11) = 138.15 Prob > chi2 = 0.00 Number of obs = 847			

Author's computation

Note: ***significant @ 1 percent level
**significant @ 5 percent level
*significant @ 10 percent level

Table 5.3.6: Marginal Effects of Variables in the Water Sector Participation Probit Model

Variable	Coefficient	S.E.	P[|Z|>z]
Household size	-0.0004	0.0034	0.908
Age	0.0014	0.0014	0.312
Education	0.0058*	0.0034	0.085
Income	-4.08e-07***	0.000	0.000
Domain (Rural-Urban)	0.087***	0.036	0.018
Channel of Service Delivery	0.158***	0.041	0.000
North-west	0.365***	0.074	0.000
North-east	-0.225***	0.046	0.000
North-central	0.091	0.066	0.170
South-west	-0.040	0.065	0.542
South-east	-0.061	0.064	0.336

Source: Author's computation

Note: ***significant @ one percent level
*significant @ ten percent level

Table 5.3.7: Estimated Probit Model of Determinants of Accountability in Water Sector

Dependent Variable: Accountability in Water Service Delivery

Variable	Coefficient	S.E.	P[|Z|>z]
Household size	0.028***	.010	0.007
Age	-0.002	.004	0.635
Education	0.031***	.009	0.002
Income	-4.11e-07*	2.36e-07	0.081
Domain (Rural-Urban)	0.638***	0.113	0.000
Channel of Service Delivery	0.057	0.099	0.561
North-west	0.264	0.190	0.165
North-east	0.520***	0.200	0.009
North-central	0.916***	0.183	0.000
South-west	0.059	0.193	0.760
South-east	-1.269***	0.222	0.000
Constant	-0.935***	0.279	0.001
Log likelihood = -465.588 LR chi2(11) = 242.28 Prob > chi2 = 0.00 Number of obs = 847			

Author's computation

Note: ***significant @ one percent level
*significant @ ten percent level

Table 5.3.8: Marginal Effects of Variables in Water Sector Accountability Probit Model

Variable	Coefficient	S.E.	P[|Z|>z]
Household size	0.0114***	0.0042	0.007
Age	-0.00079	0.0016	0.635
Education	0.0122***	0.0039	0.002
Income	-1.65e-07*	0.0000	0.081
Domain (Rural-Urban)	0.2487***	0.0424	0.000
Channel of Service Delivery	0.0229	0.0395	0.561
North-west	0.1048	0.0747	0.161
North-east	0.2022***	0.0738	0.006
North-central	0.347***	0.0633	0.000
South-west	0.023***	0.0771	0.000
South-east	-0.438***	0.0550	0.000

Source: Author's computation

Note: ***significant @ one percent level
*significant @ ten percent level

Table 5.4: Rural-Urban Split in Accountability of Water Service Delivery

Indicator	Responses	MDA				CGS			
		Rural		Urban		Rural		Urban	
		No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%
Awareness of water Projects	Yes	135	94.4	96	87.3	351	88.6	151	87.3
	No	8	5.6	14	12.7	45	11.4	22	12.7
Awareness of Procedure for Engaging Contractors	Yes	125	87.4	94	86.2	346	88.5	143	84.1
	No	18	12.6	15	13.8	45	11.5	27	15.9
Participation in Execution of water projects	Yes	54	37.8	5	4.5	180	32.0	128	32.7
	No	89	62.2	105	95.5	382	68.0	263	67.3
Existence of access to any type of information on the water facility	Yes	19	16.0	29	27.4	224	39.7	154	39.3
	No	100	84.0	77	72.6	340	60.3	238	60.7
Availability of opportunity to make a report to officials in case of dissatisfaction with functionality of water facility	Yes	40	33.6	36	35.6	185	52.1	89	54.9
Availability of Rules and sanctions guiding use of water facility	No	79	66.4	65	64.4	170	47.9	73	45.1

Source: Authors' Computation Using 2011 Survey Data

Appendix II: Figures

Figure 5.1: Proportion of Respondents That Claimed Availability of Teachers



Source: Authors' Plot Using Survey Data 2011

Figure 5.2: Proportion of Respondents That Claimed Adequacy of Classrooms



Source: Authors' Plot Using Survey Data 2011

Figure 5.3: Proportion of Respondents That Claimed Accessibility of Education Projects



Source: Authors' Plot Using Survey Data 2011

Figure 5.4: Proportion of Respondents That Claimed Affordability of Education Services



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Source: Authors' Plot Using Survey Data 2011

Figure 5.5: Proportion of Respondents That Claimed Access to Any Type of Information



Source: Authors' Plot Using Survey Data 2011

Annex III : Questionnaire

GOVERNANCE AND PERFORMANCE OF PUBLIC SERVICE DELIVERY FOR ACHIEVING MDGs IN NIGERIA QUESTIONNAIRE FOR BENEFICIARIES OF CGS AND MDA WATER PROJECTS			
S/No	**QUESTIONS AND FILTERS**	**CODING CATEGORIES**	**CODES**
A	**General Information**		
A1	State (Name)		
A2	Urban Community (Name)		
A3	Rural Community (Name)		
A4	Household size		
A5	Gender of Respondents	Male	1
		Female	2
A6	Age Last birthday		
A7	Marital Status	Never Married	1
		Married	2
		Separated	3
		Divorced	4
		Widow	5
A8	Highest Educational Attainment	No formal education	1
		Primary School not completed	2
		Primary School completed	3
		Secondary School Completed	4
		Secondary School not Completed	5
		Post secondary school	6
		Koranic Education	7
		Other (Specify)	8
A9	Primary Occupation	Farming	1
		Petty trading	2
		Artisan	3
		Public Civil Servant	4
		Private Sector Employee	5
		Unemployed	6
A10	Secondary Occupation	Farming	1
		Petty trading	2
		Artisan	3
		Public Civil Servant	4
		Private (Forma sector)	5
		Others (Specify)	6

A11	Average Monthly Income (Write)		
B.	**Governance Issues - Probe and discuss the following**		
B1	*Awareness of CGS water project:*		
B11	Are you aware of the CGS water project in the community?	Yes	1
		No	2
B12	If yes to Q.B1, what was the source of information?	Members of the community	1
		Radio/Television	2
		State CGS officials	3
		Contractor	4
		Others (Specify)	5
B2	*Participation in the execution of CGS water projects:*		
B21	Did you participate in the execution of CGS water project?	Yes	1
		No	2
B22	If response to B21 is yes, at what level did you participate?	Needs Assessment and prioritization	1
		Project identification	2
		Location of water facility	3
		Construction/Drilling of water project	4
		Determining User charges	5
		Repairs and Maintenance	6
		Monitoring and evaluation	
B23	If response to B22 is No, why did you not participate?	Not aware of the project	1
		No opportunity to participate	2
		Lack of time/chance	3
B3	*Transparency*		
B31	Are you aware of the stage - by - stage process of the construction of the water facility	Yes	1
		No	2
B32	If response to B31 is yes, what was your source of information	Community leaders	1
		CGS	2
		Others (specify)	3
B33	Are you aware of the procedure for engaging the contractors that executed the water facility	No	1
		Yes	2
B34	Are you aware of the cost of constructing the water facility	Yes	1
		No	2

B35	If response to B34 is yes, what is the source of information	Community leaders	1
		CGS officials	2
		Others (specify)	3
B36	Do you have access to any type of information on the water facility?	Yes	1
		No	2
B37	If response to B36 is yes, what is the procedure for accessing information on the water facility?		
B4	*Accountability*		
B41	Are there rules and sanctions guiding the use of CGS water facility?	Yes	1
		No	2
B42	If response to B41 is yes, describe these sanctions and rules		
B43	Do these sanctions and rules apply to all members of the community or just some groups?	All	1
		Some groups	2
B44	If response to B43 is 2, mention these groups and the reasons for this		
B45	Have any of these rules and sanctions been enforced before?	Yes	1
		No	2
B46	If response to B45 is yes, give a narration of the episode		
B47	If you are dissatisfied with functionality/quality of the CGS water facility, is there opportunity for you to make a report to CGS officials?	Yes	1
		No	2
B48	If response to B47 is yes, what is the procedure?		
B49	Has there been a case of reporting before?	Yes	1
		No	2
B410	If response to B49 is yes, give a narration of the episode		
B5	*Agency Issues*		
B51	Apart from CGS officials, who are those involved in the execution of the water projects in the community?		
B52	What was the role played by each of the actors?		
B53	How do the actors relate with one another?		
B54	How do they relate with individuals in the community?		
B55	Was there a case where contractors handling the water project were stopped and another engaged?	Yes	1
		No	2
B56	If yes what was responsible for the action?		
B7	*Stewardship Issues:*		
B71	How do you see the attitude of the CGS	Positive/favourable	1

	officials with respect to the execution of the water project	Negative/Unfavourable	2
B72	How do you see the attitude of the contractors that handled the CGS water project	Positive/Favourable	1
		Negative/Unfavourable	2
B73	How do you see the attitude of other actors involved in the CGS water project	Positive/Favourable	1
		Negative/Unfavourable	2
B74	Do you think there was adequate motivation for those who were involved in the execution of the CGS water project	Yes	1
		No	2
B75	What is your reason for the response to B74?		
C	**Performance/Effectiveness Issues**		
C1	*Availability and Quantity*		
C11	Is water from the CGS facility available all the year round?	Yes	1
		No	2
C12	If response to C11 is No, what other water facilities are used?		
C13	Is the water drawn from the CGS adequate to meet the household water needs?	Yes	1
		No	2
C14	How many times is water from CGS water facility pumped per day for community use?		
C15	On an average what is the time spent a day to draw enough water for the household need from the CGS water facility		
C2	*Accessibility and Affordability*		
C21	What is the distance to the CGS water facility from home?		
C22	Do you consider CGS water facility very accessible to your residence?	Yes	1
		No	2
C23	Do you pay for drawing water from CGS water facility?	Yes	1
		No	2
C24	What proportion of the household income is spent for drawing water from CGS water facility in a month?		
C25	Do you consider drawing water from CGS water facility affordable to the household?	Yes	1
		No	2
C3	*Quality and Functionality*		
C31	Do you think adequate measures are taken to ensure water from CGS water facility is of good quality	Yes	1
		No	2
C32	Give reason for your response to C31		
C33	Does water from CGS water facility have taste?	Yes	1
		No	2
C34	Does water from CGS water facility have colour?	Yes	1
		No	2
C35	Does water from CGS water facility have sediments?	Yes	1
		No	2
C36	Is the immediate surrounding of the CGS	Yes	1

	water facility always clean?	No	2
C37	Is the CGS water facility always covered?	Yes	1
		No	2
C38	Is the CGS water facility functional throughout the year?	Yes	1
		No	2
C39	Give reason for your response to C38		
C310	How often does CGS water facility breakdown	Frequently	1
		Once in a week	2
		Once in a month	3
		Never	4
C4	*Repairs and maintenance*		
C41	Is there arrangement for carrying out repairs and maintenance works on CGS water facility?	Yes	1
		No	2
C42	Who are those involved in carrying out repairs and maintenance works on CGS water facility in the community		
C43	How often are repairs and maintenance carried out on CGS water facility	Frequently	1
		Once in a week	2
		Once in a month	3
		Never	4
C44	How is fund for repairs and maintenance works on CGS facility sources?		
C45	Who are those managing such funds?		
D	**External Influence**		
D1	Political factors:		
D11	Does political affiliation in the community affect use of water from the CGS water facility?	Yes	1
		No	2
D12	Give reason for your response to D11		
D13	Does political affiliation in the community affect repairs and maintenance of CGS water facility?	Yes	1
		No	2
D14	Give reason for your response to D13		
D15	Are there cases where community leaders and chief use their influence on the use of water from CGS water facility	Yes	1
		No	2
D16	Give reasons for your response to D15		
D2	Cultural factors:		
D21	Are there cultural or traditional factors that influence the use of water from CGS water facility?	Yes	1
		No	2
D22	If response to D2 is yes, what are these factors?		
D3	Religious factors:		
D31	Are there religious factors that influence the use of water from CGS water facility?	Yes	1
		No	2
D32	If response to D4 is yes, what are these factors		

E	**Sustainability**				
E1	Is there arrangement for ensuring functionality of the CGS water facility?	Yes			1
		No			2
E2	If response to E1 is yes, what is the arrangement?				
E3	Is there arrangement for ensuring regular repairs and maintenance of CGS water facility?	Yes			1
		No			2
E4	If response to E3 is Yes, what is the arrangement?				
E5	Are there sanctions for misuse of CGS water facility by any member of the community?	Yes			1
		No			2
E6	If response to E5 is yes, what are these sanctions?				
E7	Have the sanctions ever been enforced?	Yes			1
		No			2
E8	If response to E7 is Yes, give a narration of the episode.				
F	**Impact**				
F1	Assess the impact of CGS water facility in the community with respect to the following comparing the situation now and before (Better 1; Worse 2; No difference 3)				
F11	Present state of water availability	1	2	3	
F12	Present state of quantity of water	1	2	3	
F13	Present state of water quality	1	2	3	
F14	Present state of water affordability	1	2	3	
F15	Present state of accessibility of water facility	1	2	3	
F16	Present state of incidence of water-borne diseases	1	2	3	
F17	present state of time spent fetching water	1	2	3	
F18	Present state of having time for economic activities	1	2	3	