



# **Governance, Accountability and Effective Basic Service Delivery in Sierra Leone**

By:

**Centre for Economic and Social Policy Analysis**

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## List of Acronyms

AICD	Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic
AM	Accountability Mechanism
AMCOW	African Ministers Council on Water
BEST	Business Engineering Science Technology
CBO	Community Based Organisation
CESPA	Centre for Economic and Social Policy Analysis
CfW	<i>cash-for-work</i>
CLoGPAS	Comprehensive Local Government Performance Assessment System
CTA	Community Teacher Associations
CWC	Community water Committees
GDN	Global Development Network
DoW	Department of Works
DWSC	District Water and Sanitation Committee
EPSD	Effective Public Service Delivery
EWRA	Energy and Water Regulatory Authority
GVWC	Guma Valley Water Company
IPHPS	International Pentecostal Holiness Primary School
JMP	Joint Monitoring Programme
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
MLGCD	Ministry of Local Government and Community Development
MEST	Ministry of Education Science and Technology
MEWR	Ministry of Energy and Water Resources
NaCSA	National Commission for Social Action
NWRB	National Water Resources Board
NPSE	National Primary School Examination
PASGR	Partnership for African Social and Governance Research
PE	Primary Education
PETS	Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys
RPSDP	Rural and Private Sector Development Project
SALWACO	Sierra Leone Water Company
SLRA	Sierra Leone Roads Authority
WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
WC	Water Committee
WSD	Water Supply Division



## Executive Summary

Sierra Leone's Post-War development is normatively and politically hinged on a signpost of *good governance*<sup>1</sup>. While the term *good governance* is illusive, the country's emphasis of good governance presupposed a shift from government to governance, which assumes some forms of legitimacy, rule of law and inclusiveness. As a result, almost all the governance related strategies and public policy documents articulate the consequences of *bad governance*. Most of these policies argue that *bad governance* is not only the most dominant factor for the causes of the ten-years bloodiest war in the country's history but it is also believed to be the main cause of the endemic poverty that has kept Sierra Leone at the bottom of the Human Development Index<sup>2</sup> (SL-PRSP, 2004). Consequently, the country's post-war governance is witnessing far-reaching, if not radical governance reforms on paper that aim at achieving the proclamation of *good governance*, which among others promotes democratic, inclusive, rule of law and accountable system of governance (Sierra Leone Constitution 1992; Anti-Corruption Act 2000; Local Government Act 2004; SL-PRSP 2004/8). This has resulted to the comprehensive democratic and devolution policy and processes, and a commitment in participatory development that not only engages people but also seeks to fully involve them in many policy formulation processes to ensure that their voices are heard<sup>3</sup> on issues that affect their livelihoods<sup>4</sup>.

It is evident therefore that the lessons learnt from the "*bad governance*" eras have not only called for public reforms but provide the impetus for far-reaching governance reforms that have seen the democratic reestablishment of district councils and the schedule for devolution of power and functions to these councils in Sierra Leone. In particular, basic education, public health, and district road network, especially Class F roads<sup>5</sup> (in rural areas and district headquarter towns) are in the process of being devolved (if not fully devolved)<sup>6</sup>. There is therefore the need to learn about the varieties of governance and effective basic service delivery and of cooperation or not between state actors (principal and agent) on the one part and non-state (profit and non-profit) actors and communities/clients on the other. This is important in the enhancement of *collective efficiency* that can accrue via *joint action* and *accountability* as groups/agencies become embedded in networks of suppliers, service providers and consumers.

This country study on ***Governance, Accountability and Effective Service Delivery*** in Sierra Leone is part of a global research in ***Varieties of Governance: Effective Service Delivery*** (VG-ESD) that targets developing and transitional countries in the three regions of the Global South, which includes South America, Africa and Asia. In Africa, the research is undertaken in four countries- Ethiopia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Uganda. The critical empirical question raised in this study on the governance of basic services *concerns the latitude with which services are delivered by agents and whether they operate autonomously or are steered by the accountability mechanisms and how effective the mode of delivery of basic services is in the case of primary education, water supply and feeder roads in Sierra Leone?*

The study was conducted in 8 out of the 14 districts of the country, with two districts in each region (North, South, East and West). Each regional headquarter district was purposively

<sup>1</sup>{SL-Vision 2025 (2003), National Recovery Strategy (NRS 2001) Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy (IPRSP 2002), SL-PRSP I & II (2005 & 2009)}

<sup>2</sup>see for example UN Human Development Reports (HDR - 2000 to 2006)

<sup>3</sup>see e.g. the Vision 2025, SL-PRSP I&II pp10 & pp25, respectively

<sup>4</sup>see for example the peoples engagement in the medium term development policies of PRSP I & II and the long term development and transformation (2011)

<sup>5</sup>Feeder roads

<sup>6</sup>Katherine Whiteside Casey Decentralization in Practice , Elizabeth Foster and Rachel Glennester; Impact of Decentralization on Public Services: Evidence to Date in Decentralization, Democracy, and Development : *Recent Experience from Sierra Leone Yohmei Zhou Ed (2009)*

selected, while the remaining districts were randomly selected. Both quantitative and qualitative techniques were used in the collection of data in a combination of structured and semi-structured questionnaires. 791 households, 59 principals and 133 agents were interviewed during the fielding of the survey. In addition, 30 experts were interviewed. The study analysed four areas, viz.: i) Governance actors in basic service delivery, ii) Accountability mechanisms, iii) Sectoral differences in the governance of basic services, and iv) Regional differences in the delivery of these Services. The main findings of the study are discussed below:

### ***Main Findings of the Study on Varieties of Governance: Effective Service Delivery***

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**Governance Actors** basic services such as primary education, water supply and feeder roads are public goods that are necessary if not a right for all households in the country. The main finding in this analysis is that in spite of the dominance of the public sector in the delivery of these services, there is still diversity in the provision of these services with the private and communities playing a significant role. While primary education (PE) is still dominated by the public as reported at 84% (being the combined of government/government assisted) of households, the private sector is gaining significance, accounting for about 16% of households PE providers in the country as oppose to the 5% in official records (World Bank, 2007; MEST, 2007). In the potable water supply (PWS) and feeder roads, the community players are gaining space and momentum accounting for about 59% and 52%, respectively in the delivery of these services, albeit with direct and indirect financing from the government. The contribution of the private sector appears to be driven by the liberal market space and the little tapped business opportunities in the PE and PWS, where demand and supply are not constrained by free public services compared to the roads sector where user fees do not exist. The community participation in potable water sector arises from the long and sustained NGOs' support in the water sector and the availability of appropriate safe water supply technologies for the delivery of both community and private water supply. On the roads sector, the social protection measures - *cash for work* (CfW) programs – aimed at cushioning unemployment among youths and vulnerable population has boosted community participation (CESPA, 2008).

The extent of effectiveness of these providers is still a source of public concern. In the PE sector, households are generally satisfied with the delivery of public primary education more so with the government (58%) and government assisted schools (55.5%) than the private schools (51%). This is expected given the widespread and fee-free nature of these public schools (government and government assisted). However, the effective governance of these schools is still a challenge due to the limited access to teaching and learning materials (TLMs), high pupil/teacher ratio (PTR), teaching contact hours, etc. (CSR preliminary results, 2010; CESPA, 2010). Private schools interviewed for the EPSD survey reported that all pupils in their schools own a textbook provided by the parents. On the whole the implications of high PTR and fewer contact hours in the public schools put them at a disadvantage in terms of effectiveness in education delivery when compared to their private school counterparts.

Households access to safe water supply appears to be significantly high (60%) in the country. While the country must have surpassed the MDG target by providing more than half the population with water, still a very good proportion of households (40%) draw their water supply from unsafe open wells/streams, and most of the safe water supply is intermittent with about 42% of households not having water supply throughout the year. In spite of the significant MDG achievement, households' are not overtly satisfied with the

providers. Less than 50% of the consumers are satisfied with water supply - public (46%), community (49%) and private (47%). This finding shows the feelings of clients on the potable water service. While water is naturally available, the providers of this basic service hardly meet the desired safe and regular water supply needs of the clients/consumers.

While feeder roads, on the other hand are principally delivered by a Central Agent (SLRA), the findings of the study show that a very significant number of communities are involved in the delivery of the feeder roads. Generally, however, households are not satisfied with the services provided by the roads' sector, no matter who the service providers are – public, community private. This might be due to the failure of SLRA to deliver safe *motorable* roads in all districts in the country and the unresolved tensions as a result of sudden shift from a professionally driven development to community-based approach on road works. According to the chief engineer of feeder roads, the CfW are not guided by any engineering standards and specification. The emergence and growing significance of the CfW in feeder roads is changing the contractual landscape of feeder roads, which was hitherto dominated by SLRA and formal contractors.

This scheme was designed with the expectation that the CfW *de facto* contractors will be trained and supervised by the implementing agency's (NaCSA) engineers and the SLRA district engineers and will over time, empower these informal contractors towards more professional contracting standards. According to the chief engineer of feeder roads, the lack of cooperation from SLRA is due to the adulteration of engineering principles, standards and specifications in the implementation of these community-based public works. However, the involvement of communities in the delivery of feeder roads provides necessary, if not sufficient rationale for the need for the decentralisation of this sub-sector. Recent SLRA press release affirmed this long awaited decentralisation of the feeder roads sub-sector.

**Accountability Mechanism** is the decision structure that influences effective service delivery. The study finds that the PE governance is over laden by a web of accountability mechanisms (AM) at both the central/local government and community levels, which in part is a consequence of the partial devolution. The pathway in public governance of PE that has evolved over the years for effective accountability at the demand-side is in practice very long (central - local government/proprietors - supervisors – inspector - head teachers – SMC – frontline teachers - client). Even though the contribution of the private sector in the delivery of PE is small, its accountability mechanism (owner/proprietor-head teacher-frontline provider -clients) sharply differs from its public counterpart. An assessment of the effect of these AM of public/private schools relative to their performance in the NPSE (2010/11) shows that the private sector irrespective of the incentive structure performed far better than its public counterparts. The lesson learnt from this is that *the private sector with shorter accountability mechanisms irrespective of lower incentives is likely to be more effective under similar conditions in the delivery of basic education*. This therefore supports the argument in the literature that *shorter accountability mechanisms* are more likely to be *effective and efficient* than the longer routes used in the public schools to deliver effective basic service.

However, this finding is unique for PE and cannot be generalised in the water and roads sector. It is also noteworthy that both the potable water supply and roads are governed by professional engineering agencies, unlike PE. The accountability mechanism of potable water supply (PWS) – central/corporations – local government/WASH inspectors – NGO/water committees – clients - and feeder roads (central/SLRA-regional engineers-local government/district engineers-roads' foremen/contractor -community/clients) are therefore relatively shorter if compared to civil service-base PE delivery system. It appears therefore that the semi-autonomous public corporation (GVWC/SALWACO) and agency (SLRA) were established by the central government to shorten the accountability mechanism to not only enhance their effectiveness and efficiency but to also reduce the *information asymmetric*

*problems* faced by public providers. As to whether the shorter accountability route in the water and roads sectors has helped improve service, has not been ascertained in this study, as services in most of these agencies' operational areas are still intermittent and public dissatisfaction is among the highest for these sectors of the study. Some of the reasons advanced for the abysmal performance of both public water companies are the lack of trained personnel and accountability systems for a modern water utility, old and inadequate distribution systems, insufficient funding and very low tariffs as against high cost of production (DFID, 2008; UNDP, 2009; Bennett et al, 2011).

The difference between sectors in terms of physical facilities/technologies used, accountability mechanisms are significant but as this study shows they have little effect on the governance modalities. Formal institutional structures set up to deliver these basic services appear to be unable to effectively deliver these services. To aid these public institutional arrangements, participatory mechanisms at community-level have been drawn upon to assist in delivery of these services. The study finds that all the three sectors (feeder roads, the water and PE sectors) have drawn on these community-based institutions.

Although the government recognises the existence of community-based organisation such as SMCs and water committees, their roles remain voluntary (CESPA, 2008). In general, all SMC in both public and private schools and the water committees are perceived to be effective in their respective communities. In spite of this positive picture painted by the households for their community-based committees in the education and the water sectors, other findings point to serious internal and external problems, which inhibit these CBOs' ability to hold the primary service providers accountable. These include weak financial base, lack of engagement skills, poor attitude of state agents towards them and certain legal and policy drawbacks such as the Public Order Act of 1965 (World Bank, 2007). There is very little evidence to show that CfW which is now a national program based on community-driven type approach to deliver feeder roads is relatively effective, except for the fact that it is a cheaper approach to deliver feeder roads. According to the chief engineer of feeder roads at SLRA, the performance of CfW does not meet engineering standards and specifications. In his observation, most CfW road works are washed away by the end of each raining season due to the lack of technical skills, engineering designs, standards and specifications. The need to significantly empower these community-based organisations to be able to hold service providers accountable cannot therefore be over emphasised.

The regional differences in the analysis of the mode and degree of participation significantly reveal some expected and unexpected differences between regions. Understandably, the significantly high participation and inclination to exact transparency and accountability from basic service providers by households in the Western region might be due to its cosmopolitan nature and centrality of the region. Western region is where the seat of the central government is located compared to the remotely located Eastern region. The unexpected significant finding that the largely excluded households in the East are more likely to be more proactive towards participation as an end and more inclined to holding accountable service providers is amazing and thus needs to be further examined, especially because of the fact that this outcome is similar for both the Eastern and Western as opposed to the Northern and Southern regions. In fact most households in the South hardly demand for better services. This thus provides the necessary rationale for strengthening decentralisation and empowering communities with the bid to improving *voice and accountability* in delivery of basic services.

#### *Policy-related Recommendations*

1. The main finding in this analysis is that in spite of the dominance of the public sector in the delivery of these services, there is still diversity in the provision of these services with the private sector and communities playing a significant role. The

government should therefore continue to provide liberal space for both the private (for and not profit) and communities for the enhancement of *collective efficiency* that can accrue via *joint action* and *accountability* as groups/agencies become embedded in networks of suppliers, service providers and consumers.

2. An assessment of the performance of public/private schools in the NPSE (2010/11) shows that private sector irrespective of the incentives structure performed far better than its public counterparts. The significant lesson from this finding is that *the private sector with shorter accountability mechanisms irrespective of lower incentives is likely to be more effective under similar conditions in the delivery of basic education*. This therefore supports the argument in the literature that *shorter accountability mechanisms* are more likely to be *effective and efficient* than the longer routes used in the public schools to deliver effective basic service. It is therefore recommended that *the government expands the liberalisation of the education landscape to allow government assisted schools to operate autonomously and to encourage the continued participation of the for-profit private sector.*
3. While the country must have surpassed the MDG target because more than half the population has access to water supply, a very good proportion of households (40%) draw their water supply from unsafe open wells/streams. Most of the safe water supply is intermittent with about 42% of households not having regular water supply throughout the year. Given that the opportunity of low-cost appropriate technologies in the water supply sector exists (which in some cases is as low as US\$20 per household), the government of Sierra Leone should exploit this to deliver safe water supply to all especially in rural areas.
4. Households especially in the Northern and Southern regions barely demand information from their agents and neither do they hold them accountable; in fact most households in the South hardly demand for better services. Instead, they participate in maintenance of the facilities. This thus provides the necessary rationale for strengthening decentralisation and empowering communities with the bid to improving voice and accountability in the delivery of basic services.
5. The findings of this study are not able to illustrate strong evidence of effectiveness of CBOs in the delivery of education, water and roads services. Other findings point to serious internal and external problems which inhibit these CBOs' ability to hold the primary service providers accountable. The need to significantly empower these community-based organisations to be able to hold accountable service providers cannot therefore be over emphasised.
6. Arguably, while roads construction/rehabilitation is relatively capital-intensive, the efficient use of the limited resource for the CfW scheme needs to be technically examined to minimise the cost of delivery of good quality feeder roads on the one hand and in meeting basic engineering standards and specification, on the other.

#### *Recommendations for further studies*

- i. The unexpectedly significant finding that the largely excluded households in the East are more likely to be more proactive towards participation as an end and more inclined to holding accountable service providers is very surprising. Especially when viewed against the backdrop of the poor state of facilities and the general dissatisfaction with all the services as was recorded in the region. We therefore recommend further studies that can ascertain or refute the fact that when people are faced with poor service provision, they begin to see their

participation in service provision as well as holding service providers accountable as a means to getting better services.

- ii. It appears that the semi-autonomous public corporation (GVWC/SALWACO) and agency (SLRA) were established by the central government to shorten the accountability mechanism in an effort to not only enhance effectiveness and efficiency but to also reduce the information asymmetric problems faced by public providers. The study has not been able to ascertain why the shorter accountability route in the water and roads sectors has been unable to improve service delivery. There is therefore the need for further studies on the effectiveness of public corporation in the delivery of basic services.

# Introductory Context

## 1.1 Introduction

There is now a growing shift from government to governance in Sub-Saharan Africa, where services are increasingly delivered by non-state (profit and non-profit) actors, see for example Awortwi, 2004; 2012 in print; Milward and Provan, 2000; World Bank, 2004; Stoker, 1998. The conceptual shift from government to governance according to Benz and Papadopoulos (2006) is as a result of the changing role of the nation state which has occurred with the emergence of new forms of democratic institutions and actors to challenge the status quo. Complexity has been compounded by the trend toward establishing principal-agent relations with private firms and voluntary agencies as a result of purchaser provider relationships (Awortwi, 2004; Milward and Provan, 2000). At the same time, the central government has become hollowed out as power is devolved from state to local governments (Stoker, 1998). In effect the command and control mechanisms associated with bureaucracy are being replaced by much more complicated relationships for the delivery of human services (Milward and Provan, 2000).

*Governance* is a more inclusive term concerned with creating the conditions for ordered rule and collective action often including agents in the private and non-profit sectors, as well as within the public sector (ibid). The essence of governance is its focus on *governing mechanisms* such as systems of accountability and monitoring that do not rest solely on the authority and sanctions of government (Stoker, 1998). These mechanisms are used to connect networks of actors, who operate in various domains of public policy and services such as education, roads, health, or economic development, in general (ibid). What is astonishing about this worldwide movement away from government to governance of public services, according to Milward and Provan (2000) is that 'there is little evidence that governments or academics know much about how to govern or manage these networks of providers'.

Empirical evidence has however shown the impact in terms of accelerated growth, reducing poverty rates and inequality that improvement in education, access to safe water supply and roads can have over time<sup>7</sup>. Education and water supply are key social sectors important in themselves, as well as, for their impact on economic growth, equality of opportunities and human development and for its relationship with other important development factors such as health, fertility rates and political development. In the same vein, the importance of a well designed, built and maintained road network in both urban and rural areas cannot be underestimated in its role of facilitating a vibrant economy, reducing poverty and providing access to education and health facilities (GDN, 2010).

There is therefore the need to learn about governance and effective basic service delivery and cooperation between state and non-state actors on the one part and beneficiary/client communities on the other. This is important in the enhancement of *collective efficiency* that can accrue via *joint action* and *accountability* as groups/agencies become embedded in networks of users, suppliers, consumers and producers (Stoker, 1998; Milward and Provan, 2000). This study therefore seeks to learn about *governance, accountability and effective service delivery*. The critical empirical question raised in this study concerns *the latitude with which services are delivered by agents and whether they operate autonomously or are steered by the accountability mechanisms, and how effective is the mode of delivery of these basic services for the case of primary education, water supply and feeder roads in Sierra Leone.*

<sup>7</sup>GDN Concept Note – Varieties of Governance (2010)

## 1.2 Research Problem Statement

In contemporary times, a variety of players, especially the private (for and not for-profit) have become visible in basic service delivery, in particular primary education and water supply (World Bank, 2009; MEST, 2007; Wash Policy 2010). However, there is very little literature on the systems of accountability and effectiveness of these governance types of basic service delivery in the country. The contemporary attempts in Sierra Leone that aim to learn about effective delivery of basic services were limited to the extent of *access to these public services and public perceptions on the delivery of these services*.

In this regard, both the GSL and donor agencies are supporting various studies to learn whether their efforts benefit the target population, especially vulnerable people. Key among these studies are the government funded and managed *public expenditure tracking surveys* see Government of Sierra Leone PETS Reports (2000 – 2011), DFID Funded *Service Delivery and Perception Studies* (SDPS) conducted by CESPAs (2006 – 2008) and the World Bank funded *annual assessment study of basic services devolved to the district councils* conducted by the decentralisation secretariat. These studies mainly focus on resource transfer (PETS) and frontline service delivery and peoples' perceptions (CESPA, 2006-08). None of the studies mentioned above, nor any known literature on Sierra Leone has focused on governance mechanism and the effect of governance type on basic service delivery. The limited knowledge in this area of research in the country provides sufficient motivation for this country study on *governance, accountability and effective service delivery*.

It is expected that this study with a focus on *governance actors, accountability mechanisms and the effectiveness of governance type* in the service delivery chain will shed light on **governance of basic services in Sierra Leone** and may thereby inform policy makers to enhance the delivery systems of basic services and/or influence government's efforts at achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).

## 1.3 Research Objectives

The main research objective is to study the *modalities of governance and the delivery of effective basic service to Sierra Leoneans in the case of the primary education, feeder roads and potable water supply sub-sectors*.

Specifically the research seeks to:

1. Study the various governance actors, public satisfaction with these providers and the basis of this public opinion;
2. Assess the Accountability Mechanisms (AM) and to examine which AM operate under different governance types;
3. Analyse sectoral and regional differences in service provision and determine the causes and consequences of the differences within and between sectors and regions in the delivery of these basic services;
4. Suggest feasible institutional and policy options for improving basic service delivery in Sierra Leone;
5. Disseminate findings to a wide policy and research audience at national, regional and global levels.

## 1.4 Research Question

The main question for this study on basic service delivery concerns the degree to which services are delivered by agents and whether they operate autonomously or are steered by



the accountability mechanisms and how effective the mode of delivery is in such sub-sectors as primary education, water supply and feeder roads.

## **1.5 Organisation of the Report**

The report is organized in six sections as follows:

- Section One is the introduction which discusses the distinction between governance and government, and the relevance and problem statement of the study. The research objectives and questions are embedded in this introductory chapter.
- Section Two presents the country and sectors' institutional context. It provides the background details with respect to the country' geographic and political economy and the sectors studied.
- Section Three discusses the conceptual framework and literature review focusing on the governance of effective public service provision
- The methodology of the research is discussed in Section Four.
- Section Five presents the analyses and discussions of the study. The analysis is divided into three sub-sections, vis. :
  - i. *Governance actors and effective service delivery,*
  - ii. *Accountability mechanisms and effectiveness of the delivery,*
  - iii. *Sector differences in the governance of services provision.*
- The conclusion, policy implications and/or recommendations are discussed in the final section, Section Six.

## 2.0 Country and Sector Context

### 2.1 Country Overview

Sierra Leone is located on the West Coast of Africa between latitudes 7<sup>0</sup> and 10<sup>0</sup> N, and longitudes 10<sup>0</sup> and 14<sup>0</sup>N (see map below). The country occupies a land area of about 72,300km<sup>2</sup> of which 60,350 km<sup>2</sup> (6.1 million hectares) is considered arable. The country's population is projected to about 5 Million (2004 Census).

**Figure 1: Map Showing West Africa and Sierra Leone**



After a chequered and turbulent post-colonial history that propelled the country to an all-out bloody civil war (1992 -2002), Sierra Leone's Post-War development lays strong emphasis on a democratic and decentralised governance system<sup>8</sup>. The third multi-party election was conducted in 2007 based on the 1992 constitution<sup>9</sup>, which many observers considered free and fair (Awoko News Paper No152 Sept. 2008). The local government Act (LGA, 2004) was enacted to serve as a comprehensive legislation that would encapsulate the major thematic focus of a well-functioning local government and the effective management of devolved functions (Gaima, 2009). Consequently, these governance reforms have resulted in the democratic reestablishment of district councils in 2004 and the schedule for devolution of power and functions to these councils was also enacted (ibid). In particular, basic education, public health, and district road network, especially Class F roads (in rural areas and district headquarter towns) are in the process of being devolved (if not fully devolved)<sup>10</sup>.

### 2.2 Context of the Basic Service Delivery in Sierra Leone

Basic services such as primary education, safe potable water supply and feeder roads network are fundamentally linked to basic human needs<sup>11</sup> (Kamara, 2003; Krantz, 2001; Denton 1990) and by extension to the millennium development goal. They are therefore important not only for their own sake but are critical for households' livelihoods (Kamara, 2003; Chambers, 1992). In Sierra Leone, the government puts a premium on primary education, water supply, feeder roads and is in the process of been devolved, if not fully devolved to local government. This sub-section will discuss primary education, potable water supply and feeder roads, in the context of Sierra Leone.

<sup>8</sup>{SL-Vision 2025 (2003), National Recovery Strategy (NRS 2001), Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy (IPRSP 2002), SL-PRSP I & II (2004 & 2009)}

<sup>9</sup> Sierra Leone's Constitution (1992)

<sup>10</sup>Katherine Whiteside Casey (2009) Decentralization in Practice, Elizabeth Foster and Rachel Glennester; Impact of Decentralization on Public Services: Evidence to Date in Decentralization, Democracy, and Development: *Recent Experience from Sierra Leone* Yohmei Zhou Ed (2009)

<sup>11</sup>Denton, John A. (1990). *Society and the official world: a reintroduction to sociology*. Dix Hills, N.Y.: General Hall. p. 17. [ISBN 0-930390-94-6](https://doi.org/10.1080/0303390946).

### 2.2.1 Primary Education Sub-sector

Education in Sierra Leone dates back to the 19<sup>th</sup> century when missionaries built schools and other institutions of learning. In the colonial era the delivery of schools was entirely done by Christian missionaries with direct financial support from the colonial government (Ministry of Education Science and Technology – MEST - 2007<sup>12</sup>). The post-colonial efforts aimed at nationalisation of education and therefore made the Ministry of Education the supreme authority in control and delivery of education in Sierra Leone (Education Act 1964). The act also mandated the handing over of all schools to this Ministry and counterparts – the District Education Councils to be managed by the then local government (Allie, 1990). The new education act, Education Act of 2004, further reinforced this control of education delivery system in the hands of the Minister of Education (MEST, 2004). The act also distinguished between the role of government and government assisted schools.

The government primary schools following the 2004 decentralisation Act were to be handed over to local government. The district council were thus required by law to take control of delivery of basic schools (primary and junior secondary schools), as well as centres of adult literacy with technical advice to be provided by the district inspectorate division of the MEST (MEST, 2007; ESE, 2005). Their functions would include supervision, recruitment and paying of salaries, the procurement of textbooks and teaching and learning materials and the rehabilitation and construction of schools.

The government assisted schools on the other hand are the traditional mission and other privately owned primary schools that benefit from direct government subventions including the paying of teachers and the provision of teaching and learning materials (MEST, 2004; World Bank, 2009). These assisted schools were charged with the responsibility of managing the schools with oversight provided by the local councils and the district directorates of education. The Act also encouraged private participation in the delivery of primary schools. Private primary schools are only required to register their schools with MEST but have the sole responsibility of setting fees, paying their teachers and providing teaching and learning materials.

The primary schools delivery system of Sierra Leone is seen as a combination of: i) direct delivery through the local government district council schools, ii) a form of partnership with proprietors: - government assisted schools, and iii) privately owned schools.

### 2.2.2 Potable Water Supply Sub-sector

Institutionally, Sierra Leone has a number of agencies charged with the management of water resources. Among them are: the Water Supply Division (WSD) of the Ministry of Energy and Water Resources, the Guma Valley Water Company, Sierra Leone Water Company (SALWACO). The Guma Valley Water Company (GVWC) was established by a colonial ordinance in 1961 to supply water to Freetown and its environs, whilst the Water Control and Supply Act of 1963 was the legal instrument for the management of water for the rest of the country (Ndomahina and Kabia, 2004). The Water Supply Division (WSD) of the Ministry of Energy and Power was responsible for the supply of water outside of Freetown (Water Control and Supply Act, 1963). The establishment of Sierra Leone Water Company (SALWACO) in 2001 and thereby WSD ceded water supply in other cities that includes Bo, Makeni and Kenema to SALWACO (Bennett et al, 2011; Ndomahina and Kabia, 2004). The delivery of water supply to households based on the various government policies is in part done by the central government (WSD) and by semi-autonomous parastatal companies (GVWC and SALWACO).

<sup>12</sup> Ministry of Education Science and Technology (MEST 2007) Sierra Leone Education Master Plan

The 2004 Local Government Act also mandates the devolution of potable water supply. However the recent government's MEWR WASH<sup>13</sup> policy (2010) insists that the transfer of urban water supply responsibilities from SALWACO and Water Supply Division (WSD) of MEWR to the local governments (district councils) needs re-examination with a view to allowing sufficient time for capacity building in the districts that will make it possible for them to take over the responsibilities. Other hindrances to the devolution of the water sector is due to the resistance of some ministries to devolve and the inconsistencies in the laws governing water management; for instance, the SALWACO Act of 2001 and the Local Government Act of 2004 have provided for these agencies exclusive mandate in the supply of water in various localities in the country.

The NGOs (since the water decade and the declaration of the MDGs) continue to play a significant role in water service delivery and capacity building, especially in rural areas. NGOs are particularly active in not only delivering the physical asset (unit water wells with hand pumps) at village-level but more importantly in the delivery of software services i.e. establishing water committees (community water management and maintenance teams) and facilitating trainings of these committees (AMCOW, 2009-10). Private (for profit) sector participation in water service delivery is very limited at the moment throughout the service delivery pathway such as drilling contractors and water supply operators (ibid). This is due to the lack of capacity across the country. The only visible role of the private sector is in the bottling service for the provision of safe drinking water. This is apparently gaining momentum especially in urban areas.

Potable water supply is thus characterised by a variety of providers: i) direct delivery by government (Central Water Supply Department), ii) corporatisation - government-owned para-statal companies (Guma Water Company and SAWACO), and iii) NGO/community and iv) private/commercial delivery.

### **2.2.3 Feeder Roads' Sub-Sector**

Until 1992 the Department of Works (DoW) was responsible for all roads activities including the planning, design and construction of all public roads, in addition to other public maintenance activities (AICD, 2010). The 1992 Sierra Leone Roads Authority (SLRA) Act vested administrative control, planning, development and maintenance of all roads and related structures in this authority. It receives the bulk of its road maintenance funds as allowed by parliament and has the power to levy road user charges subject to parliamentary approval. Sierra Leone currently has an interconnected road network of about 12,000 km, of which 71% or 8,555km are classified network (primary, secondary and tertiary). About 40% and 50% of the classified network and rural roads (feeder roads) are respectively in poor condition (AICD, 2011).

As per the Local Government Act of 2004, the roads sector should have been devolved to the local council by 2008. Although the Act mandated the devolution of the responsibility for the rehabilitation and maintenance of roads to local councils, neither the devolution nor any money has been transferred from the central government to the local councils for this function (Srivastana and Larizza, 2011). Resistance by the powerful Sierra Leone Roads Authority is the main reason for this delay (ibid). The SLRA has staff all over the country. It has offices and engineers in each of the local councils, who are in charge of road maintenance at the local level. However, the recent roads' works financed by the World Bank such as the rural private sector development project (RPSDP) and cash-for-work roads maintenance at National Commission for Social Action (NaCSA) were executed through the council (CESPA, 2009; BEST, 2011).


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<sup>13</sup>WASH is the acronym for Water, Sanitation and Health.

### 2.3 Institutional Structure of Basic Service Delivery System

The institutional structure or mechanism to deliver social or basic services in Sierra Leone, especially primary education, water supply and feeder roads has evolved from the post-colonial to the contemporary era (Allie, 2010; World Bank, 2009). The former saw a shift from democratic and decentralised government to centralised government system (Allie, 2010). In contemporary times, basic service delivery such as primary education, feeder roads and potable water sub-sectors are in the process of being devolved to the local government (Local Government Act 2004). This emerging phenomenon also creates liberal space for private sector participation. The current structure of delivery of basic services is traditionally hierarchical and its command structure is further cascaded down to the district and community-level (Figure 2).

Figure 2: Institutional Arrangement of Service Delivery Sector



Source: Adapted from Vivek Srivastana and Marco Larizza, (2011)<sup>14</sup>.

At the central level, ministries and departments including the Ministry of Local Government are the principal providers of basic services through regulations, delegation, funding, oversight and where necessary direct delivery (Vivek Srivastana and Marco Larizza, 2011; World Bank, 2009). As principal provider, the central government has fostered complex relationships with some semi-autonomous agencies or government owned companies (para-statals) on the one part, as the case of SLRA, Guma Valley Water Company (GVWC), SALWACO, and with local government on the other. The public governance mechanism is thus structured to follow a path that moves from the central principal to an agent as the case of SLRA and GVWC or directly through district agencies, local government and district

<sup>14</sup>Srivastana and Larizza, (2011) *Decentralisation in post conflict Sierra Leone: The Genie is out of the bottle*.

directorates and in principle through Community Based Organisations (CBOs) to the frontline agent before eventual delivery of the service to the client.

This public governance mechanism of service delivery is under a kind of multiple principal-agents that is often referred to in the literature as the *long route* of basic service delivery (GDN, 2010). Unlike the public service providers, in the private sector, the owner/entrepreneur deals directly with consumers on a pay and deliver basis as in the case of private schools, water vendors and water bottling companies. Also the structure developed at the community level (water committees) for the delivery of potable water supply by NGO has also shortened the accountability route by empowering local communities to maintain and deliver their water supply. In effect, both the private (for and not for profit) are using a *shorter accountability mechanism* that may have profound implications in the delivery of these basic services, which in theory is considered to be relatively *more effective and efficient* in the delivery of basic services (ibid).

### 3 Literature Review

#### 3.1 Conceptual and Theoretical Framework of Governance

Governance – that is, public governance is not new. As mentioned in the GDN (2010) *Varieties of Governance's* concept note, it can be traced as far back as the *Greek early civilization* and to the *modernization era*. In the 17<sup>th</sup> Century governance was used by Shakespeare to mean a method of management<sup>15</sup>. In the wake of the participatory revolution that reached its peak in the 1980s, scholars (Freire, 1972; Chambers, 1983; Marsden and Oakley, 1984; Oakley, 1991; Pradervand, 1989; Edwards, 1989) argued that the realities and voices of the beneficiaries count in development. The momentum of participatory development revolution that followed has also influenced development governance where generic views of governance are seen as an integral part of voice, accountability and transparency of the people and for the people, respectively (World Bank, 2004; UNDP, 1997; GDN, 2010). However, the conceptual shift from government to governance, according to Benz and Papadopoulos (2006) is as a result of the changing role of the nation state which has occurred with the emergence of new forms of democratic institutions and actors to challenge the status quo.

The contemporary interest in governance in Africa seems to stem from the World Bank's report on Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), which characterised the crisis in the region as a "crisis of governance" (World Bank, 1989). The bank argues that there is now a heightened awareness that the *quality* of a country's governance system is a key determinant of the ability to pursue sustainable economic and social development<sup>16</sup>. For Goran and Dale (2000)<sup>17</sup> 'governance is never a conceptual straightjacket but was rather expected to function as a loose framework within which each researcher could creatively explore political and decision-making issues of significance'. It is therefore not surprising that the term has been defined in different ways by different organisations and individuals.

According to the UNDP (1997), governance is "the exercise of economic, political and administrative authority to manage a country's affairs at all levels. It comprises mechanisms, processes and institutions through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise their legal rights, meet their obligations and mediate their differences"<sup>18</sup>. These conceptual underpinnings of governance focussed more on the formal authority and mechanisms or institutional processes to deliver a service that is, the supply-side of service delivery.

For GDN<sup>19</sup> (2010), governance is roughly defined as the set of formal and informal institutions that explain decision-making processes and action in a country. Here governance includes a few broad areas: (i) state capacity related to a state's power and ability to enforce rules; (ii) rule of law that establishes among other things property rights and limits the state's discretion; and (iii) democratic institutions that further limit state discretion by holding governments accountable to their public in various ways<sup>20</sup>. The concepts of governance of public service therefore incorporate a political dimension of governance - the commitment to achieve the public good - and a technical dimension - the ability or bureaucratic competence to manage effectively and efficiently (Charlick, 1992<sup>21</sup>; UNDP, 1997; World Bank, 1989; GDN, 2010). This also speaks to the quality and effectiveness of

<sup>15</sup>Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, Vol. 1, 1973, p 874 in Partnership modalities for enhancing good governance in Africa, (Economic Commission for Africa), 2005.

<sup>16</sup>Carlos Santiso (2001) Good Governance and Aid Effectiveness: The World Bank and Conditionality **The Georgetown Public Policy Review** Volume 7 Number 1 2001, pp.1-22

<sup>17</sup>Hyden Goran & Olowu Dele (ed.), *African Perspective on Governance* (Africa World Press, 2000).

<sup>18</sup>*Governance for Sustainable Human Development*, A UNDP policy paper UNDP 1997,p 2-3

<sup>19</sup> GDN Varieties of Governance:Effective Service Delivery Research Project Concept Note (2010)

<sup>20</sup>Francis Fukuyama, GDN Experts meeting at Washington DC, June 2008

<sup>21</sup>Charlick R. (1992) The Concept of Governance and its Implications for AID's Development Assistance Program in Africa in Associates in Rural Development, Burlington,P. 3.

the governance processes and relational issues such as principal-agent-client (Collier, 2007; Jensen and Meckling, 1976).

The World Bank (2004) distinctly points out that “a key dimension for the effective delivery of public services appears to be the *degree of accountability* to consumers i.e. the *capacity of citizens to demand and obtain better service delivery*, either directly from providers or through their elected representatives and civic organizations”<sup>22</sup>. Gauthier and Reinikka (2007)<sup>23</sup> provide a very helpful typology of the supply-side i.e. , direct delivery, ii) delegating to agencies, iii) devolution, iv) service purchase, v) partnerships and vi) direct privatisation.

The GDN (2010) focusing on the demand-side posits that there are five basic components of accountability relations; delegation & financing (from principals to agents), delivery & reporting (from agents to principals) and enforcement (by principals). The emphasis here is on accountability relations and how it works in practice between policy makers and service providers (the long route of accountability), as well as, directly between citizens and service providers (the short route of accountability).

### 3.2 Principal-Agent Theory

The thrust of the principal agency theory is about the relationship between the principal-agent and its effect on services on the demand-side (Arwortwi, 2012; Brown and Potoski, 2003; Collier, 2007; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The problem of agency is particularly salient on the demand-side of public service delivery, which arises from the fact that clients, politicians and frontline providers have divergent interests compounded by the fact that **multiple principal-agent problems** result in the delivery chain (Kemenyi, Ray and Chen, 2006<sup>24</sup>; Arwortwi, 2012). In a competitive market system, the initial and subsequent bidding processes provide principals/clients with information about trade-offs between quality, quantity, and price (Brown and Potoski, 2003). In the absence of a competitive market place as the case of *basic service delivery in Sierra Leone*, the principal may find it difficult to determine whether the prices and service quality offered by the agent are reasonable because it cannot weigh one bid against the other, and in the event of failure its options are limited (ibid).

Critics however argue that the agency-theory model is one-sided because it negatively characterizes an agent’s behaviour as self-seeking, and ignores agent loyalty, pride, and professionalism in aligning with the principal’s goals (Davis, Donaldson and Schoorman, 1997). They argue that some agents are not overwhelmingly motivated by self-interests, and may well place value on collective goals for example community based organizations. The steward does not have to be altruistic – merely recognize that mutual benefit ultimately delivers greater personal benefit. Another criticism of the agency theory is that it omits opportunistic behaviour by principals (Waterman and Meier, 1998; Donaldson, 1990). This is especially so in public services where politicians and bureaucrats stand to gain personally from colluding with private agents (Kettl, 1993; Schneider, 1992).

The *Principal-Agency Theory* however provides a good basis to understand the relationship in which one party (the principal) delegates work to another (the agent), who performs the task (Collier, 2007; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Even though the *principal* is dependent upon an *agent* whose interest differs from his own, Collier (2007) argues that the principal is not powerless to the extent that he is in charge of remuneration. Various mechanisms can be used by the principal to align the interest of the agents to his own. Thus, the *primary*

<sup>22</sup>The World Bank (2004): *World Development Report, Making Services Work for Poor People*, [www.worldbank.org](http://www.worldbank.org)

<sup>23</sup> Bernard Gauthier and Ritva Reinikka (2007) *Methodological Approaches to the Study of Institutions and Service Delivery: A Review of PETS, QSDS and CRCS*, HEC Montreal and World Bank

<sup>24</sup>Kimenyi, Mwangi S., Subhash Ray, Lie Chen (2006), *Tools and Techniques for Evaluating Service Delivery*, AERC Collaborative Research Paper



*control mechanisms* for the principal are dependent on: i) the *performance measurement and evaluation system*, ii) the *reward and punishment system*, and iii) the *system for assigning decision rights* to client – voice and accountability (Jensen, 1983).

The extent of the effectiveness of the principals' control mechanism such as *accountability mechanism* in the delivery of service has not yet been examined in Sierra Leone. The aim of this study is therefore to learn about the structure of principal-agent (governance actors) and how the institutional arrangement (accountability mechanism) of the various principal actors has influence on the *effectiveness of the agents*.

## 4. Analytic framework, Approach and Methodology

### 4.1 Analytic Framework

The thrust of this research is on **governance, accountability and effective basic service delivery** of education, water supply and the roads' sectors. Studying governance relations and their attributes of accountability and effectiveness is daunting and complex. The complexity arises from the fact that these attributes do not easily lend themselves to more qualitative or quantitative measurements. Drawing from the literature, governance elements include but are not limited to (i) relational i.e. mechanism or structure that affect governance and (ii) enforcement that is expected to bring about effective governance (Milward and Provan, 2000). In this study accountability mechanisms are based on the following forms of service delivery relationships:

- i. Public (CG & LG),
- ii. Community actors (NGOs, CBOs & informal providers), and
- iii. Private (commercial sector)

*Public Service provision*, in as far as it refers to direct delivery, has to do with central and local government providers, which also include departments (water supply division, directorate of basic education, local government, etc. ), agencies such as SLRA and corporations such as SALWACO and Guma Water Company. In this context, the government (principal) delegates and finances (GDN, 2010), which presupposes that it is also responsible for the *enforcement* i.e. institutes i) the *performance measurement and evaluation* system, ii) the *reward and punishment system*, and iii) the *system for assigning decision rights* to clients – voice and accountability (Jensen, 1983).

The *Community actors* (NGOs, CBOs & informal providers) refer to some form of partnership (Gauthier and Reinikka, 2007) with providers, mainly with voluntary groups such as faith-based schools, NGOs & community based organisations (school management, water committees, etc. ), who may have been *assigned or have decision rights*. Here, a functional relationship exists where the users/clients are expected to participate in the delivery of the service and/or hold agent/service providers accountable.

*Private* (commercial sector) provision of basic services refers to market delivery systems, where private providers develop and supply services including management and fixing rates/prices for these basic services. The public responsibility is to ensure quality control and fair competition.

Accountability has stood out for many years as the cornerstone for the viability and delivery of effective financial services. Accountability has thus recently gained significance in contemporary social science, especially in the governance of basic services (GDN, 2010; World Bank, 2009). Here accountability which is often referred to as social accountability goes beyond the voice in decision making that influences policy. It is fundamentally perceived to be a step further from participation in decision-making to act on or enforce decisions/policies by holding accountable the service providers (World Bank, 2009). This is taking voice at a second level that shifts the principal's governance role (supply-side) to consumers (demand-side) to enforce the agents' contract for effective governance in the delivery of basic services. In this study we examine *Accountability Mechanism* not only as a means to institutionalise this behaviour in basic service delivery but more especially as functions of institutional relationships, contract agreement, incentive structure, performance monitoring, sanctions etc. that have been put in place (or not put in place) between the central government and agents (public, private & CBOs) and citizens and how this has affected the effective service delivery or quality outcomes.

Accountability mechanism thus plays in part the role of enforcement in the principal-agent-client relationship. In this context, accountability presupposes that *the delivery of basic service is more likely to be effective, if the principals hold agents accountable by enforcing their contracts and in the same vein, if the client can hold both the agent and principal accountable*. The ability of the client to hold the service provider accountable and the willingness of the service provider to account to the client are fundamental to effective service delivery (ibid). The study examines *Accountability Mechanisms* in primary education, potable water supply and feeder roads and how they affect the effective delivery of these basic services.

Effective governance of basic service delivery is assumed in the literature to be the:

- i. *Degree of accountability* (World Bank, 2004; Milward and Provan, 2000), and
- ii. *The conventional wisdom of effectiveness in the delivery of basic services, which presupposes quality outcomes (both tangible and intangible) such as passes in the National examination, state of physical facilities and public perceptions.*

The aim here is to examine basic service delivery in as far as it relates to agency problem with respect to *information asymmetry, vis-à-vis, primary control mechanisms* for the principal focusing on: i) contractual ii) *evaluation* system and iii) the *system for assigning decision rights* to client – voice and accountability; with respect to the governance type (public, private and community-based organisations).


Effectiveness is analysed from a system analytic point of view where effectiveness includes both input and output subsystems. The input subsystem covers human/agent and technology. In the case of governance actors the analysis covers the quality of frontline providers and the facility and material used (technology) and the degree or level of use. For example in primary education, the learning environment includes, school facilities, teaching and learning material and teacher pupil ratio, etc. For potable water supply and feeder roads, we examine the providers/agents and how these services function in order to provide safe roads and water supply (technology). On the output side, we examine outcome indicators (tangible and intangible). In effect, it may have both measurable and immeasurable outcomes. The measurable outcome is based on *quality of turn-over*, for example effectiveness of primary education delivery can be measure based on the weighted average of the *number of passes per provider* in the National Primary School Examinations (NPSE). The immeasurable include customer perceptions such as their perception of the providers' effectiveness and satisfaction with the service thereof.

## 4.2 Approach and Methodology

In this study, CESPAs draw from fundamental interdisciplinary approaches -*quantitative and qualitative* approaches using structured and semi-structured instruments or questionnaires to collect primary information. This interdisciplinary approach employs a two-tier (secondary and primary) stage of data collection. Conventional methodological techniques were used to collect field data. These include: (i) literature review and design of questionnaires, (ii) review of questionnaires including peer-review and field testing, recruitment and training of field staff (enumerators and supervisors), (iii) data collection and entry using CS-Pro Database (iv) analysis using SPSS, narrative discussion of the findings and peer review of research report. (v) validation workshop and dissemination of findings. The typical research cycle of the methodology is presented in Figure 3.

It is important to note that CESPA’s self-explanatory research methodological cycle takes cognisance of the process dynamics and feedback linkages in every stage of the study to achieve the desired purpose of this research.

**Figure 3: Cyclic Methodological Research Process for the EPSP Sierra Leone’s Country Study**



### 4.3 Study Instruments and Data collection

Two complementary methodologies were applied to gather data from target respondents using structured and semi-structured instruments to collect the required information. Four instruments were used:

- I. Household/Clients/End-users structured questionnaire
- II. Principal open-ended questionnaire
- III. Agents open-ended questionnaire
- IV. Experts open-ended

These questionnaires were peer-reviewed and field tested before data collection (see Annex A).

### 4.4 Training of field assistants and fielding of the questionnaires

The fieldwork was designed to generate primary data on the governance of basic services. Research assistants were selected from CESPA’s data base of enumerators. A five-days training was held from Tuesday, 21st June to Saturday, 25th June, 2011 for both field supervisors and enumerators. The supervisors’ training was held on Monday 20th June during which all the instruments were discussed and modifications made where necessary.

As part of the training, the field assistants undertook a 3 hour pre-test of the data collection instruments on Saturday, 25<sup>th</sup> June, after which all the participants met to discuss their findings. The pre-test was done in localities in the mountain district of Western rural as well as Eastern, Western and Central Freetown, in order to capture the rural/urban divide.

## 4.5 Study Sample

The study targeted Households/client, Principals, Agents and Experts. **Household** by definition comprises of persons living together or living apart but have the same cooking arrangements. **Principals** in this study refer to the state/government or policy-maker that delegates and finances some or all of the basic services. **Agents** refer to frontline service providers engaged directly by the government/public or their partners or by the private sector and **Experts** include both state (principal-central government and decentralised organs – district/metropolitan councils) and non-state actors such as NGOs, religious-based organisations, retired civil servants and elderly people in communities who by virtue of their vast experience and age have a good knowledge of the historical trend of service delivery in the country.

## 4.6 Respondents

The coverage for the study was 8 out of the 14 decentralised districts, using both purposive and random selection. The purposively selected districts targeted the 4 regional headquarter districts and 4 randomly selected ones - one district drawn from each region. About 791 (67% rural and 33% urban) households were interviewed in the 8 districts. Table 1 presents the gender and rural/urban distribution of the households sampled.

**Table 1: Distribution of household respondents**

Gender	Percentage	Location	Percentage
Male	59%	Rural	67%
Female	41%	Urban	33%
Total	100%	Total	100%

A total of 59 principals, 133 agents and 30 experts or informants were interviewed for the study.

## 4.7 Data Management

The data processing system to manage data collected was designed to ensure results of the survey were available for analysis and interpretation. Data entry program was designed with CSPRO (Censuses and Survey Processing) a comprehensive data processing package for data entry, verification, consistency checking, exporting and menu creation.

All CSPRO components are stored in ASCII file and data was easily converted into SPSS format for statistical analysis. CSPRO version 4. 0 and SPSS version 16. 0 were used.

## 4.8 Data Analysis

Descriptive statistics, Cross-Tabulation, Frequency counts and Chi-square and ANOVA analysis were carried out in the analysis.

## 5. Analysis and Discussion of Main Findings

This section presents the analysis and discussions of the findings of the Sierra Leone Country study. The chapter is divided into five sub-sections. These are:

- i. *Governance actors and effective service delivery*: Here the analysis focuses on the different providers of water, education and feeder roads and how users/households rate the effectiveness of these service providers. The study sought to find out whether different governance actors make any difference.
- ii. *Accountability mechanisms in the delivery of effective basic delivery*: In this sub-section, the study attempts to determine accountability mechanisms (structured institutional relationship, contract agreement, incentive structure, performance monitoring, sanction, etc.) that have been put in place (or not put in place) between the principal and agents and citizens. This sub-section explains the differences in the effectiveness of outcomes of the service delivery by types of providers (public, private & CBOs).
- iii. *Sector differences in the governance of basic services*: This sub-section examines sector differences in the delivery of potable water, primary education and feeder roads. This section explains how the sector characteristics influence the governance of service delivery.
- iv. *Geographical differences in the governance of basic services*: This final analysis focuses on the differences in service delivery at the regional levels if any and why these differences exist.

### 5.1 Governance Actors in Basic Service Delivery

This section discusses the various governance actors in public service delivery in primary education, potable water supply and feeder roads. This assessment examines the type of governance actors, focusing on public, private and community (NGO, CBO and informal providers) actors.

#### 5.1.1 Governance Actors

**Education:** Primary schools in Sierra Leone can be divided into three types of providers, viz. : i) government schools which are managed by government ii) Government assisted schools which are managed by churches/missions or other proprietors but benefit from government subventions including payment of teachers and school supplies (Local Government Act 2004; MEST, 2007<sup>25</sup>); and iii) the private schools, which are ran and managed by private entities (World Bank, 2009).

The devolution of the primary education to the district councils has shifted the governance of government and government assisted schools to these councils, especially the supervisory role. Government and government assisted schools accounts for 95% of primary schools' population in country, whereas the private schools account for the remaining 5% (SLIHS, 2003/2004; CSR preliminary results, 2010). Table 2 presents the distribution of type of primary schools' providers used by households' per district. About 84% of households depend on the government (39%) and government assisted schools (45%). The significantly high numbers of government assisted schools is not surprising given their long history of participation in the sector that date back to the colonial era (Allie, 2010).

<sup>25</sup>Sierra Leone Education Sector Plan, 2007

**Table 2: Distribution of Primary Schools Providers per District**

District	Service providers (%)		
	Public	Government Assisted	Private
Kenema	42	37	21
Kono	37	50	13
Bombali	6	87	7
Koinadugu	36	56	8
Bo	35	54	11
Pujehun	44	47	9
Western Rural	53	28	19
Western Urban	59	3	38
<b>Average</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>16</b>

Source: CESPA EPSD Data Collection Survey

Also about 16% of households reported using some form of private services. This finding is higher compared to other studies (SLIHS, 2004; World Bank, 2009). This might be due to the fact that many of the private schools have not received any formal accreditation by MEST. Thus this higher score of private participation might be due to spontaneous private service providers who seek to cater for the demand shortfall in primary education in their respective areas.

The dominant providers of **potable water** in all districts are communities/NGOs, which account for more than 58% on average (Annex B, Table 1). This is as expected because most of the rural water supply is delivered by these providers (UNDP, 2009). In the Western Urban district however, 78% of respondents reported that they obtain their water supply from public (government) sources. The dominance of Communities/NGOs in water supply is a direct consequence of the failures of the central department and agencies (WSD, GVWC and SALWACO) to deliver this service, especially with regards to the state of disrepair of the central delivery system of water supply in most districts' headquarter towns (DFID, 2008; UNDP, 2009; Bennett et al, 2011). The participation of the private sector in the provision of households' potable water appears to be small (13.5%). However, the role of private sector is observed mainly in the construction of water facilities (borehole and protected wells with pumps) and more importantly in the provision of 'safe' bottled water.

In the **roads sector** (feeder roads) government's main agent has been a professional agency - Sierra Leone Roads Authority - (SLRA) set-up through the SLRA Act 1993. The act mandates SLRA to take full responsibilities of the feasibility studies and engineering designs, roads condition surveys, bill of Quantities, procurement and contracting of all road works.

The *feeder roads* sector is mainly dominated by the public and communities (Annex B: Table 2). The contribution of the private sector (4%) in the delivery of feeder roads appears to be small as compared to public (44%) and community (52%) even though in practice they deliver most of the roads contracts issued by public (SLRA and other public agencies). The high participation of communities/NGOs might be due to the proliferation of the *cash-for-work* (CfW) scheme coordinated at NaCSA. This is part of a *social cash transfer scheme* that started during the 2007/08 *high volatile food prices* that aims to cushion vulnerable populations and unemployed youths from the high food prices (CESPA, 2008). The scheme has taken a national proportion (as at the time of the CESPA's EPSD survey, 2010) to support this vulnerable population to deliver public works, especially in feeder roads. This

scheme which is financed outside the SLRA's box points to a shift in the liberalisation of the roads sector. This bottom-up action provides necessary, if not sufficient rationale for the decentralisation of the feeder roads sub-sector.

Results from the study show that basic services such as primary education, water supply and feeder roads are public goods that are necessary if not a right for all households in the country. The public sector has therefore been a leading player in the provision of these services. While PE is still dominated by the public as reported by 84% (being a combination of government/government assisted), it appears the private sector is gaining significance, accounting for about 16% of households PE providers in the country. In the water supply and feeder roads sectors, the community players are gaining space and momentum accounting for about 59% and 52%, respectively in the delivery of these services, albeit with direct and indirect financing from the government. This shift is due to the long and sustained NGO support and the availability of appropriate safe water supply technologies for the water sector. The social protection measures including the *cash for work* programme and NGO/Community participation in potable water supply could be the result of community driven development policies initiated as part of Sierra Leone's national recovery programs (NRP, 2002) and decentralisation efforts.

### 5.1.2 Effectiveness of Actors/Providers of Basic Services

**Primary Education:** The effectiveness of primary education delivery among others requires the availability of the service, i.e. good learning environment, adequate school supplies and availability of motivated, trained and qualified teachers (World Bank, 2007). The 2007 World Bank publication observed that inadequate school facilities in terms of school buildings, classroom furniture and teacher accommodation is still a challenge in Sierra Leone. According to the report, about 60% of primary school buildings needed major rehabilitation. This study found that about 41% of the primary schools facilities are reported to be in good state (meaning that the remaining 59% are not in good state). This goes to reinforce the point made earlier that most schools' in Sierra Leone lack good infrastructural facilities.

Availability of teaching and learning materials (TLMs) such as textbooks and writing materials that enhance effective education delivery is limited. Some 34% of households interviewed reported of adequate TLMs in the schools in their communities. A CESP (2010) study for the Decentralisation Secretariat also found that only 14% of the schools visited in the Northern, Southern and Eastern regions of the country had access to adequate school supplies such as chalk, textbooks, school register and exercise books. Whereas in a few schools (especially in urban areas), the pupil/textbook ratio was 1:1, in others, especially schools that are far removed from the urban centres there was only one book for the whole class in which case the teacher had to use it since there were no teachers' handbooks either (CESP, 2010). Private schools interviewed for the EPD survey reported that all pupils in their schools owned a text book provided by their parents.

The pupil/teacher ratio (PTR) in the country is high. In public schools, pupil/qualified teacher ratio is 67:1, whereas for private schools, it is 41:1 (CSR preliminary results 2010). Apart from PTR which favours private schools, instructional hours for both sets of schools are also unequal, primarily because of the practice of a double shift system in urban public primary schools<sup>26</sup>. According to the *Africa Human Development Series* (2007), private schools have 350 more instructional hours in the year than public schools which practice the double shift system and 117 more hours than public schools without the shift system. Whereas it is

<sup>26</sup>This was necessitated by the need to accommodate the growing number of school children temporarily as a result of an influx of school going children from rural to urban areas after the civil conflict.



difficult to determine a good PTR, it is important that classes are not too large to disrupt effective teaching and learning, neither should they be too few as to lead to underutilisation of educational resources (World Bank, 2007). On the whole the implications of high PTR and fewer contact hours in the public schools put them at a disadvantage in terms of effectiveness in education delivery when compared to their private school counterparts.

Generally, households perceived primary education as affordable irrespective of the provider (Annex B: Table 3). However, there are huge disparities in fees between public and private, and within the private sector itself. The public primary education (government and government assisted schools) is free for households, even though in reality parents are still paying levies (CESPA, 2009). In the private sector, fees charged vary widely. For example, fees charged per child per term in the private schools range between Le 35,000 (US\$8.14) and Le 800,000 (US\$186.05) per term/quarter (see Annex B: Table 4).

Table 3 presents the public perception of education service delivery. Households are generally satisfied with the delivery of primary education especially with the government where 6% and 52% (58%) of households are very satisfied and satisfied, respectively, and government assisted schools (55.5% i.e. 7% very satisfied and 48.5% satisfied) than the private schools (51% of households are either very satisfied – 7% or satisfied – 44%). This might be due to the availability and low-cost/free nature of these public schools.

**Table 3: Public Satisfaction with Primary Schools Delivery**

	Public service (%)	Government assisted (%)	Private entity (%)
Very Satisfied	6	7	7
Satisfied	52	48.5	44
Somewhat Satisfied	40	37.5	48
Unsatisfied	2	7	1

In summary, in spite of its availability, challenges still loom in the delivery of primary education especially public schools<sup>27</sup> where about 60% of primary school buildings need major rehabilitation, are faced with high pupil teacher ratios, low contact hours and the limited access to TLMs when compared to their private counterparts. This limits the effectiveness of these providers. However, households are generally satisfied with the delivery of public primary education more so with the government (58%) and government assisted schools (55.5%) than the private schools (51%). This might be due to the widespread and free nature of these public schools (government and government assisted), even though the effective governance of these schools remain a challenge.

**Potable Water Supply Actors:** An effective potable water service as defined by this study is the provision of accessible and safe water supply source to households on a regular basis. A source<sup>28</sup> which separates the delivery of drinking water from potential contamination, such as a piped supply or a protected well or spring is deemed to be “safe”. Interpretation of “access” has varied between countries but in this study it refers to a household supply of 20 litres that can be fetched within a 30 minute round trip, a distance of about one kilometre (ibid). Generally, there is limited information on quality of water in Sierra Leone. However, in 2008, a nationwide study on the quality of water funded by UNICEF indicates that water from open wells were more prone to bacterial contamination than boreholes and other protected sources of water supply. The boreholes were contaminated with metals such as manganese and iron. It is safe to conclude that the best water source so far is tap water

<sup>27</sup>Even though there may be challenges in the private sector, no nationwide research has been done anywhere on private education in Sierra Leone for the team to make a conclusive statement.


<sup>28</sup><http://www.wssinfo.org>

even though this could be contaminated along the distribution channel because desperate consumers cut open the pipes to have access to water thereby compromising the quality and also leading to leakage of pipes and water wastage<sup>29</sup>.

Respondents reported high access to water (93%). Even though high access to water is good, the source of the water is important to the extent that it could pose a threat to consumers' safety. A significantly high number of households (60%) in the country have access to safe water supply. Some 23% of households reportedly obtain their water from taps and 37% from hand pump wells. A very good proportion of households (40%) still draw their water supply from open wells/streams (Annex B: Table 5). This finding is consistent with the World Bank (2011) and CESP (2008) that also found that about 40% of households in Sierra Leone obtain their water from unprotected water sources. According to the 2008 Demographic and health survey report, as much as 35% of rural water is not of good quality probably because most of them obtain their water from unprotected sources. Urban dwellers on the other hand fare better in terms of quality of water; 83% of them have access to improved water (Demographic and health survey report 2008).

Figure 4 presents households that pay for water service per type of facility. As expected, households with access to pipe-borne water supply (65%) pay more for the service compared to hand-pump wells (14%) and open wells (17%). This may be due to the fact that the latter two water supplies are mostly free of cost even though water committees are expected to encourage households to pay nominal fees for maintenance in the event of breakdown of the pumps.

**Figure 4: Payment of Service by type of facilities**



For Bennett et al (2011) in many areas in Sierra Leone, water is not paid for as a result of the unwillingness to charge and in some cases communities' refusal to pay as a result of poor service from both SALWACO and GVWC. This comment is further substantiated by the evidence that less than 50% of the consumers are satisfied with (public, 33%; community, 28.5 and private, 32%) water delivery (Annex B: Table 6). Less than 40% of households are either somewhat satisfied or unsatisfied with all the providers – public, community and private. This finding shows the mixed feelings of clients on the potable water service. While water is naturally available, the public providers hardly meet the desired safe and regular water supply needs of the clients/consumers.

While the country must have surpassed the MDG target since more than half the population has access to water, still a very good proportion of households (40%) draw their water supply from unsafe open wells/streams. While water is naturally available, the providers of this basic service hardly meet the desired safe and regular water supply needs of the clients/consumers, for this reason, less than 50% of the households are satisfied with the

<sup>29</sup>Source: Observation from activities of consumers in Freetown.

service providers. The sustainability of the water supply without public subvention is also a challenge, given the low willingness to pay for these public services.

**Feeder Roads:** Table 4 below illustrates public perception of feeder roads' delivery. Generally, households are not satisfied with the services provided by the roads' sector, no matter who the service providers are; public, community or private.

**Table 4: Public Satisfaction with Feeder Roads**

Perception	Public service (%)	Community/NGO (%)	Private entity (%)
Very Satisfied	3	11	0
Satisfied	16	13	8
Somewhat Satisfied	27	24.5	22
Unsatisfied	41	39	48
Very Unsatisfied	13	12.5	22

Source CESPA VG-EPSD Survey

For instance, only 13% of respondents are satisfied with community/NGO services, compared to 16% and 8% for the public actors and private entities, respectively. Among the three service providers, respondents are least satisfied with private entities; a total of 70% were either 'unsatisfied' or 'very unsatisfied' with their services. The low satisfaction with the private sector is worrisome as they are the main sub-agents usually contracted to deliver this service by SLRA.

In summary, the feeder roads are principally delivered by a Central Agent (SLRA) with sub-offices in all the regions and districts and draws from the private sector (roads' contractors) as sub-agents to deliver these services. As at the time of the data collection of the study, the feeder roads sub-sector was still not devolved, although it was reported that this policy was in the making. However, the finding shows that a very significant number of communities are involved in the delivery of the feeder roads. The involvement of communities in the delivery of feeder roads provides necessary, if not sufficient rationale for the decentralisation of this sub-sector. Recent SLRA policy press release affirmed this long awaited decentralisation of the feeder roads sub-sector. Generally however, households are not satisfied with the services providers of the roads' sector.

## 5.2 Accountability Mechanism in the Governance of Basic Services

Basic services such as primary education, potable water supply and feeder roads are traditionally public goods that fall within the purview of government either as direct providers or delegated and/or regulated by the government to ensure universal access to and the quality outcome of these basic needs. Government thus has a central and fundamental role to play in the effective delivery of these services. In this sub-section we examine the institutional framework of the delivery of these basic services of the three sector of the study and how they have affected the effective delivery of these services.

Table 5 below illustrates the differential governance relationships of principal-agent-clients for the three sectors studied. In each of the three sectors, government still plays a principal role, either directly or indirectly. The PE sub-sector is directly controlled by a central government Ministry (MEST) and other government structures such as local councils and the district PE directorate (Table 5). Also the government has fostered partnership with primary school proprietors who run the previously mission owned government assisted primary

schools. The regulations and the partnership that emerged enables the government to have equal decision-making opportunity in these schools'. The proprietors in these schools thus serve as *de facto* principals (Table 5).

**Table 5: Principal-Agent Differentiation in the Delivery of Basic Service**

	Primary Education	Potable Water Service	Feeder roads
Principal	Ministry of Education (department of basic education and commission for the local government), Ministry of Local Government and Community Development, and respective LGAs, Schools Proprietors/Religious Organisations, Private Proprietors	Ministry of Energy and Water resources; Ministry of Local Government and Community Development, Ministry of Health and Sanitation, and respective LGAs,	Ministry of Works, Roads and Infrastructure
Agent	District Schools Directorate, Schools inspector, head teachers and teachers.	Sierra Leone Water Company (SALWACO), GUMA Valley Water Co. , District WASH Inspectors	Sierra Leone Roads Authority (SLRA), Roads contractors, CBOs
Clients	School Management Committee (SMC)/ Parents/Teachers' Association (PTA), Parents, pupils, communities.	NGOs and water contractors, water associations/committees, Households/citizens,	Government, Households, communities, farmers, traders, service providers,

Source: EPSD Literature Review 2011

At the agents' level the PE services are coordinated by the schools' district directorate with a corps of area inspectors that are assigned to inspect schools in their respective zones. The head teacher and teachers are the main frontline agents charged with the responsibility of delivering the services to the clients. At the community-level, the clients are facilitated to establish school management committees to serve as *de facto* owners of the schools. They are thus given in theory decision rights to oversee the frontline service providers of PE in their respective communities. In the delivery of PE, the public has therefore designed a systematic accountability mechanism (AM), which from a bottom-up perspective involves communities, government assisted, local government, and districts' education directorates to the central level.

On the other hand, the private primary schools' proprietors serve as principal/owner and usually supervise the agent directly with or without the schools' directorate. According to one of the primary school head teachers, 'the public inspectors of schools only come once in a 'blue moon'. This points to the freedom and liberal space given to private schools to operate.

The accountable mechanisms put in place to deliver PE to clients/households has a two-tier central mechanism with MEST's basic education directorate charged with the responsibility of coordinating the supervisory mechanism (education directorate) at the district level, on the one hand, and on the other, Ministry of Local Government and Community Development (MLGCD) directorate charged with the responsibility to oversee the district councils to deliver these services. As part of the decentralisation, the PE governance has been devolved to the district council (Local government Act 2004). The council also has its own governance mechanism that includes the democratically elected council and chair persons, the education committee, the ward committee etc., chaired by their councillors (Local Regulations, Processes and Procedures' manual 2011).

This local government mechanism is to supervise the district directorate and inspectorate of schools to bring about the desired effective delivery of the service by frontline providers in

government/government assisted and private schools. In addition, the client/communities (School Management Committees) are also given decision making rights by assigning them the ownership of the schools in their communities. Thus a web of accountability mechanisms both at the central/local government and community levels have been designed for the effective delivery of PE. The pathway in public governance of PE (central - local government –government assisted - supervisors –inspector-head teachers – SMC – frontline teachers - client) that has evolved over the years for effective accountability at the demand-side has been in practice very long. It depicts a typical bureaucratic mechanism lying over the other; what is generally described in the literature as the *long route to Accountability* (GDN Concept Note, 2010). Even though the contribution of the private sector in the delivery of PE is small, its accountability mechanism sharply differs from its public counterpart. The service delivery in these schools is usually from owner/proprietor to head teacher to the frontline provider and eventually to the clients. In effect the decision-making mechanism is shorter in the private sector. A shorter accountability pathway is fundamentally considered to be relatively more *effective and efficient* (GDN, 2010).

Multiple principal/agents deliver services in the **potable water supply** sub-sector. The Sierra Leone Government has about three agencies delegated to deliver potable water supply; among them are the Guma Valley Water Company (GVWC), Sierra Leone Water Company (SALWACO) and the Water Supply Division (WSD) of the Ministry of Energy and Water Resources. The GVWC was established as a corporation by the public ordinance of 1961 as the sole provider of potable water supply (PWS) to consumers in Freetown and its environs, whilst the Water Control and Supply Act of 1963 was the legal instrument for the supply and distribution of water for the rest of the country, which was under the mandate of Water Supply Division (Ndomahina and Kabia, 2004). The WSD of the Ministry of Energy and Water Resources was then responsible for the supply of water outside of Freetown until the Sierra Leone Water Company (SALWACO) Act (2001) ceded household water supply in other urban and peri-urban areas in Bo, Kenema, Kono, Makeni and in all other parts of the country to SALWACO (Bennett et al, 2011; Ndomahina and Kabia, 2004; WASH Policy, 2010).

The accountability mechanism of potable water supply is thus coordinated by a central government department and by a public central agent (GVWC and SALWACO). The WASH policy (2010) cautiously endorsed the devolution of WASH to local government, with the responsibility of technical management of the central distribution of potable water supply (PWS) and the capacity-building of district councils for eventual take over, assigned to SALWACO (ibid). As a result of the policy, the WSD has thus assigned WASH inspectors to the councils. Without an additional layer of a district WASH directorate, councils are now being empowered to govern PWS delivery in their locality. The private participation of both the - for and not-for profit - sectors is also encouraged within these structures (ibid). The accountability mechanism (AM) of PWS is thus between the central/local government on the one hand and the central and the public agency on the other. The AM for the public delivery system of PWS appears to be relatively shorter (central – local government/WASH inspectors – NGO/water committees – clients). The fully decentralised AM of SALWACO as district central agent is also expected to exhibit a similar shorter route (central-SALWACO/LG-water committees/consumers).

**Feeder Roads Sub-Sector:** Table 7 in Annex B presents statutory relationships of feeder roads delivery. Centrally the Ministry of Works Housing and Infrastructure (MWHI) is the principal agent who coordinates with MLGCD for the delivery of feeder roads at the district level.

SLRA was established as a central professional agency by the Sierra Leone government to govern the delivery of all roads in the country (SLRA Act 1992). This agent is in practice charged with the responsibility of coordinating all the road works including the design,

construction and maintenance of feeder roads (Annex B: Table 7). Its mandate includes, the hiring of professional staff, identifying, contracting and supervising the delivery and maintenance of all roads including feeder roads. SLRA has therefore taken over the delivery of roads from the hitherto Ministry of Works and infrastructure and thereby established offices in all districts to coordinate this service.

As shown in Table 6 below, SLRA contracts construction companies for the delivery of roads' rehabilitation/maintenance. Contractors (private entities) are usually the sub-agents of SLRA, central government and the local councils (Table 6). Therefore the governance mechanism of SLRA follows a typical engineering procurement of construction services (SLRA-LG-contractor-client) using open market bidding process. The feeder roads governance mechanism is also short.

**Table 6: Typical Statutory and Contractual Agency Relationships in Feeder Roads**

Type of principal	Contractual relationship with agents		
	Decentralization Act (%) (Devolved/local government function without employment contract)	Employee agreement (%)	Contractor(%)
<b>Feeder roads</b>			
Ministry of Works Housing and Infrastructure	50	0	50
Sierra Leone Roads Authority	11	11	78
District Council /Ward Committee	17	0	83
<b>Average</b>	<b>26%</b>	<b>4%</b>	<b>70%</b>

Source: CESPA's VG-ESD Survey Data July 2011

**Summary** In the PE governance, a web of accountability mechanisms both at the central, local government and community levels have been designed for effective primary education delivery. The pathway in public governance of PE (central - local government – government assisted - supervisors – inspector - head teachers – SMC – frontline teachers - client) that has evolved over the years for effective accountability at the demand-side is in practice very long; normally referred to in the literature as the *long route to Accountability* (GDN Concept Note, 2010). Even though the contribution of the private sector in the delivery of PE is small, its accountability mechanism sharply differs from its public counterpart. The service delivery in these schools is usually from owner/proprietor to head teacher to the frontline provider and eventually to the clients. In effect the decision-making mechanism is shorter in the private sector for the delivery of PE. In theory, shorter pathways of accountability in governance are relatively more *effective and efficient* (GDN, 2010).

For the water and roads sector, the corporatization of the water supply and the agencification of the roads appear to be designed to shorten the accountability mechanisms to not only make them more responsive to the goal of the principal but to be more effective and efficient. In both the roads (SLRA-LG-contractor/agent-client) and the water sectors with its multiple principal relationships (WSD-LG/WASH inspectorate – client/WC, and GVWC-agents-clients or SALWACO-LG-WC/clients) accountability mechanisms are in practice short, which is thus expected to bring about effective and efficient delivery of these services.


### 5.2.1 Effectiveness of Accountability Mechanisms

The decentralisation of the PE service has resulted in the devolution of the supervisory role of PE to the local government. In effect, the respective district councils now control the funds for supervision of PE as well as the responsibility to coordinate the role of the district directorate in the supervision of schools (MLGCD, 2011). While the regulations mandate this coordination role of district councils, the expert interviews indicate that there is no formal contract between the district councils and the directorate of education other than the reporting obligation of the supervisors of schools to the councils before the disbursement of subsequent funds for supervision. The study field evidence also revealed that the agents (teachers) are not directly paid by the district councils.

Table 8 (Annex B) presents the remuneration of some of the staff in public and some private schools. The incentives are fixed by the central government for public schools, whereas the private schools freely fix salaries and fees. While there are significant differences between the public and private, it also oscillates on the one side where the public incentive is much higher than one of the private providers and on the other hand the private is just marginally higher in monthly salaries (Annex B: Table 8). What is noteworthy in this incentive structure is that in spite of the surprisingly low incentive in one of the private primary education providers, this provider is still able to perform better than its public counterparts. Based on the National Primary School Examination (NPSE - 2011/12), 100% of the students entered by the International Pentecostal Holiness Primary School (IPHPS) for the NPSE passed the examination based on the minimum government's pass scores with an average score<sup>30</sup> of 278 compared to their neighbouring government assisted school (Benevolent Islamic primary school) with 75% pass rate<sup>31</sup> and an average score of 237.

According to the head of West African Examination Council (WAEC)<sup>32</sup> the NPSE 2010/11 results give an optimistic picture of primary education outcome in spite of the fact that the percentage of students passing the examination has dropped due to its increasingly rigorous high pass scores mandated by the MEST in 2005. He observes that the system has been 'producing drastically increasing numbers of qualified candidates in spite of the fact that 24,000 pupils failed the 2010/2011 NPSE and only a marginal (0.6%) increase in passes compared to the previous year. A critical look at the examination results also shows hidden disparities between private and public schools' performance (government/government assisted). Figure 5 presents randomly selected schools performances in the regions. This evidence-based finding shows that the private schools performed significantly better than their public school counterparts.

**Figure 5: Mean of Mean Score<sup>33</sup> of NPSE scores in selected schools**



<sup>30</sup>  $\Sigma$  Pupil Exams Score/No. of Pupil that took the exams

<sup>31</sup> No of pupil that passed the exams in %

<sup>32</sup> Awoko Newspaper, August 2010

<sup>33</sup> The mean of average scores of selected schools in the Region

The lesson learnt from this finding is that to some extent the private sector with shorter accountability mechanisms irrespective of lower incentives is likely to be more *effective* under similar conditions in the delivery of basic education. This therefore supports the argument that shorter governance mechanisms are more likely to be *effective and efficient* than the longer routes used in the public sector to deliver effective basic service. This finding also dismisses some argument in the literature that teachers in public primary schools are faced with poor working conditions including low and unattractive salaries compared with their private counterparts (anti-corruption commission, 2006; MEST, 2007; World Bank, 2007). The findings reveal that even though public schools incentives are relatively higher than some private schools, the lower incentive private schools still perform better than their public counterparts in the NPSE. Incentive structure is therefore necessary but not sufficient in ensuring effectiveness of the accountability mechanisms in the delivery of these basic services.

**Potable Water Supply:** The multiple principal-agent structure of the potable water supply sector has resulted in a diversity of incentives to their agents that is provided by the central government (WSD) and by the two heavily subsidised water companies (GVWC & SALWACO). Table 9 (Annex B) presents the salaries of the frontline agents for the water supply sector for the three public providers that include area/regional engineers, technical supervisors, foremen, mains' layer/plumber and assistants. GVWM seems to have the full complement of agents of 5 staff per area compared to SALWACO with 3 and WSD 2 staff. WSD has the least paid staff (Annex B: Table 9), which is based on the civil service pay structure. Its engineers receive far less than a third of the utility companies' engineers, which undoubtedly has an effect on their motivation and performance. SALWACO regional engineers' take home pay (inclusive of medical insurance), is relatively higher compared to GVWC and WSD. However, GVWC technicians staff take home pay is relatively higher and also they benefit from a free medical care service and 20% annual leave allowance compared to only 10% at SALWACO. What is noteworthy is that these engineers sign an annual performance contract with the company unlike GVWC and WSD that also include an annual evaluation, monthly performance and reporting obligation.

As to whether this incentive structure has helped improve service has not been ascertained by this study, as services in most of these agencies' operational areas are still ineffective. Table 7 below presents the regularity of water supply by providers. None of the providers has a 100% all year water supply. Responses from respondents indicate that 56% of consumers of public providers, 57.5% of communities/NGOs supplies and 48% of private providers have an all year supply.

**Table 7: Regularity of Water Supply Source**

	Public service	Community/NGO	Private entity
Cannot get service throughout the year	32	31.5	39
Only Few months in the year	11	10	12
Yes, the services are always available	56	57.5	48
Other	1	1.5	1

Source: PASGR/GDN/CESPA Country Survey.

Among reasons advanced for the abysmal performance in the water supply sector is the lack of trained personnel and accountability systems for a modern water utility, old and inadequate distribution systems, insufficient funding and very low tariffs as against high cost of production (DFID, 2008; UNDP, 2009; Bennett et al, 2011). However, the introduction of



an annual performance contract by SALWACO is a good measure that might help to improve performance of these agents, if it is rigorously applied now and in the future.

Given the poor water supply, it is difficult for these para-statal companies to generate enough funding for their activities, especially when the billing rates are low (Bennett et al, 2011). Currently GVWC charges Le50<sup>34</sup> for a gallon of water and SALWACO does not have a fixed rate due to the lack of the service in its catchment areas. According to the 2008 DFID report, about 70% of water supplied has no records to indicate results from leakages, non-billing or theft. Also, most of the metres installed by GVWC are not in good working condition and only between 2000 and 3000 out of the 18,000 households in Freetown have functioning metres that are billed according to their consumption; the rest are billed monthly on fixed tariffs (Bennett et al, 2011; DFID, 2008).

Private sector participation in water service delivery is very limited at the moment throughout the service delivery pathway (AMCOW, 2009-2010). This is due to the lack of capacity across the country. The NGOs play a crucial role in water service delivery and capacity building, especially in rural areas (Bennett et al, 2011; AMCOW, 2009-2010; Tearfund, 2005). Their roles include the provision of construction services of protected potable water supply and building the capacities of the local communities through training. They also engage in the provision of water supply by empowering rural communities in maintaining and delivery of communities' water supply (AMCOW, 2009-2010).

The water supply division, as a necessity, has hurriedly devolved to local government their district water supply. However, the recent government's (MEWR) WASH policy (2010) argues that 'the transfer of urban water supply responsibilities from SALWACO and Water Supply Division (WSD) of MEWR to the local governments (district councils) needs re-examination with a view to allowing sufficient time for capacity building in the districts'. Currently, the WASH supervisors paid by WSD are stationed at each district council office to oversee potable water supply. The study has no evidence whether the capacity-building is being carried out.

The delivery of feeder roads was expected to have been devolved (Decentralisation Act, 2004; Feeder Roads Policy, 2010). It is not certain as to what extent this has happened other than the donor agencies' (World Bank<sup>35</sup>) funded feeder roads' rehabilitations including the *cash-for-work* schemes that are implemented through the district councils. Table 10 (Annex B) presents the incentives provided by SLRA, CfW and private contractors' to their staff. As a professional engineering institution, it is understandable that SLRA provides a significantly good incentive to their engineering staff (Annex B: Table 10). The CfW is relatively the lowest in incentive and also void of engineers, which gives credence to the claims of poor workmanship levelled against this community-based public works.

The emergence and growing significance of the CfW in feeder roads is changing the contractual landscape of feeder roads, which was hitherto dominated by SLRA and formal works contractors. This scheme was designed with the expectation that the CfW *de facto* contractors would be trained and supervised by NaCSA's (the implementing agency) engineers and the SLRA district engineers that may over time empower these informal contractors towards more professional contracting standards. The CfW contractors have also complained of the lack of guidance from the SLRA engineers. According to the chief engineer of feeder roads, the lack of cooperation from SLRA is due to the adulteration of engineering principles, standards and specification in the implementation of these community-based public works. He argues that the delivery of these road works go against the SLRA policy (1992). It is also noteworthy that the feeder roads are delivered on a user

<sup>34</sup>USD\$0.69 at an exchange rate of Le4350.00 to the USD.

<sup>35</sup>World Bank's Rural private sector development project

free basis i.e. households/vehicles are not directly charged roads' user fees other than the roads *tax* paid on a gallon usage of fuel on the roads for the maintenance/rehabilitation of roads including feeder roads.

Community-based Accountability Mechanisms: Although the government recognises the existence of SMCs and water committees, their roles remain voluntary (CESPA, 2008). About 81% of households confirmed the presence of CTAs/SMCs and water committees in their communities. However, their ability to positively affect delivery depends on whether they have the capacity to hold accountable service providers. In general, all SMC in both public and private schools (Annex B: Table 11) and the water committees are considered effective in their respective communities, 33.5% of SMCs in government assisted schools compared to 25% in government schools and 23% in private schools were reported to be very effective. For the water committees; 18% at the public sector compared to 25.5% of the community/NGO sector and 33% in the private sector were reported to be very effective. In the case of the roads sector, 7% of roads committees in the public sector, compared to 12% in the Community/NGOs and 0% in the private sector respectively are perceived to be very effective (Annex B: Table 12).

In spite of the significant outcome of these community-based groups, evidence on the ground points to serious internal and external problems, which inhibit these CBOs' ability to hold the frontline service providers accountable. These include weak financial base, lack of engagement skills, poor attitude of state agents towards them and certain legal and policy drawbacks such as the Public Order Act of 1965 (Africa Regional Affairs Unit, World Bank, 2007).

### **5.3 Differences within and between Sectors in the Governance of Basic Services**

The main commonality of water, education and feeder roads is basically their public utility and usefulness. Quality water supply and education improve the quality of life of a population, as do roads that allow the free and safe movement of persons, goods and services (GDN, 2010). They are therefore important not only for the sectors' sake but also as a means for a productive life (Sierra Leone's MGD Country Report, 2008; CESPA, 2009; GDN, 2010). Arguably, the major differences between these sectors are the governance regimes. In this section, we examine the differences within and between sectors in the governance of these public goods. The study attempts to assess governance modalities for their delivery and the effectiveness of accountability mechanisms put in place for service delivery. It is assumed that the difference in governance of basic services between sectors may result from resource/asset/technological costs, governance type and accountability mechanism.

The technologies for delivering basic services vary in scope and cost in terms of physical assets. The standard learning environment of PE include school buildings, ventilated improved toilets, water wells with hand-pump and a play and sports ground (MEST, 2009), which some engineer's estimates put at USD\$75,000 (BEST, 2011). The full complement of these physical assets may or may not be provided to bring about learning as observations in some primary education shows that PE can also be delivered in basic mud houses or under trees in communities where these services are not available. The technology used in the potable water supply sector also varies in scope. The technology for a township central water supply will run into millions of dollars depending on the size of the township. On the other side of the technology divide, a decentralised borehole or water well with hand pump for communities will cost between USD\$10,000 and USD\$5000 per unit, respectively. The governance of these services also differ depending on the degree of mechanisation of the systems. The centralised water supply services can be delivered directly to households without intermediary agencies and water can also be fetched directly by households from

stand pipes or pumps, and where they are not available, streams and other open sources are used. Also a well-built feeder road may cost about USD\$15,000 per km (SLRA, 2010) and does not need a service provider for the use of the road except for its maintenance. It is evident therefore that PE, water supply and roads differ in the technologies used in the delivery chain.

The cost of the provision of these services differ due to the difference in the physical facilities used by these sectors. Based on the availability of appropriate technologies used in the water sector, it is relatively cheaper to deliver water to communities compared to education and roads. Unlike water supply and feeder roads that are dependent on mechanized facilities, the governance of PE is more agent-based. The distinction between PE and the roads and the water sectors is thus the human and technological interactions. The governance of PE may therefore differ due to the centrality of the agent at the delivery while depending on the degree of mechanisation of the service, the water and the roads sector by design hardly have direct agent-client interactions. Also, PE has had a more profound political interest in post-colonial era as a result of the nationalisation of this sector from its private (missionaries) delivery of these schools (Allie, 2010). As a consequence, the PE governance has not seen any liberal change in contemporary governance, unlike water and roads, which saw corporatisation and agencification (SALWACO Act, 1992 and SLRA Act, 1992).

As discussed in section 5. 1. 1 the education sector is governed by the civil service bureaucratic system, with a number of accountability mechanisms, which range from central ministry to the local government and district agencies (including schools supervisors, inspectors and proprietors) and community based associations such as School Management Committees(SMC). In theory, these mechanisms are designed by the principals to ensure effective delivery of the service by the frontline agents (Kemenyi, Ray and Chen, 2006). PE is thus observed to have about five (5) layers of accountability mechanism (central – local government – district education directorate – inspectorate-SMC and -agents) that are charged to oversee the delivery of primary education to households. Unlike PE, potable water supply is delivered by multiple central agencies that include central water supply division and two public corporations (GVWC and SALWACO) that are expected to operate as commercial ventures (GVWC Act, 1961 and SALWACO Act, 1992). The public accountability mechanism (AM) for the water supply sector is laden with only two to three steps of accountability between principal-agent. At the corporation level, the mechanism is from the principal (GVWC & SALWACO) to supervising engineers to the frontline providers (2 AM), while the decentralized WSD is from the central ministerial level to district councils - WASH inspectors and to frontline service providers who are sometimes water committees. At the corporation level, the water supply sector impressively adopts short accountability mechanisms, which are similar to the private sector delivery. This may be due to the commercial motive of these public corporations that draw on efficient approaches to service delivery, even though these corporations are yet to be sustainable in their commercial ventures (Bennett et al, 2011). Bennett et al (2011) succinctly describe the dilemma of the water providers:

*Householders are caught up in a vicious cycle of low payment and bad services. Householders are unwilling to pay for bad services, which are due, in turn, to irregular power supply to the pumps and the high cost of generator fuel for a low customer base. As a consequence, the utility cannot invest in improving services.*

The SLRA on the other hand was delegated the authority to deliver all roads' development and governance including feeder roads (SLRA Act, 1992). In practice, the delivery mechanism developed appears to be at 3 levels i.e. from the central authority to the region engineers to the district engineers and to the frontline agents.

Comparatively therefore, the PE has the longest (5) accountability mechanism with respect to the two (2 AM) for corporate potable water supply services, and 3 for both the potable water supply and feeder roads (SLRA). It is also noteworthy that both the potable water supply and roads are governed by professional engineering agencies, unlike PE. It appears that the semi-autonomous corporation (GVWC/SALWACO) and agency (SLRA) were established by the central government to shorten the accountability mechanism and thereby reduce the information asymmetry problems faced by public providers.

The *long route* to accountability as was shown in the PE and even the *short route* as the case of GVWC and SALWACO do not necessarily lead to effective service delivery, other than serving as a means for efficiency in the delivery of these services by these public institutions. For instance, the PE's *long governance route* is relatively less effective if compared to the shorter private sector delivery of primary education. While the water supply delivered by corporations is through a short (2 hierarchical step) accountability mechanism, the service is still ineffective due to capacity challenges arising from inadequate infrastructure facilities and input resources (including human resources and material supplies) required for the delivery of the service (DFID, 2008).

Formal institutional structures set up to deliver these basic services appear to be short of effective delivery. To aid these institutional arrangements, participatory mechanisms at the community-level have been drawn upon to assist in delivery of these services. The water sector and PE sectors have drawn on these community-based institutions. However, the public water corporations, especially the GVWC are reportedly not using local communities for their over 500 stand-pipe community water supply in Freetown. Unlike PE and the water sector these local accountability mechanisms are not directly fostered by SLRA. According to the feeder roads chief engineer, most community roads committees are a diversion to the professional practice of SLRA and are therefore not encouraged.

Table 13 (Annex B) illustrates the participation of communities in the delivery of these basic services. It appears that in all the sectors there is significant community participation. Arguably, the highest form of community participation is joint decision-making. Here the PE sector seems to be more involved in this participatory activity which might more likely result in holding providers accountable than in the water and roads' sectors. Although water committees are also used in the water sector, this practice is not common in Freetown, the GVWC operational area. The SLRA is averse to direct community involvement in the provision of feeder roads, other than the provision of labour and local materials. However, the widespread use of CfW schemes has created space for community participation in this sector. In effect, community provision of roads from these community-driven efforts is the highest form of community participation in the roads sector.

It is also evident from Table 8 that SLRA seldom or never acted on community demands compared to the water and the PE sector.

**Table 8: Response to Demands from Consumers per Service Providers**

<b>Water:</b>	<b>Public service (%)</b>	<b>Community/NGO (%)</b>	<b>Private entity (%)</b>
Promptly	37	33	31
Seldom	52	47	51
Never	11	20	18
<b>Education:</b>			
Promptly	29	36	26
Seldom	57	52	52
Never	14	12	22

<b>Roads:</b>			
Promptly	9	7	3
Seldom	68	67	61
Never	23	26	36

The findings do not show any significant evidence whether lower or bottom-up accountability has any effect in the delivery of these services in all sectors of the study. Generally however, respondents are more satisfied with the educational services in their communities. More than 55% of each of the respondents from the Northern (Very Satisfied -2% and Satisfied -54%), Southern (Very Satisfied -8% and Satisfied -53%) and Eastern (Very Satisfied -7% and Satisfied -52%) regions of the country made this assertion. In the Eastern region however, only 49% (Very Satisfied -3% and Satisfied -36%) of respondents were satisfied with the educational service (Annex B: Table 14). Satisfaction with water service delivery is also on the average high about 53%: (Very satisfied -16.5% and Satisfied -26.75%), (Annex B: Table 14). This high satisfaction with the water sector may be due to the increasing number of households benefiting from hand-dug wells with hand pumps and gravity water supply, especially in rural areas. In the case of the roads sector, respondents are generally dissatisfied with the quality of roads in their vicinities as can be observed from Table 14 (Annex B). The most dissatisfied are respondents from the East where about 57% (Unsatisfied -41% and Very Unsatisfied -15.75%) are either unsatisfied or very unsatisfied. Also, there are low levels of public satisfaction with the quality of roads irrespective of the service provider (see Table 4).

Generally, households are more satisfied with the educational services (55%) in their communities compared to water supply (43%). On the other hand, the respondents are generally dissatisfied with the quality of roads in their vicinities. The reason behind this public satisfaction with the primary education sub-sector might relate to the free PE policy and the investment in primary education after the civil war which saw the country not only doubling enrolment in 2005 but registering a gross enrolment rate (GER) of 160<sup>36</sup> the highest in low income countries (World Bank, 2007<sup>37</sup>). The low public satisfaction with water supply compared to education might be due to the low public investment in this area. As has already been stated, access to water even in urban areas is inadequate. Households have to depend on small scale private providers such as carts and vendors who source water from established stand-pipe taps of utility networks or from private sources such as wells and boreholes.

Feeder roads are generally in poor state of disrepair, in spite of public contribution to the CfW. Arguably, while roads construction/rehabilitation is relatively capital-intensive, the efficient use of the limited resource in the CfW scheme needs to be technically examined to help deliver good quality feeder roads that meet basic engineering standards.

## 5.4 Geographical Differences in the Governance of EPSD

This final analysis of the study examines the differences between the regions in selected areas of governance indicators where there are systematic differences among the regions e. g. access and state of basic service facilities, public satisfaction, and the mode and degree of participation per region.

<sup>36</sup>The GER is greater than 100 because of the high number of people aged above the normal primary school age who were acquiring primary education.

<sup>37</sup> World Bank (2007): Education in Sierra Leone – Present Challenges, Future Opportunities

### 5.4.1 Access and State of Basic Service Facilities across the Regions

The delivery of basic water supply, feeder roads and primary education services require investment in facilities to enhance the safe and conducive use of these facilities by households/client. Regionally, most households access the facilities within a mile radius. However, there are significant disparities in terms of the state of facilities between regions. For all the basic services, households in the Eastern region are relatively deprived of access to good facilities. Only 15% and 13% respectively observed that their education and water facilities were in good state and as few as 2% reported that their feeder roads were in good state. The same region reported of over 70% of poor state of roads (Annex B: Table 15). The marginalisation of the East in the delivery of basic service might not be due to economic or political reasons other than geographic location from the *seat of power*. Ironically, the East is known to be economically very productive, it has been and still is the cash crop (coffee and cocoa) producer and has the diamond belts of the country. However, the region is located at the farthest distance from the seat of government in the country. The marginalisation might be due to these roads' side biases, which might in part be due to the principal's inability to enforce agents' contract to these services, as a consequence of the location disadvantage.

While public satisfaction with the services varies within and between sectors, the variation is also evident across regions. Again the Eastern region expressed the highest dissatisfaction with all the basic services (Annex B: Table 15). This is expected as the region's facilities are in the poorest state of disrepair compared to the other regions.

## 5.5 Mode and Degree of Community Participation in Basic Services

This section discusses the mode and degrees of community participation in basic services. There is still a marked variation between the regions. A surprising finding is that with the exception of the Western region, Eastern region seems to participate more in joint-decision making and in the provision of these basic services, than the other two regions (Annex B: Table 16). Also the Eastern region tends to demand for information and holds frontline agents accountable relatively more than their Northern and Southern Counterparts (Table 9).

**Table 9: Degree of Community Participation**

<b>Water Supply</b>	East	North	South	West
Demand information	30	19	22	30
Hold Frontline service providers accountable	33	23	27	29
Maintenance	37	58	51	41
<b>Primary Education</b>	East	North	South	West
Demand information	33	23	23	37
Hold Frontline service providers accountable	36	21	32	37
Maintenance	31	56	45	26
<b>Feeder Roads</b>	East	North	South	West
Demand information	27	20	23	29
Hold Frontline service providers accountable	34	19	28	31
Maintenance	39	61	49	40

Understandably, the significantly high participation and inclination to institute transparency and accountability of basic services by households in the Western region might be due to its cosmopolitan nature and the centrality of the region. It is where the seat of the central government is located compared to the remotely located Eastern region. The unexpectedly significant finding that the largely excluded households in basic services are more likely to be proactive towards *participation as an end* and more inclined to holding accountable service providers is amazing.

The findings also significantly demonstrate that the provision of labour and material - a *means to an end* as opposed to an *end-in-itself*, is the most dominant participatory engagement within communities. This finding points to the low level of knowledge and empowerment in participatory engagement at the local level. As shown in Table 8 of this chapter, households barely demand for information and neither do they hold agents accountable compared to participating in maintenance of the facilities in the cases of the Northern and Southern regions. In fact most household in the South hardly demand for better service. This thus provides the necessary rationale for strengthening decentralisation and empowering communities with the bid to improving *voice and accountability* in the delivery of basic services.

## 6. Conclusion, Discussion and Recommendations

This country study on **Governance, Accountability and Effective Service Delivery** in Sierra Leone examined *the latitude with which services are delivered by agents and whether they operate autonomously or are steered by the accountability mechanisms. It also sought to find out how effective the mode of delivery of these basic services in the case of primary education, water supply and feeder roads in Sierra Leone is.* The focus of the analysis for this country study is therefore on *governance actors, accountability mechanisms, differences within, and between sectors and the regions* of the study.

A significant finding in the analysis of governance actors is that in spite of the dominance of the public actors in the delivery of these basic services, there is still diversity within sectors in the provision of these services with the private sector and communities playing a significant role. While PE is still dominated by the public sector as reported by 84% (being the combination of government/government assisted schools), the private sector is gaining significance, accounting for about 16% of households' PE providers in the country as opposed to the 5% in official records (World Bank, 2007; MEST, 2007). In the water supply and feeder roads, the community players are gaining space and momentum accounting for about 58% and 54%, respectively in the delivery of these services, albeit with direct and indirect financing from the government. The contribution of the private sector appears to be driven by the liberal market space and the little tapped business opportunities in the PE and PWS sectors, where demand and supply are not constrained by free public services compared to the roads sector where user fees do not exist. The increase in participation of communities/NGOs in the water sector is as a result of the long and sustained NGO support since the water decade and the availability of appropriate safe water supply technologies for the potable water sector. On the roads sector, the social protection measures - *cash for work* (CfW) programs – aimed at cushioning unemployed youths and vulnerable populations has boosted community participation.

On **Accountability Mechanisms** the study findings reveals that PE governance is over laden by a web of accountability mechanisms at both the central/local government and community levels. The pathway in public governance of PE that has evolved over the years to bring about effective accountability at the demand-side is in practice very long (central - local government/government assisted - supervisors – inspector - head teachers – SMC –

frontline teachers - client). Even though the contribution of the private sector in the delivery of PE is small, its accountability mechanism (owner/proprietor- head teacher - frontline provider -clients) sharply differs from its public counterpart. An assessment of the performance of public/private schools in the NPSE (2010/11) in all regions (Annex B: Table 17) shows that the *private sector irrespective of the incentive structure performed far better than its public counterpart*. This therefore supports the argument in the literature that *shorter accountability mechanisms* are more likely to be *effective and efficient* than the longer routes (GDN, 2010).

However, this finding is unique for PE and therefore does not seem to apply to the water and roads sectors. The accountability mechanism (AM) of potable water supply (PWS) – central/corporations – local government/WASH Inspectors – NGO/water committees – clients -; and feeder roads (central/SLRA-regional engineers/local government/district engineers-roads’ foremen-community/clients) are relatively shorter when compared to private PE delivery system. It is also noteworthy that both the potable water supply and roads are governed by professional engineering agencies that are generally a function of technological capacity for its delivery, unlike PE. It appears therefore that the semi-autonomous public corporation (GVWC/SALWACO) and agency (SLRA) were established by the central government to shorten the accountability mechanism to not only enhance effectiveness and efficiency but to also reduce the *information asymmetric problems* faced by public providers. Whether the shorter accountability route in the water and roads sectors has helped improve service has not been ascertained in this study, as services in most of these agencies’ operational areas are still intermittent and public dissatisfaction is highest in these sectors. Among reasons advanced for the abysmal performances of both public water companies are the lack of trained personnel and accountability systems for a modern water utility, old and inadequate distribution systems, insufficient funding and very low tariffs as against high cost of production (DFID, 2008; UNDP, 2009; Bennett et al, 2011).

The difference between sectors in terms of physical facilities/technologies used and accountability mechanisms is significant but as this study shows the facilities/technologies used have little effect on the governance modalities. Formal institutional structures set up to deliver these basic services appear to be unable to effectively deliver these services. To aid these public institutional arrangements, participatory mechanisms, at community-level have been drawn upon to assist in the delivery of these services. The study finds that all the three sectors (feeder roads, water and PE sectors) have drawn upon these community-based institutions. However, there is insufficient evidence to show that these community-based organizations are capable of holding service providers accountable. Other findings point to serious internal and external problems, which inhibit these CBOs’ ability to hold the primary service providers accountable. These include weak financial base, lack of engagement skills, poor attitude of state agents towards them and certain legal and policy drawbacks such as the Public Order Act of 1965 (Africa Regional Affairs Unit, World Bank, 2007).

In conclusion, this study ascertained the argument in the literature that *shorter accountability mechanisms* are more likely to be *effective and efficient* than the longer routes at the sector level. It was found in the primary education sector that *private sector with shorter accountability mechanisms irrespective of lower incentives is more likely to be effective under similar conditions in the delivery of basic education*. Another unexpected but significant finding is that the largely excluded or marginalised households as the case in the Eastern region are more likely to be proactive towards *participation as an end* and are relatively more inclined to hold accountable service providers.

#### *Recommendations for further Studies*

- i. The unexpectedly significant finding that the largely excluded households in the East are more likely to be more proactive towards participation as an end and



more inclined to holding accountable service providers is very surprising. Especially when viewed against the backdrop of the poor state of facilities and the general dissatisfaction with all the services as was recorded in the region. We therefore recommend further studies that can ascertain or refute the fact that when people are faced with poor service provision, they begin to see their participation in service provision as well as holding service providers accountable as a means to getting better services.

- ii. It appears that the semi-autonomous public corporation (GVWC/SALWACO) and agency (SLRA) were established by the central government to shorten the accountability mechanism in an effort to not only enhance effectiveness and efficiency but to also reduce the information asymmetric problems faced by public providers. The study has not been able to ascertain why the shorter accountability route in the water and roads sectors has been unable to improve service delivery. There is therefore the need for further studies on the effectiveness of public corporation in the delivery of basic services.

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# Annex A

## Questionnaires

### HOUSEHOLD QUESTIONNAIRE

SECTION A: Respondent Characteristics		
Question	Response code	Response
A1. Gender of respondent	1 Male 2 Female	
A2. Age	1. Less than 20 years    2. 20-30 years 3. 31-40 years            4. 41-50 years 5. 51-60 years            6. 61-70 years 7. Above 70 years	
A3. Marital status	1 Single                      4 Widowed 2 Married                   5 Separated 3 Divorced                 6 No response	
A4. What is your relationship to the head of this household?	1. Head 2. Spouse 3. Child 4. Father 5. Mother 6. Other relation	
A5. Main Occupation	1. Student, 18 and above 2. Teacher 3. Business/trader 4. Farmer 5. Fisherman 6. NGO worker 7. House wife 8. Civil Servant 9. Artisan 10. Driver 11. Uniform personnel (military, police) 12. Security/watchman 13. Miner 14. Health worker 15. Unemployed 16. Religious leader 17. Other, specify ----- --	
A6. What is your annual income?	1. Less than Le 500,000 2. Le 500,000 – Le 1000,000 3. Le 1000,001 - Le 1,500,000 4. Le 1,500,001 – Le 2000,000 5. Le 2,000,001 – Le 2,500,000 7. Le 2,500,001 – Le 3,000,000 8. Above Le 3,000,000 9. Don't know	
A7. Highest level of education attained	1. Did not complete Primary School 2. Completed primary school	

	3. O'Level 4. A'Level 5. Completed JSS 6. Completed SSS 7. Vocational/ technical education 8. Completed College 9. Completed University 10. Completed Post-graduate 11. Koranic studies 12. Other, specify ....., 13. None	
A8. How many people are in this household?.....		
A9. How many people depend on you for a living?.....		

Section B				
Access				
Question	Response code			Response
B1. Are these primary public services available in your community?	1. Basic water supply	1. Yes 2. No		
	2. Primary Education			
	3. Feeder roads			
B2. How long have these services been available in this community?	1. Basic water supply.....			
	2. Primary education.....			
	3. Primary roads.....			
B3. What type of service do you have?	1. Water	1. Tap/ Pipe-borne water	1. Yes 2. No	
		2. Hand pump well		
		3. Open well		
	2. Primary education	1. Pre-school/Nursery	1. Yes 2. No	
		2. Primary 1-3		
		3. Primary 1-6		
	3. Feeder road	1. Feeder	1. Yes 2. No	
		2. Trunk road		
		3. Not applicable		
B4. Who provides these services? (Please choose as many options as apply)	1. Water	1. Public servants	1. Yes 2. No	
		2. Community		
		3. NGO		
		4. Private entity		
	2. Primary education	1. Public servants	1. Yes 2. No	
		2. Community		
		3. NGO		
		4. Private entity		
	3. Feeder roads	1. Public servants	1. Yes 2. No	
		2. Community		
		3. NGO		
		4. Private entity		
B5. Do you pay for these services?	1. Water	1. Yes		
	2. Primary education	2. No		
	3. Feeder roads			



B6. How affordable is the service?	1. Water	1 <i>Very affordable</i> 2 <i>Somewhat affordable</i> 3 <i>Unaffordable</i> 4 <i>Very unaffordable</i>	1. Yes 2. No	
	2. Primary education			
	3. Feeder roads			
B7. How long does it take to reach this service?	1. Water point	1. <i>Less than 15min</i> 2. <i>16 to 30min</i> 3. <i>31min to 1hr</i> 4. <i>More than 1hr</i>		
	2. Primary school			
	3. Feeder road			
B8. What is the distance to this service?	1. Water point	1. <i>Less than 1 mile</i> 2. <i>1-3 miles</i> 3. <i>4-6 miles</i> 4. <i>7-9 miles</i> 5. <i>Above 9 miles</i>		
	2. Primary school			
	3. Feeder road			
B9. What is the present state of these facilities?	School buildings	1. <i>In Good state</i> 2. <i>Somewhat good</i> 3. <i>In Poor State</i>		
	Feeder roads			
	Water point			
B10. For how long have they been in this condition?	1. Water point.....			
	2. School buildings.....			
	3. Feeder roads.....			

**Section C**

**Participation and accountability**

Question	Response code		Response	
C1. Do you participate in the provision of any of these services?	1. Water	1. Yes 2. No		
	2. Schools			
	3. Feeder road			
C2. Please explain how you participate?	Water	1. Jointly decide on the type of service desired	1. Yes 2. No	
		2. Consultation/informed		
		3. Contribute local materials		
		4. Provide Labour		
		5. Responsible for the provision of the service		
		6. others		
	School	1. Jointly decide on the type of service desired	1. Yes 2. No	
		2. Consultation/informed		
		3. Contribute local materials		
		4. Provide Labour		
		5. Responsible for the provision of the service		
		6. others		
	Feeder roads	1. Jointly decide on the type of service desired	1. Yes 2. No	
		2. Consultation/informed		
		3. Contribute local materials		

		4. Provide Labour		
		5. Responsible for the provision of the service		
		6. others		
C3. To what extent are you involved in the process of basic delivery of these services?	Water	1. Demand Information	1. Yes 2. No	
		2. Hold Accountable the frontline providers		
		3. Maintenance		
		4. others		
	School	1. Demand Information	1. Yes 2. No	
		2. Hold Accountable the frontline providers		
		3. Maintenance		
		4. others		
	Feeder Road	1. Demand Information	1. Yes 2. No	
		2. Hold Accountable the frontline providers		
		3. Maintenance		
		4. others		
C4. Who do you normally hold accountable for ineffective service delivery?	Water	1. Nobody	1. Yes 2. No	
		2. Frontline Service provider		
		3. Councillor		
		4. Parliamentarian		
	School	1. Nobody	1. Yes 2. No	
		2. Frontline Service provider		
		3. Councillor		
		4. Parliamentarian		
	Feeder road	1. Nobody	1. Yes 2. No	
		2. Frontline Service provider		
		3. Councillor		
		4. Parliamentarian		
C5. Are you aware of any checks and balances by any of these officers?	Water	1. District officers	1. Yes 2. No	
		2. Government Officers		
		3. NGO/CSOs		
	School	1. District officers	1. Yes 2. No	
		2. Government Officers		
		3. NGO/CSOs		
	Feeder road	1. District officers	1. Yes 2. No	
		2. Government Officers		
		3. NGO/CSOs		
C6. Are you aware of any	1. Water Committee	1. Yes		

community based oversight committees?	2. Community Teacher Association (CTA)/School Management Committee (SMC)	2. No 3. Don't know	
	3. Road user committee		
C7a. How effective are these oversight committees?	Water Committee	1 <i>Very effective</i> 2 <i>Effective</i> 3 <i>fairly effective</i> 4. <i>Ineffective</i> 5. <i>Very ineffective</i>	
C7b. Please explain your answer.....			
C7c. How effective are these oversight committees?	2. CTA/SMC	1 <i>Very effective</i> 2 <i>Effective</i> 3 <i>fairly effective</i> 4. <i>Ineffective</i> 5. <i>Very ineffective</i>	
C7d. Please explain your answer.....			
C7e. How effective are these oversight committees?	3. Road user committee/ Project Management Committee (PMC)	1 <i>Very effective</i> 2 <i>Effective</i> 3 <i>fairly effective</i> 4. <i>Ineffective</i> 5. <i>Very ineffective</i>	
C7f. Please explain your answer.....			
C8. Are these services being monitored?	School inspection	1. Yes 2. No	
	Water inspection and treatment		
	Road maintenance and inspection		
C9. Do the frontline service providers provide information about how they conduct their activities to your community?	1. Water	1. Yes 2. No	
	2. Primary education		
	3. Roads		
C10. If yes, how often is this done?	1. Water	1. Monthly 2. Every quarter 3. Every 6 months 4. Yearly 5. Don't know	
	2. Primary education		
	3. Roads		
C11. If yes, how is this done? (Please choose as many options that apply in each case)	1. Water	1. Community bill boards	1. Yes 2. No
		2. Newspapers	
		3. Community meetings	
		4. Loud speaker/ Town Crier announcements	
		5. Announcement in mosques/churches	
		6. Other specify	
	2. Primary education	1. Community bill boards	1. Yes 2. No
		2. Newspapers	
		3. Community meetings	
		4. Loud speaker	

		announcements		
		5. Announcement in mosques/churches		
		6. Other specify		
	3. Roads	1. Community bill boards	1. Yes 2. No	
		2. Newspapers		
		3. Community meetings		
		4. Loud speaker announcements		
		5. Announcement in mosques/churches		
		6. Other specify		
C12. Do you demand for better services for any of the services?	1. Water		1. Yes 2. No	
	2. Primary education			
	3. Roads			
C13. If yes, how do you go about it?	1. Water.....			
	2. Primary education.....			
	3. Roads.....			
C14. Do service providers act on your demands?	1. Water		1. Yes 2. No	
	2. Primary education			
	3. Roads			
C15. How soon do they respond?	1. Promptly 2. Seldom 3. Never			
C16. Is the delivery of services monitored by agencies outside the community?	1. Water		1. Yes 2. No	
	2. Primary education			
	3. Roads			
C17. If yes, who monitors the community based services? <i>(Please choose as many options as are applicable)</i>	1. Water	1. Parliamentarian	1. Yes 2. No	
		2. Councillor		
		3. Ward committee		
		4. Public servant/ Government officer		
		5. NGO/CSO		
	2. Primary education	1. Parliamentarian	1. Yes 2. No	
		2. Councillor		
		3. Ward committee		
		4. Public servant/ Government officer		
		5. NGO/CSO		
	3. Roads	1. Parliamentarian	1. Yes 2. No	
		2. Councillor		
3. Ward committee				
4. Public servant/ Government				

		officer	
		5. NGO/CSO	

<b>Section D</b>			
<b>Community perception of services</b>			
<b>Question</b>		<b>Response code</b>	
<b>Water</b>			
D1. How satisfied are you with your current water supply?		1 <i>Very Satisfied</i> 2 <i>Satisfied</i> 3 <i>Somewhat satisfied</i> 4. <i>unsatisfied</i> 5. <i>Very unsatisfied</i>	
D2. Please give reasons for your answer.....			
D3. Can you obtain water throughout the year from your major water source?		1. <i>cannot get service throughout the year</i> 2. <i>Only few months in the year</i> 3. <i>Yes, the services are always available</i> 4. <i>Other</i> Specify.....	
D4. If water source is not regular, which alternative water source do you use? .....			
D5. Are these diseases prevalent in this community?		1. Diarrhoea 2. Bilharzia 3. River blindness 4. Cholera 5. Typhoid fever 6. Others specify.....	
		1. Yes 2. No	
<b>Question</b>		<b>Response code</b>	
<b>Primary Education</b>			
D7. Do you have any school going child/children in this house?		1. <i>Yes</i> 2. <i>No</i>	
D8. Are there enough teaching and learning materials in the school in your community?		1. <i>Yes</i> 2. <i>No</i> 3. <i>Don't know</i>	
D9. Is there enough furniture in the schools?		1. <i>Yes</i> 2. <i>No</i> 3. <i>Don't know</i>	
D10. Please describe the condition of the furniture in the schools.....			
D11. Are the teachers in the schools regular to school?		1. <i>Yes</i> 2. <i>No</i> 3. <i>Don't know</i>	
D12. How satisfied are you with the schools in your community?		1 <i>Very Satisfied</i> 2 <i>Satisfied</i> 3 <i>Somewhat satisfied</i> 4. <i>unsatisfied</i> 5. <i>Very unsatisfied</i>	
D13. Please explain your answer.....			
<b>Question</b>		<b>Response code</b>	
<b>Feeder Roads</b>			
D14. Are the roads in and around your community easily accessible by vehicles?		1. <i>Yes</i> 2. <i>No</i>	
D15. How would you describe the nature of the roads in your		1. <i>Very motorable (easily accessible)</i> 2. <i>Motorable (with difficulty)</i>	

community?	3. <i>Not motorable</i> 4. <i>Seasonal</i>		
D16. How long have they been in this condition?			
D17. How well do the roads serve you in the following areas?			
D17_1: Access to markets	1. Very well 2. Well 3. Average 4. Poorly 5. Very poorly 6. No effect		
D17_2: Please explain your answer.....			
D17_3: Access to health service	1. Very well 2. Well 3. Average 4. Poorly 5. Very poorly 6. No effect		
D17_4: Please explain your answer.....			
D18. How satisfied are you with the quality of roads in your community?	1 <i>Very Satisfied</i> 2 <i>Satisfied</i> 3 <i>Somewhat satisfied</i> 4. <i>unsatisfied</i> 5. <i>Very unsatisfied</i>		
D19. Please explain your answer.....			

EXPERT INTERVIEWS

**BACKGROUND RESEARCH QUESTIONS**

The background research questions will attempt to explore theoretical/conceptual underpinnings, problematic and contextual issues and seeks to deal with:

- *Why, how and what was/is or should be the state of basic service delivery in a country like Sierra Leone?*
- *Is there any significant difference in the way primary services are delivered in the various governance eras - post-independence (1961 – 1973), Republican (1973 -92), Junta and the War-democracy (1992 – 2002) and in post-war – contemporary governance*

The enquiry for this section of the study is explorative and will draw on qualitative thinking. The hypothesis to be tested here is:

- *There are no significant differences in public service delivery in the three governance eras.*

**The sources of information will be literature and expert interviews.**

**1. Public Perception of Basic Service Delivery**

1.1. How do you perceive the condition of the governance eras stated below for the delivery of basic service, in particular primary education, portable water supply and feeder? Please explain your answers.

No	Governance Era	State of Governance	Score	Please explain your scores
1	Post-independence (1961 – 1973)	1. Good governance 2. Somewhat good 3. Bad Governance		
2	Republican and One-party Autocratic rule (1973 -92)			
3	Junta and the War-democracy (1992 – 2002)			
4	post-war – contemporary governance			

1.2. In your view, how do you perceive the state of basic service delivery now in terms of Access and Quality compared to 1992 and to date?

No	Basic Service Studied	State of Governance	Score	Please explain your scores
1	Primary Education	1. Much improved 2. Somewhat improved 3. Remain the Same 4. Not improved		
2	Portable Water Supply			
3	Feeder Roads			

1.3. Is there any significant difference in the way these primary services were and are delivered in the various governance eras?

No	Governance Era	State of Governance	Score	Please Explain your Answer
1	Post-independence (1961 – 1973)	1. Yes – better service 2. No poor service 3. Don't Know		
2	Republican and One-party Autocratic rule (1973 -92)			
3	Junta and the War-democracy (1992 – 2002)			
4	post-war – contemporary governance			



1.4. Do political parties and individual politicians during these eras interfere with basic service delivery?

No	Governance Era	State of Governance (MR)	Score: 1. Yes 2. No 3. Don't Know	1	2	3	4
1	Post-independence (1961 – 1973)	1. in the decisions of planning, 2. in the selection of projects, 3. concessionaires and allocation of construction and maintenance contracts for basic service delivery, 4. supervisory and regulatory agencies					
2	Republican and One-party Autocratic rule (1973 - 92)						
3	Junta and the War-democracy (1992 – 2002)						
4	post-war – contemporary governance						

1.5. Do they promote or block particular reform initiatives for effective services delivery? 1. Yes 2. No

1.6. If yes through which channels?

.....

1.7. What effect does this have on basic service delivery?.....

1.8. Are you aware of any literature that describes the type of service delivery during these eras? 1. Yes 2: No

1.9. If yes, please provide references of these literatures, if any.

## 2. RELATIONSHIPS AND INTERACTIONS BETWEEN AND AMONG STAKEHOLDERS

2.1 What forms of relationship exist between the principal (that is, government agencies/ministers etc)-agent (service provider) -client (beneficiary) during these eras?

No	Governance Era	State of Governance (MR)	Score: 1. Yes 2. No 3. Don't Know	1	2	3	4	5
1	Post-	1. Participator						

	independence (1961 – 1973)	y, 2. Transparent 3. Accountabl e, 4. Central Control 5. Regimental						
2	Republican and One-party rule (1973 -92)							
3	Junta and the War-democracy (1992 – 2002)							
4	post-war – contemporary governance							

Please explain the relationship:

1. Post-independence (1961 – 1973).....

2. Republican and One-party rule (1973 - 92).....

3. Junta and the War-democracy (1992 – 2002).....

4. Post-war – contemporary governance.....

**To what extent do you agree with the following statement with regards to the governance of basic delivery under the various governance eras?**

Score: 1. Agree 2. Disagree 3. Don't Know 4. Agree to some extent

No.	Good Governance Indicators	Governance Eras			
		Post-independence (1961 – 1973)	Republican and One-Party Rule (1974 – 1992)	Junta and War Democracy (1992 – 2003)	Post-War and Contemporary Decentralise and democratic Governance (2004 – Date)
<b>1</b>	<b>Effectiveness:</b>				
1.1	Basic services such as primary, water supply				

	and feeder roads where accessible to most population then compared to now?				
1.2	The Quality of Service was better then?				
1.2.1	Service delivery was regular				
1.3	The delivery of service was more effective in terms of supervision and oversight of agents?				
1.4	Public Agent/service provider performance was better				
1.5	Moral of service provider and Agent was High				
1.6	Public satisfaction was high				
1.7	Supplies are available and on time				
1.8	Good Customer care				
<b>2</b>	<b>Efficiency</b>				
2.1	Basic Services is delivered more cost effectively				
2.2	Open Market approach is used in the overall delivery of service				
2.3	The cost of service is affordable				
2.4	Client use less time to access the service				
2.5	Service Delivery Resources are managed Judiciously				
2.4	Corruption among service providers is low				
<b>3.</b>	<b>Accountability</b>				
3.1	The service provider/Agent Account to Principal				
3.2	Principal do hold Agent Accountable				
3.3	The service provider/Agent Account to end-users				

3.4	End-user do hold Agent Accountable				
3.5	End-user do hold Principal Accountable				
4	Transparency				
4.1	Dissemination of information done regularly and to all functionaries and stakeholders by the agent and principal on basic service delivery (BSD)				
4.2	Sharing of information with end-users done regularly by principal and agent				
<b>5.</b>	<b>Participation</b>				
5.1	End-users/Community participation in Planning of BSD				
5.2	Community-based Committees exist to support BSD				
5.3	Community Participates in the Supervision of BSD				

**FRONT LINE SERVICE PROVIDER (AGENTS) QUESTIONNAIRE**

The second set of questions will seek to address operational or functional issues or problem of principal-agent-client in the practice of service delivery focussing on the contemporary service delivery with **democratic governance and decentralisation** as given.

The hypotheses to be tested are:

- The relationship between principal-agent-client is mutually inclusive
- There is a good system of check and balance between *principal-agent-client* and verse versa
- People’s participation is very high
- There are no significant difference in the governance of the three primary sectors of the study

This enquiry will draw on both quantitative and qualitative enquiry and will use semi-structure questionnaires

**1. STAKEHOLDERS IN THE DELIVERY OF BASIC PUBLIC SERVICES**

1.1 What form of basic services does your agency deliver and who is/are the principal(s)?

Sectors	Type of Principal code	Answer
Public Primary Education	1. Ministry of Education Science and Technology (MEST) 2. District Ministry of Education Science and Technology (DMEST) 3. District Council /Ward Committee 4. Communities 5. Others Specify .....	

Potable water Supply	1. Ministry of Energy and Water Resources (MEWR) 2. District Ministry of Energy and Water Resources (DMEWR) 3. District Council /Ward Committee 4. Communities 5. NGOs 6. Others Specify .....	
Feeder roads	1. Ministry of Works Housing and Infrastructure (MWHI) 2. Sierra Leone Roads Authority 3. District Council /Ward Committee 4. Communities 5. Others Specify ...	

1.3 What service do you deliver as a service provider?

Sectors	Construction	Maintenance/repairs	Delivering/Managing the service
Primary Education			
Potable water Supply			
Feeder roads			

1.4 Do you have performance targets in the delivery of basic services? 1. Yes 2. No

1.4.1 If yes, are you able to meet your set targets? 1. Yes 2. No

If yes, please explain your

answer.....

1.4.2 If no, why

not?.....

**2. RELATIONSHIPS AND INTERACTIONS BETWEEN AND AMONG STAKEHOLDERS**

2.1 What forms of relationship exist between you as a service provider and your employer?

- 1. Strong in terms of regular supervision and Monitoring
- 2. Weak in terms of irregular supervision and Monitoring

2.2 Are there any sanctions levelled against you (the service provider) in case you fail to deliver?

- 1. Yes 2. No

2.2.1 Are these always followed? 1. Yes 2. No

2.2.2 If yes how is this done? .....

2.2.3 If no, why not?

.....

2.3 What kinds of rules and regulations govern the relationship between you (the service provider) and your employer?

.....

2.4 What kinds of rules and regulations govern the relationship between you (the service provider) and those you provide the service for?

.....

**3. PERCEPTION OF EFFECTIVENESS/EFFICIENCY**

1.1 How do you perceive the effectiveness of the service you deliver in producing the desired results?

- 1. Very effective
- 2. Effective
- 3. Somewhat effective
- 4. Not effective

3.2 Please explain your answer.....

3.3 Do you think beneficiaries are satisfied with the services you provide?

- 1. Yes
- 2. No

3.4 How do you know?.....

**4. ACCOUNTABILITY**

4.1 Are there any systems of supervision, monitoring and annual evaluations of your performance?

- 1. Yes
- 2. No (skip to 4.4)

4.2. If yes how are the findings /feedback sent to you?

.....

4.3 To what extent have these (supervision, monitoring and annual evaluations) influenced your delivery of services?

.....

4.4 If no, why?.....

4.5. How is your performance evaluated?

4.6. Are there avenues through which beneficiaries of your services are able to channel their complaints? 1. Yes 2. No

4.7. If so, how effective are they?

- 1. Very effective
- 2. Effective
- 3. Somewhat effective
- 4. Not effective

4.8. If no to 4.6, why not?  
.....

**Post-War and Contemporary Decentralised and Democratic Governance (2004 – Date)**

No.	Governance Indicators	Score:
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		<b>1. Agree</b> <b>2. Disagree</b> <b>3. Don't Know</b>
<b>5</b>	<b>Effectiveness:</b>	
5.1	Basic services such as primary, water supply and feeder roads are accessible to most populations now compared to 1990.	
5.2	The Quality of Service of primary education, water supply and feeder roads is good	
5.3	Provision of Basic Service delivery is regular	
5.4	Supervision and oversight of service providers is done regularly	
5.5	Public service provider performance is good	
5.6	Morale (confidence) of service provider high	
5.7	Public satisfaction for basic service delivery is high	
5.8	Basic Supplies for the delivery of services are available and on time	
5.9	Customer care is good	
5.10	Service facilities are maintain regularly	
5.11	Feedback on supervision is provided as and when supervision is done	
<b>6</b>	<b>Efficiency</b>	
6.1	Basic Services is delivered more cost effectively now compared to 1990	
6.2	Open Market approach is used in the overall delivery of service	
6.3	The cost of service is affordable now compared to 1990	
6.4	Beneficiaries use less time to access the service	
6.5	Resources for the delivery of services are managed judiciously	
6.6	Corruption among service providers is low now compared to 1990	
<b>7.</b>	<b>Accountability</b>	
7.1	The service provider accounts to employers for all the services delivered	
7.2	Employers do hold service providers accountable	
7.3	The service providers account to beneficiaries (end-users)	
7.4	Beneficiaries do hold service providers accountable	
7.5	Beneficiaries do hold employers of service providers accountable	
<b>8</b>	<b>Transparency</b>	
8.1	Dissemination of information is done regularly to all	

	functionaries and stakeholders by the service providers and their employers on basic service delivery (BSD)	
8.2	Sharing of information with beneficiaries done regularly by the service providers and their employers.	
<b>9.</b>	<b>Participation</b>	
9.1	Beneficiaries/Community participation in the planning of basic service delivery	
9.2	Community-based Committees exist to support basic service delivery	
9.3	Community Participates in the Supervision of basic service delivery	
9.4	Women and Youths are involved in decisions regarding basic service delivery at the community level	

### PRINCIPALS QUESTIONNAIRE

The second set of questions will seek to address operational or functional issues or problem of principal-agent-client in the practice of service delivery focussing on the contemporary service delivery with **democratic governance and decentralisation** as given.

The hypotheses to be tested are:

- The relationship between principal-agent-client is mutually inclusive
- There is a good system of check and balance between *principal-agent-client* and verse versa
- People's participation is very high
- There are no significant difference in the governance of the three primary sectors of the study

This enquiry will draw on both quantitative and qualitative enquiry and will use semi-structure questionnaires

### STAKEHOLDERS IN THE DELIVERY OF BASIC PUBLIC SERVICES

1.1.1 What form of basic services does your agency deliver and who is/are the principal(s)?

Sectors	Type of Principal	Code
Public Primary Education	1. Ministry of Education Science and Technology (MEST) 2. District Council/Ward Committee 3. Communities 4. Other, Specify.....	
Potable water Supply	1. Ministry of Energy and Water Resources (MEWR)/ Ministry of Health and Sanitation (MHS) 2. District Council/ Ward Committee 3. Communities	



	4. NGOs 5. Other, Specify .....	
Feeder roads	1. MWHI 2. Sierra Leone Roads Authority (SLRA) 3. District Council /Ward Committee 4. Communities 5. Other, Specify .....	

1.1.2 Do you engage the services of an agent in the delivery of these services? 1. Yes 2. No

1.1.3 If yes, what is the contractual relationship with this agent?  
 1. Decentralization Act (Devolve Function without employment contract)  
 2. Employee agreement  
 3. Contractor  
 4. Other Specify ....

1.1.4 Do you have performance targets in the delivery of basic services? 1. Yes 2. No

1.1.5 If yes, are you able to meet your set targets? 1. Yes 2. No

1.1.6 Please explain your answer.....

**2. PERCEPTION OF EFFECTIVENESS/EFFICIENCY**

2.1 Are there any standards/ policies that determine the effectiveness of basic service delivery? 1. Yes 2. No

2.1.1 If yes, which ones

2.1.2 If no, why not

2.2 How do you perceive the effectiveness of Service delivery?

1. Very effective
2. Effective
3. Somewhat effective
4. Not effective

2.2.1 Please explain your answer.....

2.3. Are there any systems of supervision, monitoring and annual evaluations of the performance of the people you employ to carry out basic service delivery? 1. Yes 2. No

2.3.1 If yes how do you send feedback to the service providers?

2.3.2 To what extent has this feedback influenced the performance of the service providers?

1. To a very large extent

- 2. To a large extent
- 3. To a small extent
- 4. To a very small extent
- 5. No effect

2.3.3 Please explain your answer

2.4. Are there avenues for beneficiaries' complaints? 1. Yes 2. No

2.5. If yes, how effective are they?

- 1. Very effective
- 2. Effective
- 3. Somewhat effective
- 4. Not effective

2.6. If no, Why not?.....

**1. Post-War and Contemporary Decentralised and Democratic Governance (2004 – Date)**

No.	Governance Indicators	Score: 1. Agree 2. Disagree 3. Don't Know
<b>3</b>	<b>Effectiveness:</b>	
3.1	Basic services such as primary, water supply and feeder roads are accessible to most populations now compared to 1990.	
3.2	The Quality of Service of primary education, water supply and feeder roads is good	
3.3	Provision of Basic Service delivery is regular	
3.4	Supervision and oversight of service providers is done regularly	
3.5	Public service provider performance is good	
3.6	Morale (confidence) of service provider high	
3.7	Public satisfaction for basic service delivery is high	
3.8	Basic Supplies for the delivery of services are available and on time	
3.9	Customer care is good	
3.10	Service facilities are maintain regularly	
3.11	Feedback on supervision is provided as and when supervision is done	
<b>4</b>	<b>Efficiency</b>	
4.1	Basic Services is delivered more cost effectively now compared to 1990	

4.2	Open Market approach is used in the overall delivery of service	
4.3	The cost of service is affordable now compared to 1990	
4.4	Beneficiaries use less time to access the service	
4.5	Resources for the delivery of services are managed judiciously	
4.6	Corruption among service providers is low now compared to 1990	
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<b>6</b>	<b>Transparency</b>	
6.1	Dissemination of information is done regularly to all functionaries and stakeholders by the service providers and their employers on basic service delivery (BSD)	
6.2	Sharing of information with beneficiaries done regularly by the service providers and their employers.	
<b>7.</b>	<b>Participation</b>	
7.1	Beneficiaries/Community participation in the planning of basic service delivery	
7.2	Community-based Committees exist to support basic service delivery	
7.3	Community Participates in the Supervision of basic service delivery	
7.4	Women and Youths are involved in decisions regarding basic service delivery at the community level	

## Annex B

**Table 1: Availability of Service providers in the Water sector**

District	Public (%)	Community/NGO (%)	Private entity (%)
Kenema	28	57	15
Kono	7	79	14
Bombali	6	77	17
Koinadugu	7	67	26
Bo	18	69	13
Pujehun	28	46	26
Western Rural	18	58	24
Western Urban	78	15	7
<b>Average</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>58.5</b>	<b>17.5</b>

Source: CESPA EPSD Data Collection Survey 2010

**Table 2: Service Providers in the Roads Sector**

Districts	Public sector	Community/NGO	Private entity
Kenema	52	42	6
Kono	64	33	3
Bombali	6	92	2
Koinadugu	21	76	3
Bo	33	64	3
Pujehun	41	54	5
Western Rural	55	43	2
Western Urban	83	10	7
<b>Average</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>4</b>

Source: CESPA EPSD Data Collection Survey 2010

**Table 3: Affordability of Primary Education by Service Provider**

	Public sector (%)	Government Assisted (%)	Private entity (%)
Very affordable	49	44.5	46
Somewhat affordable	48	51.5	53
Unaffordable	3	4.5	1
Very Unaffordable	0	0	0

Source: CESPA EPSD Data Collection Survey 2010

**Table 4: Fees Charged by Some Private Schools**

Name of Private Schools	Fees per term/Quarter
International Primary School, Freetown	Le800,000
International Pentecostal Holiness Primary School, Calabatown, Freetown	Le35,000.
Awarda Primary School, Bo, Bo District	Le250,000
SOS, Primary School, Bo, Bo District	Le380,000
Every Nation Academy, Makeni, Bombali District	Le121,000
Public Primary Schools	Free

Source: Chief Informant

**Table 5: Water sources by district**

	Tap/Pipe borne water	Hand pump well	Open well
Kenema	20	40	40
Kono	31	43	26
Bombali	11	41	48
Koinadugu	16	19	65
Bo	5	42	53
Pujehun	0	58	42
Western Rural	27	46	27
Western Urban	76	7	17
Average	23	37	40

**Table 6: Satisfaction with Water Supply**

Indicator	Public service	Community/NGO	Private entity
Very Satisfied	13	20.5	15
Satisfied	33	28.5	32
Somewhat Satisfied	36	27.5	37
Unsatisfied	16	17.5	14
Very Unsatisfied	2	6	2

Source: CESPA EPSD Data Collection Survey 2010

**Table 7: Feeder Roads Sub-Sector's Governance Relationship**

Potable Water Supply Sub-Sector	Stakeholders	Governance Type	Basis of the governance relationship
<b>Principals</b>	1. Ministry of Public Works and Infrastructure	Central Authority	Statutory Governmental Mandate
	2. Ministry of Local Government and Community Development	Partnership in the devolution of Road's maintenance and Feeder Roads	Statutory – Decentralisation Act (2004)
	3. Local Governments/ District councils,	Partnership in the devolution of Road's maintenance and Feeder Roads.	Statutory – Decentralisation Act (2004)
<b>Formal Agents</b>	The Sierra Leone's Roads Authority	Professional Agency	SLRA Act (1993)
<b>Sub-agents</b>	Contractors	Private Roads Construction Companies	Market
<b>Informal Agent</b>	CBOs and communities	Informal partnership	Unregulated independent groups and communities

Source: CESPA's VG-ESD Literature review 2011

**Table 8: Remuneration of Teachers by the Government and Different Private Schools**

Agents	Public (Government/Assisted Schools)	Private 1 (International Pentecostal Holiness Primary Sch., (IPHPS) Freetown)	Private 2 (Every Nation Academy Primary Sch., (ENAPS) Makeni)	Private 3 (Awards Primary Sch., Bo)
Head Teacher	Le800,000	Le250,000	Le900,000	Le1,200,000.
Assist Head	Le735,000	Le200,000	Le820,000	- -
Qualified Teacher (TC)	Le440,000	Le170,000	Le500,000	Le500,000
Qualified Teacher (HTC)	Le552,000	- -	Le500,000	Le700,000

Source: Chief Informant Interviews

**Table 9: Incentive for the Agents in the Water Supply Sector**

Agent	GVWC	WSD	SALWACO
Area/ Regional engineer	1,986,000	635,500.00	2,286,000
Supervisors/senior technician/WASH supervisor	950,000	300-200,000	750,000
Technician foreman	850,00		- -
Technician mains layer/ Pipe fitter/ plumber	700,000		500,000
Assistant pipe fitter/ mains layer	400,000		- -

Source: Chief Informants interviews

**Table 10: Incentive of Service providers' Agents of Feeder Roads**

Agent	SLRA	Contractors	CfW
Regional Engineer	2,500,000	- -	- -
District Engineers	1,500,000	1,200,000	- -
Foreman	750,000	900,000	500,000
Technicians (Masons)	500,000	500,000	400,000
Labourers	300,000	300,000	225,000

Source Chief Informants

**Table 11: Availability/Effectiveness of Community Teacher Associations (CTA)**

Description	Public sector	Government Assisted	Private entity
Availability	68	40.5	26
Very effective	25	33.5	23
Effective	65	46.5	66
Fairly effective	7	18	9
Ineffective	2	3	1
Very effective	1	1	1
<b>Water Committees</b>			
Indicator	Public sector	Community/NGO	Private entity
Availability	39	57.5	31
Very effective	18	25.5	33
Effective	49	43.5	39
Fairly effective	24	16	16
Ineffective	6	9	9
Very effective	3	6	3

Source: CESPA EPSD Data Collection Survey 2010

**Table 12: Availability/Effectiveness of Road Committees**

Indicator	Public sector	Community/NGO	Private entity
Availability	45	53.5	44
Very effective	7	12	0
Effective	31	20.5	22
Fairly effective	30	30	44
Ineffective	21	26	17
Very ineffective	11	11.5	17

Source: EPSD Survey Data 2010

**Table 13: Community Participation in the Delivery of Basic Services**

	Public sector	Community/NGO	Private entity
<b>Water Supply Services</b>			
Jointly decide on the type of service desired	12	16.5	15
Consulted/Informed	23	13	12
Contribute local materials	22	27	27
Provide labour	31	31.5	31
Responsible for the provision of the service	12	12	15
<b>Primary Education Service</b>			
Jointly decide on the type of service desired	22	18	26
Consulted/Informed	22	16.5	31
Contribute local materials	23	27.5	17
Provide labour	23	31.5	18
Responsible for the provision of the service	9	7.5	8
<b>feeder roads services</b>			
Jointly decide on the type of service desired	10	12.5	11
Consulted/Informed	19	11.5	13
Contribute local materials	22	27.5	23
Provide labour	34	35.5	36
Responsible for the provision of the service	15	13	17

Source: EPSD Survey Data 2010



**Table 14: Public Satisfaction with Basic Service Delivery by Region**

<b>water supply</b>	East	North	South	West	<b>Average</b>
Very Satisfied	11	29	15	11	<b>16.5%</b>
Satisfied	22	12	35	38	<b>26.75</b>
Somewhat Satisfied	32	27	29	31	<b>29.75</b>
Unsatisfied	18	26	19	19	<b>20.5</b>
Very Unsatisfied	17	6	2	1	<b>6.5</b>
<b>Primary Education</b>	East	North	South	West	
Very satisfied	3	2	8	7	<b>5</b>
Satisfied	36	54	53	52	<b>48.75</b>
Somewhat satisfied	48	34	38	38	<b>39.5</b>
Not satisfied	13	10	1	3	<b>6.75</b>
Very Unsatisfied	0	0	0	0	<b>0</b>
<b>feeder roads</b>	East	North	South	West	
Very satisfied	0	19	3	4	<b>6.5</b>
Satisfied	3	7	18	24	<b>13</b>
Somewhat satisfied	18	23	22	32	<b>23.75</b>
Unsatisfied	50	31	46	37	<b>41</b>
Very Unsatisfied	29	20	11	3	<b>15.75</b>

Source EPSD Survey Data 2010

**Table 15: State of Basic Physical Facilities by Region**

<b>Water</b>	East	North	South	West
In good state	13	33	58	39
Somewhat Good	57	47	32	50
In Poor state	30	20	10	11
<b>Education</b>	East	North	South	West
In good state	15	56	55	41
Somewhat Good	51	35	30	50
In Poor state	34	9	15	9
<b>Roads</b>	East	North	South	West
In good state	2	25	6	26
Somewhat Good	25	24	46	51
In Poor state	73	51	48	23

Source: CESPA EPSD Data Collection Survey 2010

**Table 16: Mode of Community Participation in Service Delivery**

<b>Water Supply</b>	East	North	South	West
Jointly decide on type of service	20	12	9	27
Consulted/ Informed	17	13	6	4
Contribute local materials	22	31	36	20
Provide labour	24	37	40	35
Provide service	17	7	9	14
<b>Primary Education</b>	East	North	South	West
Jointly decide on type of service	22	14	13	30
Consulted/ Informed	21	19	12	28
Contribute local materials	23	30	34	17
Provide labour	26	35	34	14
Provide service	8	2	7	11
<b>Feeder Roads</b>	East	North	South	West
Jointly decide on type of service	12	12	7	14
Consulted/ Informed	21	11	6	23
Contribute local materials	21	30	29	21
Provide labour	29	37	40	29
Provide service	17	10	18	13

Source: CESPA EPSD Data Collection Survey 2010

**Table 17: Performance of Selected Government, government Assisted and Private Schools in**

Schools	Pupil Entered	No. Female Passes	No. Male Passes	School Average Pass Scores(Government Minimum Score: 225)
<b>Eastern Region, KENEMA DISTRICT</b>				
<b>Government Primary Schools</b>				
DEC , KENEMA	28	9	15	<b>190</b>
DEC, DAMA	76	19	24	<b>193</b>
<b>Government Assisted</b>				
SLMB KENEMA	77	22	18	<b>195</b>
SDA, KENEMA	192	73	42	<b>198</b>
<b>Private Schools</b>				
SAM-ETA PR. SC. KENEMA	10	4	2	<b>306</b>
CO. CRIST PR. SC. KENEMA	53	20	9	<b>245</b>
<b>Western Area, Freetown</b>				
<b>Government Schools</b>				
Tower Hill Municipal pr.sc	137	42	47	<b>288</b>
EAST END Municipality	193	59	48	<b>267</b>
<b>Government Assisted</b>				
St. Joseph primary, F/town	227	138	0	<b>255</b>
HIZBULA primary school	25	4	5	<b>228</b>
<b>Private Schools</b>				
Tower Hill Kindergarten	38	22	1	<b>328</b>
TINY TOTS P. SC	9	3	3	<b>297</b>
<b>Southern Region, Bo District</b>				
<b>Government Schools</b>				
DEC, BO	32	8	7	<b>223</b>
DEC. BUMPEH	33	13	13	<b>265</b>
<b>Government Assisted</b>				
Meth.Pr.SC,BO	82	27	19	<b>257</b>
Ahm. Pri. Bo	88	27	29	<b>243</b>
<b>Private Schools</b>				
BTC. EXP. BO	43	8	13	<b>259</b>
EV.NATION AC.	19	3	6	<b>271</b>
<b>Northern Region, Bombali District</b>				
<b>Government Schools</b>				
BDEC school Matetie	56	10	25	<b>270</b>
BDEC, Madina	29	11	9	<b>248</b>
<b>Government Assisted</b>				
SLMBO, MAENI	84	22	24	<b>236</b>
RC PRIM KABOMBEH	19	5	6	<b>261</b>
<b>Private Schools</b>				
Henry Dundant Prm. School	18	3	7	<b>277</b>
EVERY NATION ACADEMY	53	15	15	<b>280</b>